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Preface
Foreign sales have become basic to U.S. farmers' economic health and to
the future growth of U.S. agriculture. Growth in foreign markets for U.S.
products helps strengthen the dollar and helps hold down costs of im-
ports. However, expanding trade is a two-edged sword. Greater reliance
on foreign markets results in greater instability and uncertainty. Factors
largely beyond our control—politics, economics, and weather in the rest
of the world—become our problems and strongly influence our export
sales.
Our expanded reliance on foreign sales points out that successful
agricutural policy is a close-knit combination of domestic and interna-
tional policy. This already complex picture becomes more complicated
when long-term issues are considered. For example, how should U.S.
trade policy deal with efforts of the world to feed itself? How should we
respond to the "new international economic order" being forged by
developing nations? What about U.S. food aid and other development
assistance?
Compared to the complicated policy environment in which agricul-
tural trade occurs, the purpose of this publication is modest. Speaking of
Trade: Its Effect on Agriculture was developed as a reference text in the
agricultural trade and trade policy areas. It does not examine complex
trade policy issues in full detail; rather, it offers the interested reader a
good starting point from which further study might proceed. A thorough
knowledge of basics is a prerequisite to understanding complex issues.
Chapter 1 provides historical perspective on the development of
international trading relationships, institutions developed to facilitate
trade, and U.S. trade policy. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a set of economic
ideas that help explain the gains and trade-offs from trade. Chapter 2
focuses on theory of trade between nations and examines reasons under-
lying protectionist policies and their economic consequences. Chapter 3
focuses on the link between international trade and domestic agricultur-
al policy. It provides an analytical basis and a review of the policies
various nations have taken with regard to trade and domestic policy.
Chapter 4 deals with international commodity agreements. Nations im-
porting and exporting agricultural commodities show increasing interest
in such agreements as means to achieve policy objectives. Chapter 5
provides an overview of major commodity flows and how they have
changed in recent years. Issues likely to occupy the attention of policY"
makers in the future are discussed in the final chapter. A glossary at the
end will help familiarize the reader with many economic terms used
throughout the publication.
We believe Speaking of Trade: Its Effect on Agriculture will be
useful to everyone who teaches in the trade policy area, whether ext
sion specialists, classroom teachers, community leaders, or public off1.-
cials. Additional teaching and learning are required for successful poll-
cymaking. This publication will contribute to those efforts.
Martin K. Christiansen
Extension Economist in
Agricultural PolicY
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Introduction
The political and economic framework for world trade is discussed in
this chapter. The introductory sections review some history of world and
U.S. trade. Because today's trade problems, policies, and systems have
evolved from past problems and actions, a look at earlier systems and
I'vhY they became inadequate provides a basis for understanding the
Present.
The principal focus of this chapter is a discussion of the foundations
of the contemporary world economic system. This includes monetary
and. trade arrangements in the post-World War II period and major inter-
ndational and regional organizations and institutions which regulate and
ete. rm.. me imports and exports. The chapter also summarizes U.S. trade
Policies and agricultural policies affecting trade.
We selected topics to include in this chapter on the basis of theirtizrtrtande.ce to an understanding of the forces impinging on U.S. agricul-
Historical Roots
Trade among peoples in different lands began thousands of years ago as asim-ple, loosely structured system. By the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuriesindianaci during colonial expansion, huge business firms (e.g., East
Hudson Bay companies) and money, exchange, and credit
markets emerged to facilitate trade and settlement.
Attha
ttime, governments supported trade to obtain gold to pay for
exploratory voyages and for wars to protect settlement and trading opera-
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tions. Hence, they encouraged exports, and imports were discouraged or
prohibited. These goals and the means to achieve them became known as
"mercantilism." The idea that imports could raise domestic consump-
tion levels and thereby be beneficial was not recognized.
Mercantilistic ideas began to recede in the 1800s as the fruits of the
industrial revolution spread. Many raw materials needed for expanding
factory production had to be imported. Markets for the burgeoning out-
put were sought around the globe. Trade volume mushroomed.
Significant moves toward more liberal trade occurred from the mid-
1800s until World War I. Goods and capital flowed among nations with
few barriers. Former tariff walls in Europe were lowered, and cheaper
imports allowed nations to raise living standards. Economic arguments
favoring free trade supported the movement. The period is known as an
era of liberal trade.
The Gold Standard
The stability of currency exchange rates among trading nations facili-
tated trade expansion. Stabilization was achieved through the operation
of the "gold standard." Values of national currencies were defined in
terms of gold, linking them to one another. Since the value of transactions
in any currency tied to gold was assured, a multilateral system of interna-
tional payments could operate. Monetary institutions in London (then
the financial center of the world) developed and managed credit and
investment mechanisms to aid the flow of goods and of capital and to
maintain exchange rate stability.1
International stability was achieved by adjustments within nations.
The adjustment process operated through money supplies which were
tied to national gold supplies. Increasing or decreasing the national gold
supply exerted inflationary and deflationary pressures, respectively, on a
nation's economy. The consequent price and income adjustments led to
shifts in demand and supply schedules for imports and exports of goods,
services, and capital. For example, if a nation's imports and exports
resulted in a negative balance of payments (the country imported more
than it exported), the deficit was made up by exporting gold. The reduced
gold supply caused deflationary adjustments until imports and exports
were brought into balance. (Or, more often, governments prevented gold
outflow by reducing money supplies with other deflationary tools.) The
resulting flow of goods, services, and capital was consistent with stable
exchange rates and no gold flow. Thus, adjustments to international
market changes were achieved by variations in price, output, and em-
ployment of each nation's domestic economy.
The gold standard was regarded as a self-regulating mechanism. To
the extent that money supplies were tied to gold and that governments
allowed their citizens to bear the burden of adjustment, it was true. In this
period monetary managers did control domestic credit to maintain stable
exchange rates. This did not create severe domestic problems because no
great corrections were required.
The delicate international balance that permitted the gold standard to
function was totally disrupted by World War I. But even before the war,
the gold standard was under pressure. The direct correlation between
gold stocks and money supplies eroded as nations developed more elabo-
'In time, British pounds (sterling) became more widely usecr than gold as an international money. It could be
redeemed for gold, so its value was assured. This system is known as a "gold-sterling exchange standard."
rate credit systems. And, as trade sectors became larger and larger com-
ponents of nations' economies, controlling credit to maintain stable
exchange rates placed restrictions on economic growth that created se-
vere domestic unemployment. When the internal consequences became
politically unacceptable, the gold standard was dropped as the means of
equilibrating international trade accounts.
Early U.S. Developments
From the colonial period to World War I, the U.S. developed from a
frontier society into the world's leading industrial nation. As might be
expected, U.S. trade policies reflected the changing internal and external
conditions the new nation experienced.
At the close of the American Revolution most political leaders fa-
vored free trade, but because revenue was needed a tariff was enacted in
1789. The tariff lacked national consensus, however.
The North suffered competition in the export market for manufac-
tured goods and wanted tariff levels high enough to provide protection.
Meanwhile, the South favored free trade to encourage exports of its farm
produce. The changing influence of these two regions on government
decision making led to periodic shifts between liberal and protective
trade policies. The Tariff Act of 1816 became the first tariff legislation to
declare "protection" as an aim.
Between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of World War I,
the United States enjoyed rapid economic growth. The country contin-
ued as a major producer and exporter of farm products. (It is interesting to
note that the outpouring of grains from North America depressed Europe-
an prices, leading to demands for protection by many European farmers.
However, Denmark and the Netherlands responded differently. Instead
of erecting tariff walls, these nations retained free trade policies and
transformed their agricultures from crop to livestock production.)
Meanwhile, the conflict between liberal and protectionist advocates
kept trade policies and tariffs fluctuating. By and large, import duties
remained high. They reached their highest level with the passage of the
Dingley Tariff of 1897. This was in the midst of a liberal trade era in
Europe.
The Interwar Years: 1918-1940
Because of its global impact, World War I drastically altered production
and trade patterns. Nations developed industries to meet war needs and
to provide goods cut off by interruptions in international commerce.
Loans and grants to support the war effort and postwar reconstruction
distorted the patterns of capital flow and credit balances. Production and
money
-transfer decisions were not related to long-run economic consid-
erations but to wartime goals. Nations imposed foreign currency con-
trols, restricting movement of goods and money.
International economic relationships among nations were much less
reflective of competitive conditions by the end of the war. Industries
which had expanded to meet wartime demand saw their markets dwin-
dle away. Agriculture typified the problem.
Grain production soared in Australia, Canada, and the U.S. to meet
war demand. At the end of the war, when demand slackened, prices fell
around the world. Farmers petitioned their governments for aid. Import-
ing nations sought immediate relief by means of heavy import duties,
quotas, and licensing systems. Exporters countered with subsidies.
Meanwhile, political and business leaders of many nations attempted
to restore international commercial order and growth. Not surprisingly,
they turned to the gold standard that had served well previously. But they
did not adequately assess the changed circumstances. Eventually, most
nations redefined the values of their currencies in terms of gold, so that
relative values among foreign currencies could be determined and inter-
national accounts settled. However, the relative values (exchange rates)
were far from equilibrium levels—i.e., they did not reflect the relative
economic positions of the nations. Most nations chose their prewar
currency values, which wartime changes had rendered obsolete. More-
over, national governments continued restrictions on the flow of goods
and money in their attempts to adjust from war to peace. Consequently,
the formal tie between currencies and gold did not function to balance
international economic relationships.
The U.S. emerged from the war as the world's strongest economic
power. We were not ready, however, to assume the leadership role
imposed by this new status. In the void, nationalistic policies were
pursued almost universally. Nations attempted to raise domestic em-
ployment and income by resorting to export subsidies, import prohibi-
tions, and exchange depreciation. Because such practices improved one
nation's economic welfare while hurting its trading partners, they are
called "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies.
The strains imposed by mounting trade interventions and an inade-
quate international monetary mechanism contributed to a breakdown in
international commerce. World trade volume plummeted during the
interwar years.
In the absence of a functioning multilateral trading system, bilateral
agreements and regional trading blocs proliferated. Germany dominated
a Central and Eastern European group. England led in developing the
Commonwealth preferential trading system. Within each trading group
or under bilateral agreements, terms for payments and special tariff deals
were spelled out.
Some actions taken by the United States illustrate policy develop-
ments affecting trade. To alleviate the distressed condition of the farm
economy, the McNary-Haugen measure proposed establishment of a
government corporation to buy farm commodities for export to maintain_
a desired level of domestic prices. Export sales would be made at what-
ever prices they would bring—an export dumping scheme. Although
various versions were seriously considered in five sessions of Congress,
none became law.
U.S. industry also demanded protection from external market forces.
Congress responded in 1930 by passing the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, one of
the highest in U.S. history. Many other nations retaliated by increasing
their levels of protection. The consequent decline in trade and severe
economic effects of the Great Depression led to a reexamination of protec-
tionist policies in the U.S. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934
resulted from this reexamination and reversed the trend of ever-higher
tariffs. It emphasized the need to expand markets for U.S. products and
authorized the President to enter into mutually advantageous bilateral
trade agreements. Since the act contained a "most-favored-nations" pro-
vision, these bilateral agreements had a multilateral effect. From 1934 to
1945, agreements were concluded with 30 countries, moving the U.S.
somewhat toward freer trade in industrial products.
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At the same time industrial trade was being encouraged, agricultural
trade was being curtailed. The introduction of direct-market-interven-
tion farm programs, designed to raise and stabilize farm prices and
incomes, had international repercussions, because most authorized ex-
port subsidies and import barriers. For example, U.S. grain and cotton
prices were supported at levels above world prices in most years. Quotas
prevented imports while subsidies abetted exports. These practices se-
vered the link between internal and external prices for farm products,
bringing trade policy and farm policy into conflict.
Additional farm programs were implemented in the U.S. to expand
domestic demand, curtail production, store commodities, and encourage
exports. Many provisions introduced in the 1930s have been retained
into the 1970s. Two of these, commonly known as Section 22 and Section
32 (1935 amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933),
permit import quotas and export subsidies, respectively, to aid domestic
price support efforts.
Foundations of the Contemporary
World Economic System
The destruction and the rearrangements of production patterns resulting
from World War II, coupled with memories of the international economic
chaos of the depression years, led to strong desires to create an expan-
sionist and open economic order after the war. Cooperation among na-
tions in international economic relationships was considered vital as all
nations sought to minimize postwar unemployment.
In contrast to its isolationist posture after World War I, the U.S.
asserted its leadership role in constructing the post-World War II world.
While international efforts for reconstruction and development centered
in the United Nations and its associated organs, they all. bore the U.S.
stamp of approval. Of special relevance are the trade and monetary
institutions which evolved.
Discussions for shaping the postwar world economy began before the
end of the war. They culminated in a conference at Bretton Woods in
1944 for planning an international monetary system supportive of free
multilateral trade. Two monetary institutions were established: the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the IBRD, or the
World Bank) which began operation at the end of 1945, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (the IMF, or the Fund) which opened in 1947. The
specific formulation of a trading institution was delegated to subsequent
negotiation.
The negotiations began in 1945 to frame an international trade charter
as the foundation for a worldwide system of liberal trade. The charter
Proposed establishing an International Trade Organization (ITO). After
several preparatory sessions, the United Nations convened a Conference
on Trade and Employment at Havana in 1947 to finalize and adopt a
charter for the ITO. The charter specified principles and rules for reduc-
tion of tariffs, elimination of quotas, and creation of conditions for the
expansion of multilateral trade on equal terms. It set up rules for interna-
tional commodity agreements and government regulation of business
Practices that might restrain international trade. It recognized the need
for governments to relate foreign trade policies to domestic measures in
order to allow for stability and full employment. It also provided some of
the elements of a code for private international investment. In addition,
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less developed countries (LDCs)2 secured some provisions to allow
imposition of trade and monetary controls to protect their developing
economies.
Efforts to ratify the Havana ITO charter were abandoned after political
support could not be generated in the U.S. Congress. To powerful U.S.
interests it appeared that every nation except the U.S. could claim ex-
emption from the trade liberalization provisions. The developmental
work was not all lost, however. The commercial trade policy section of
the charter, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), had
already been accepted by 23 nations, including the U.S. Thus GATT
became permanent and was transformed into an international agency
responsible for implementing a code of conduct for international trade.
These major international agreements—GATT, IMF, and IBM) are
now discussed in more detail, as they have formed the institutional
framework for international commerce in the postwar era.
The GATT Trading System
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral
treaty dealing with international trade. It replaced a series of prewar
bilateral agreements that segmented world trade. The agreement con-
tains a code of principles and rules and provides a continuing forum for
consultation and dispute settlement and for periodic negotiating confer-
ences to be called by member nations. More than 80 governments, includ-
ing the U.S„ participate fully; others have observer or partial status.
GATT has grown, since 1947, in membership and influence.
The original fundamental aim of GATT, to liberalize and expand
trade through negotiated reductions in obstacles to trade, implied a "free
market" objective for the world trading system. Yet, in recognition of
immediate postwar problems, the first goal became to prevent nations
from exporting their adjustment problems and from raising existing
levels of protection. Gradually, the ultimate aim of free trade was broad-
ened. Now, increased attention goes to improving trade conditions and
market access for all countries. Added emphasis recently has been given
to harmonization of domestic goals to avoid consequences which are
disruptive to trade.
GATT has five basic principles. (1) Trade must be nondiscriminatory.
All contracting parties receive equal treatment regarding import and
export duties and charges. No new preferential or bilateral agreements
are sanctioned. The original agreement allowed exceptions for LDCs and
regional trading groups; however, the impact of future trading blocs was
not foreseen. (2) Domestic industries receive protection mainly by tariffs.
Agriculture was granted special treatment, however. For instance, Arti-
cle 11 permits import quotas on agricultural products if domestic pro-
duction restrictions are in force. (3) Agreed-upon tariff levels bind each
country. If tariff levels are raised, compensation must be made to injured
countries. (4) Consultations are provided to settle disputes. (5) When
warranted by economic or trade circumstances (such as balance of pay-
ments problems), GATT procedures may be waived, or escape provisions
allowed, if other members agree and compensation is made to them. ,
Since its inception, seven major negotiating conferences or "rounds'
have been held. The first major achievement was to bind (prevent the
raising of) existing tariff levels. Each subsequent round of negotiations
2Countries where the gross national product is low—generally below $500 to $600 per capita.
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reduced industrial tariffs substantially. Trade problems of LDCs received
little special attention in these early years.
Despite extensive discussions, no agreement could be reached to
liberalize agricultural trade during the first decade of GATT. All major
nations protected their agricultural sectors and could not envision re-
treating from those policies. In the 1950s the U.S. requested an agricul-
tural ruling to legalize its use of import quotas for protecting domestic
dairy producers. A waiver was granted that was broader than the exemp-
tion allowed under Article 11 of GATT. (Article 11 permits quotas only if
production is controlled. U.S. dairy programs do not control supply.)
This step weakened U.S. influence on future developments in GATT. For
instance, other nations cite our waiver when they resist our attempts to
gain or improve access to their protected agricultural markets.
The three most recent sessions discussed below reveal the evolving
nature of GATT negotiations. The ability of -GATT to address new
problems in a changing trade climate reflects the willingness—indeed
the eagerness—of its members to avoid an international economic
catastrophe.
"Dillon Round" (1960-61). This session came in direct response to the
formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), now known as
the European Community (EC or "Common Market"). The U.S. and other
non
-EEC GATT members wanted to prevent economic discrimination by
the EEC. EEC policy called for a common external tariff for EEC members.
Such a tariff violated previous commitments by individual nations. The
non
-EEC members were unsuccessful in their challenge. The EEC and its
tariff policies became a reality. For political reasons, U.S. support of a
strong Europe tempered its pursuit of these economic goals.
The U.S. did achieve one significant concession for agriculture in this
round. Soybeans, soybean meal, other oilseeds, and cotton were granted
virtually duty-free entry to the EEC.
"Kennedy Round" (1963-67). These negotiations were instigated at
the request of the U.S., as was the Dillon Round. After arduous preparato-
ry sessions, negotiations began with industrial products. Members even-
tually agreed to a one-third reduction in tariffs. However, agricultural
negotiations were delayed by a disagreement on procedures. The EEC
was not prepared to negotiate on farm products since its internal policies
were not yet settled. Agricultural negotiations finally got underway in
September 1965, with suggested provisions for an agreement on grain
trade. Discussions led to the International Grains Arrangement, con-
cluded in 1967, which replaced an expiring International Wheat Agree-
ment. (These and other commodity agreements are discussed in chapter
4.)
Despite difficulties in negotiating, some tariff concessions were made
on a wide range of farm products. Even though tariff reductions on farm
Products were generally smaller than those for industrial products they
vyere significant, because for the first time GATT seriously attempted
liberalization of agricultural commodity trade. Our government willing-
1Y entered such negotiations since it had lowered U.S. grain prices to
world levels. However, our miss:five stance_on agricultural imports
c ntinued to la ue efforts to I_____Tsblre barriers for_agriculturaLexports.
Meanwhile, the EEC remained steadfast in protecting Community-pro-
duced farm products at high prices. The rising economic power of Eu-
r9pe. (and Japan) was changing the international power structure. U.S.
clominance in the world economic system was starting to diminish.
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Although achievements of the Kennedy Round did not satisfy the
optimists, it is still regarded as a high-water mark of international trade
cooperation.
"Tokyo Round" (1973 to date). Multilateral trade negotiations re-
opened in Tokyo in September 1973, with more than 100 participating
nations. The impetus for this round was the reformation of international
economic relations called for by President Nixon in August 1971. Our
government argued that existing monetary and trade arrangements dis-
criminated unfairly against U.S. exports.
Our negotiators sought greater access to markets for U.S. agricultural
exports. They requested discussion of nontariff barriers (the chief imped-
iments to agricultural trade), which include variable levies, import quo-
tas, export subsidies, packaging and labeling standards, government
procurement practices, customs valuation methods, import licensing
requirements, and sanitary regulations. The United States also-wanted
agricultural and industrial negotiations kept together to ensure a positive
and equitable outcome for U.S. agriculture.
The final outcome of this round is not known at the time of writing.
International Monetary Fund
The International Monetary Fund (the IMF, or the Fund) was originated
to develop and maintain an orderly and stable international monetary
system which would permit expansion of world trade and economic
growth for its member nations. The regulatory procedures agreed-upon
formed a sharp contrast to the automatic process the gold standard once
provided. Its guiding principles have been consultation, cooperation,
adaptability, and flexibility. These principles originated from recogniz-
ing that fundamental disequilibrium among economies of the world can
and does occur as nations develop at differing rates and with different
policies. The need for adjustment is evident in balance of payments
surpluses or deficits. For instance, a nation with continuing deficits can
lose its international liquidity (funds to settle its international accounts),
which triggers a lack of confidence in its currency. Consequently, IMF
provisions were made for temporary and permanent adjustments in ex-
change rates.
To cover temporary trade deficits, member nations 'are able to draw
funds from a revolving pool of foreign currencies and gold, paid as a
requirement for membership. Major changes in exchange rates require
consultation and agreement by members of the Fund. Although numer-
ous adjustments have been made, the system has functioned more as a
fixed than a flexible exchange rate system. Despite this, the original
system worked well enough to survive nearly a quarter century.
During its lifetime, IMF membership has expanded from an original
few dozen nations to virtually global coverage of the non-Communist
world. To belong, a nation must agree to free monetary movements
among nations and to redeem its currency for foreign currency,. Because a
sudden change from a restricted foreign exchange practice to a free
system would disrupt an economy, a transition period was allowed to
dismantle exchange controls. In the transition period, yearly consulta-
tions with the Fund require members to review progress and to discuss
proposed policies. Wartorn nations employed the transition period pro-
visions in the, first postwar decade to restore their internal economies
before moving to currency convertibility. The currencies of most indus-
trialized nations became convertible after 1958.
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LDCs have continued to use the transition period provision as a
means of entry into the IMF, while maintaining controls on foreign
exchange. LDCs consider such controls essential for pursuing their do-
mestic development goals. Another feature which benefits the LDCs is
the compensatory financing provision, introduced in 1963 and expanded
in 1975. It authorized loans to LDCs when export earnings fall. Repay-
ment is due when earnings rise.
Until the mid-1970s, gold was the basis of the IMF monetary system.
National currencies were assigned values in terms of gold or in terms of a
gold
-based currency, which in practice was the U.S. dollar. The system
was, therefore, a gold-dollar exchange standard. This gave the U.S. dollar
a special status in the international monetary system. It created a direct
and substantial interaction between the U.S. economy and international
financial conditions.
For the international economy to grow, the international money sup-
ply must grow. Therefore, when dollars are the main international
money, the U.S. should run balance of payments deficits to increase the
international money supply. U.S. deficits do not occur, however, because
of the need for international liquidity but because of imbalances in U.S.
capital and trade flows. Imbalances of other nations were resolved by
changing exchange rates, not automatically but by agreement of the
Fund. The U.S. situation does not preclude such realignments, but it does
discourage them because of the ramifications for the rest of the world.
This illustrates a vulnerable feature of such a system.
Students of the international monetary system recognized that the
System just described needed reform, yet no acceptable solution was in
the offing in the 1970s. Several steps had been taken in the 1960s to
mitigate emerging problems. For instance, the Fund enlarged its pool of
gold and currencies by raising members' quotas. Special arrangements
also were made to permit borrowing of currencies. "Special drawing
rights," sometimes called "paper gold" or SDRs, were created to supple-
ment national currencies and gold and create liquidity. All of these
measures aided members in managing their balance of payments.
These measures alleviated but did not resolve the underlying weak-
nesses eroding the original IMF system. The system broke down in 1971
• when the U.S. suspended its commitments to the IMF and called for
reform. This marked the end of the original post-World War II or Bretton
Woods monetary scheme. Lack of confidence in the dollar and the U.S.
action reflected the inability of the original system to adjust international
monetary relations to changing international economic conditions.
The crisis created by the U.S. action stimulated other nations to agree
to substantial revisions in the world monetary system. The value of the
U.S. dollar relative to other currencies had gotten seriously out of line.
Disparities were greatest between the dollar and the yen and the mark.
The dollar was devalued twice: 8 percent in August 1971 and 10 percent
in February 1973. These realignments proved inadequate, so world mon-
etary managers agreed to a further step away from the stable exchange
rate system. Exchange rates now are allowed to fluctuate (or "float"),
letting the market determine their relative values. National monetary
authorities now let rates change from moment to moment as the market
dictates. Governments may intervene to control or manage fluctuation for
domestic purposes, within the scope allowed by IMF rules. The system is
functioning reasonably well, but only time will tell for how long.
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the IBRD,
or the World Bank) and its two affiliates, the International Finance
Corporation and the International Development Association, originated
to stimulate the flow of capital among nations. At first postwar recon-
struction was the focus; now it has become economic development.
The contribution of the World Bank group to trade is less direct than
that of the IMF. The Bank's chief function is to channel capital into
investments in LDCs. Among Bank activities are projects to aid produc-
tion and marketing of exportable commodities, to finance imports of
capital equipment, and to train country specialists.
Trade and the LDCs
The LDCs, or developing countries of the world, found fault with the
monetary and trade institutions (IMF and GATT) established and man-
aged mainly by the industrialized countries with market economies.
(Discussions between developed and developing countries on interna-
tional economic problems often are called the "North-South dialogue"
because most developed nations are in the northern hemisphere and
most LDCs in the southern hemisphere.) The LDCs claimed their needs
were not given adequate consideration by other bodies and, in fact, that
their development was impeded by some policies which benefit more
advanced nations. As an example LDCs observed that prices of their
exports, mainly raw materials, had not risen as fast and were more
variable than prices of their imports, mainly manufactures.
To seek redress, the LDCs turned to the international organ where
their voices predominate, the United Nations; and in 1964 they suc-
ceeded in establishing the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) as a permanent organization. It functions with a
continuing body, the trade and development board,,and periodic confer-
ences. The conferences, referred to as UNCTAD I, UNCTAD II, and the
like, are held every 4 years. The most recent conference, UNCTAD IV,
was at Nairobi in 1976.
Discussions among LDCs which centered in UNCTAD led to calls for
a "new international economic order" (NIE0) in the international com-
munity in the mid-1970s. One cornerstone of the NIEO/is an integrated
program for commodity trade. The NIE0 and this program are discussed
in chapter 4, which examines international trade arrangements.
Regional Organizations and Trading Blocs
International trading relations in the final decades of the twentieth centu-
ry are being influenced increasingly by regional organizations and trad-
ing blocs. Such groupings are formed to seek or preserve some economic
advantage for member nations. In general, they seek some of the benefits
accruing from international specialization when worldwide agreements
are unlikely or undesirable from the viewpoint of a nation or group of
nations.
A great variety of organizations are encompassed in regional organi-
zations and trading blocs. They include free-trade areas (no tariffs or
quotas between members, and nonmember policies determined by each
country); customs unions (no tariffs or quotas between members and
common external policies); common markets (no tariffs or quotas be-
tween members, common external policies and unrestricted movement
of labor and capital); and economic and monetary unions (in addition to
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the integration measures of common markets, fiscal and monetary poli-
cies are harmonized).
The practice of forming trading blocs stretches far back into history.
Only those which play major Jules in the current international economy
are described here.
European Community (EC or "Common Market"). This is one of the
most influential trading blocs in today's world. Formed by West Ger-
many, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in 1957
by the Treaty of Rome, it enlarged in 1973 with the addition of the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.
The goals of the EC are to promote harmonious development of
member nations' economies with continuous and balanced growth,
greater stability, improved living standards, and closer relations. Politi-
cal union was the ultimate aim of EC architects. To achieve their goals
they have fostered free movement of goods, capital, and labor among
members, while maintaining a common tariff for the rest of the world,
and common economic, social, and monetary policies.
Agriculture has proven a difficult sector to bring into the Community
framework. Community farmers had been heavily protected, and social
concerns have dictated the continuance of protective measures. Commu-
nity agricultural policy is called the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The thrust of the CAP is to maintain internal prices at levels generally
above world prices. Details of the CAP are discussed in chapter 3.
In addition, special trading relationships have developed between
the EC and several other individual nations and groups of nations. These
agreements offer varying degrees of preferential treatment to participa-
ting countries. The U.S., Japan, and Australia are among the few nations
who do not have special agreements with the EC. One agreement, the
Lome Convention concluded in 1975, includes about 50 LDCs (mostly
former colonies) in Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean. A second group
includes nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Other agreements
have been made with EFTA and COMECON (described below) and with
1-13Cs in Asia and Latin America.
Many concessions granted LDCs are in accord with UNCTAD com-
mitments for developed countries to offer nonreciprocal preferences to
LDCs' products. Others are a continuance of former trading privileges
between colonies and former colonizers. Despite this wide network of
Special trading relationships, however, there has not been a general
lowering of protection to Community farmers.
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This organization was
formed in 1959 by the United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland to unify non-EC European nations.
The commercial interests of these nations were threatened by the forma-
tion of the EC.
The broad objectives of EFTA—full employment, financial stability,
improvement of living standards, and expansion of trade—were to be
advanced by eliminating tariffs and quotas and by promoting economic
cooperation among members.
Finland became an associate member in 1961. In 1970 Iceland joined.
The United Kingdom and Denmark left in 1973 after becoming EC mem-
bers. Import duties on most industrial products were removed by 1967.
During 1972 and 1973 each EFTA member contracted a bilateral free
trade agreement with the EC to dismantle industrial tariffs. When fully
implemented it will be the first time in history that industrial goods willbe free to move among the 16 European EC and EFTA nations without
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trade restrictions. It is a remarkable accomplishment. However, farm
commodities are not covered by EFTA or in the bilateral EC agreements.
The difficulties in reconciling the social, political, and economic goals of
national farm policies with the consequences of freer trade have proven
insurmountable.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, or CMEA).
This group organized in 1949 to further economic cooperation among
Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union. Mongolia joined in
1962; Cuba has belonged since 1972. Yugoslavia does not participate
fully. Finland, Iraq, and Mexico have joined as "cooperants." Other
nonsocialist states also are exploring some form of association. Repre-
sentatives from each nation meet to coordinate planning. Within CMEA,
each member has veto power over agreements applying to it. Because
agreements do not bind all members, bilateral agreements often are
concluded under the CMEA umbrella.
In 1964 CMEA formed a bank to clear currencies among countries.
They also formed a bank in 1971 to finance joint investments of member
nations. Currency values are based on the Soviet ruble, and, in the
absence of a market system, transaction values are determined by
negotiations.
Since the mid-1960s the CMEA has been a viable forum for economic
cooperation and planning.
Others. The Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), the Caribbean
Free Trade Area (CARIFTA), and the Central American Common Market
(CACM) are three trading blocs formed by developing countries. LAFTA
was created in 1960 by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Free trade among
member countries is the goal. Little progress has been achieved. CACM,
which includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nic-
aragua, is virtually dead. CARIFTA was formed in 1968 by former British
Caribbean colonies. Most tariffs and quotas have been eliminated. Some
hope for success seems justified. In general, the economic integration of
LDCs has been fraught with more pitfalls than the groupings of more
industrialized nations.
U.S. Trade Policies
Since the 1930s U.S. agricultural trade policy has been shaped largely by
domestic farm programs. For years many prices were maintained above
world price levels. Export subsidies, import quotas, and foreign food aid
programs were required to cope with excess production. Earlier, agricul-
ture was exempted from the move toward trade liberalization following
enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Later, as
agricultural exports became increasingly important to U.S. farm income
and to the balance of payments, positive measures were pursued. to
establish and expand foreign markets. A synopsis of the key legislative
actions is provided here.
Trade Acts
U.S. trade policy after World War II was formulated under the authority
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 as amended and ex-
tended until 1962. A 1945 change allowed the President to cut U.S.
import duties by as much as 50 percent from their original levels. Among
several important amendments in 1948 were: (1) a "peril point" clause
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that required the Tariff Commission to establish rates of duty below
which tariffs could not be cut without damaging U.S. industry; and (2)
changes in Section 22 provisions to give the President more flexibility to
restrict imports that interfered with U.S. agricultural price support pro-
grams. (This violated U.S. obligations under GATT and necessitated the
1955 waiver mentioned previously.) In 1949 the peril point amendment
was eliminated. Two years later the peril point clause was restored and,
reflecting "cold war" politics, tariff concessions on imports from the
USSR and other Communist-dominated countries were suspended.
In 1955 and 1958 the President was given additional but very limited
authority to reduce U.S. duties. U.S. tariffs could not be reduced below
certain peril points, which were to be determined by the Tariff
Commission.
New legislation, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, marked a change to
more aggressive pursuit of trade liberalization by the U.S. government.
Presidential power was expanded and many restrictive clauses were
excluded. Although the peril point provisions were not retained, the
Tariff Commission (now the U.S. International Trade Commission) was
directed to advise the President on the "probable economic effects" that
changes in duties or other import restrictions might have on U.S.
industries.
Of special note is a major innovation contained in the act, a provision
for adjustment assistance to firms and workers if, "as a result in major
Part" of U.S. trade agreement concessions, imports "cause, or threaten to
cause, serious injury" to the firm. The underlying philosophy was that
the remedy for increased imports should be adjustment to new competi-
tive conditions or a shift of resources to other activities, rather than trade
restrictions that would result in retaliation, loss of export markets, and
higher consumer prices. In practice, little assistance was granted.
There was no authority for trade negotiations after the 1962 act ex-
pired on July 1, 1967, until enactment of the Trade Act of 1974. The 1974
act grants the President power to reduce tariffs over a 5-year period. The
act also provides more relief from serious injury or threat of injury caused
by growing import competition, and it broadens the range of actions the
United States can take in response to unfair international trade practices.
In addition, it permits the United States to extend most-favored-nation
tariff treatment to countries not now receiving it and to participate with
Other developed countries in granting generalized tariff preferences to
Products of developing nations. The generalized system of preferences is
designed to give LDCs limited duty-free access for many export com-
modities. It primarily is intended to open U.S. markets for LDCs' manu-
factures, although about 300 agricultural products are covered, too.
The U.S. has participated in GATT negotiations since 1947 under the
authorities of the above laws.
Export Subsidies
Domestic agricultural legislation authorizes subsidy payments to en-
courage exports when U.S. prices exceed prices abroad. Such payments
have been a common practice. From 1955 to 1966 about one-third of all
been 
agricultural exports received assistance. Wheat exports have
I3 the main beneficiary. Sizeable payments also have been made to aid
exports of fruits, feed grains, cotton, dairy products, rice, and tobacco.
Annual outlays fell after the mid-1960s. Since then farm income has been
supported mainly with government payments to farmers, allowing pricesto move at world levels; therefore, direct export subsidies are not needed.
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Import Quotas
Import quotas have been applied in recent years for dairy products,
grains, cotton, peanuts, sugar, and meat. Special legislation restricts
sugar and beef imports. Quotas on other commodities may be imposed
under Section 22, when domestic price support programs keep prices
above internationally competitive levels. Escape clause provisions of the
1974 Trade Act also allow imposition of quotas. In some cases sanitary,
packaging, and other regulations have been sought to restrict imports.
Producers of the restricted items benefit by quotas or import prohibi-
tions, but users of those items are disadvantaged by higher prices. The
interests of export commodity producers and consumers clash with the
interests of import commodity producers.
Govermnent Program Exports
A buildup in U.S. agricultural surpluses began in 1953. To remedy the
situation—and continue humanitarian assistance inaugurated earli-
er—the concept of using U.S. surpluses to help countries that could not
purchase commercially the food and fiber they needed was developed.
Congress approved the concept and incorporated it into the Agricul-
tural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, or Public Law 480,
which soon became an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy. P.L.
480 sales were made for foreign currencies which were used to promote
economic development in recipient countries, to promote U.S. farm
products overseas, and for other purposes. Amendments to P.L. 480 in
1966 and 1972 called for gradually replacing sales in foreign currencies
by 1972 with sales under long-term, low-interest credit, repayable in.
dollars or convertible foreign currencies. In addition to credit sales (ac-
counting for about 70 percent of all farm commodities shipped under P.L.
480), P.L. 480 programs have included donations to meet disasters,
develop child and maternal feeding programs, and support self-help
development projects.
Besides P.L. 480, U.S. concessional agricultural aid has been pro-
vided under U.S. Mutual Security/Agency for International Development
(AID) programs. Amendments to P.L. 480 and AID programs were inte-
grated in the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975
(amended in 1977). This act further increased the emphasis on support-
ing economic development and self-help efforts of developing countries
and providing food assistance to the poorest nations.
Trade with Communist Countries
For political reasons the U.S. prohibited most trade with Communist
countries after World War II. On a case-by-case basis controls were
gradually lifted; trade subsequently increased. An expansion of trade and
the concomitant closer linkage of "Eastern" and "Western" nations was
viewed as a constructive development in international relations. Greater
interdependence is economically advantageous to both sides and, there-
by, raises the cost to either side of disrupting the world order.
The Soviet Union has been an erratic purchaser of grains in world
markets in the past decade. In several years unanticipated large pur-
chases were made to offset low production. To lessen the destabilizing
effects of such purchases the U.S. negotiated a 5-year grain agreement
with the USSR to set annual minimum and maximum purchase levels. To
obtain more U.S. grain, consultation is required.
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This bilateral agreement is viewed generally as a stabilizing influ-
ence, at least on U.S. grain markets. However, the assurance of grain
supplies to the USSR may lessen the incentive to secure Soviet participa-
tion in global food security planning.
Concluding Comments
The contemporary world economic system described in this chapter is a
dynamic process which undergoes continual change. As national and
international problems arise, legislative and administrative bodies take
actions that modify monetary and trade policies and institutions. The
current events of today will affect the trade policies of tomorrow. The
issues most likely to shape the future world system are discussed in.
chapter 6. How the many nations of the world choose to work individu-
ally and collectively to solve their economic and political problems will
determine what system will prevail in future years.
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Introduction
Some of the. most bitter disputes in economic policy explode when
international trade and trade policy are discussed. Politicians, business
and labor leaders, farm spokesmen, and consumer advocates constantly
wrangle about exports, imports, and the international balance of pay-
ments. Professional economists, too, are heard on most sides of any
particular trade issue. Yet, the basic theory of international trade consists
of ideas on which economists widely agree.
Then why is there such a gulf between the theory and the everyday
world of international trade and trade policy? Part of the answer lies in
the abstract nature of trade theory. Part lies in the uneven way economic
adjustments affect real people and their institutions, as changes in trade
and trade policy occur.
This chapter emphasizes the basic building blocks of international
trade theory and highlights some of the special characteristics of interna-
tional exchange that once led a British statesman to write, "Free trade
• . . is in almost every country unpopular." This remark, made about 150
years ago, could have been penned yesterday. First, we look at- some of
the basic ideas of international trade theory. Then we consider why
modern trade policy and practice often depart radically from what is
suggested by the basic ideas of international trade theory.
As we discuss the basic concepts of trade it is important to remember
that trade theory, like all economic theory, is a simplification of reality. It
is a tool with which we simplify and understand the underlying forces at
work even as governments, institutions, and problems change.
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Why and How Trade Occurs
Trade concepts can be reviewed from several viewpoints. One is the
viewpoint of individual buyers and sellers; another is the viewpoint of
particular commodity markets; still another is the viewpoint of a nation
considering its economic position relative to other nations. The classical
development of trade theory stems from this latter vantage point, consid-
ering the whole nation as an economic unit.
The Nation as an Economic Unit
Trade theory is concerned with economic relations among nations. To
focus on economic forces that shape these relations, trade theory treats
each nation as if all decisions were made either by a single rational
authority or by many small buyers and sellers in keen competition with
each other. This is a simplification also employed in other fields of
economic theory.
Using the nation as the economic unit defines away many real issues.
In pure trade theory, the nation-unit is assumed to employ its resources
fully. Its economic structure is assumed to permit resource adjustments
to occur smoothly and completely in response to changing conditions.
More advanced discussions of trade theory explore the consequences of
changing these stringent assumptions. Naturally, the complexity of the
analysis increases. Yet few would quarrel with these assertions:
(1) Economic resources usually can be reallocated more easily within
a nation than among nations.
(2) Language, law, institutions, and customs are generally more uni-
form within a nation than among nations.
(3) Political barriers exist for international transactions. These barri-
ers do not have counterparts in purely domestic transactions.
These conditions are enough to justify using nations as economic units
for trade analysis. The ideas that flow froin viewing nations as economic
units can be compared with the forces which play on individual buyers
and sellers in international markets.
Causes of Foreign Trade
Individual traders generally use current prices and costs to form their
decisions. They buy goods (and services) wherever they Can obtain them
most cheaply, and they sell them to the buyers offering the highest prices.
This behavior is observed within and across national borders. Hence,
the early classical economists used it as a guiding principle to explain
international trade. Accordingly, a country exports whatever it can
produce more cheaply than others and imports those items others can
produce more cheaply. A country has an "absolute advantage" in the
production of a good if its production costs are lower than other coun-
tries' at prevailing prices and exchange rates.
The principle of absolute advantage appeals to common sense. But as
our view expands from single products or industries to whole nations,
then the least cost or absolute advantage principle loses something. What
if a nation has an absolute advantage in all its products because of very
cheap labor, abundant resources, or highly advanced technology? Al-
though this is very unlikely, the logic of absolute advantage suggests that
this nation would export products but import nothing. Why would a
nation wish to do this? What would it do with its export earnings?
Questions like these led economists to develop the idea of "comparative
advantage" (see figures 1-3 and accompanying explanation).
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Figures 1-3. The Key to Comparative Advantage in Trade
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Think of two countries, Alphaland and Betaland. Each can use its resources and people to
Produce two major products—agricultural goods (F) and manufactured goods (M). Panel
A of figure 1 shows Alphaland's possible outputs of F and M based on its particular
combination of natural resources, capital, and people.
If Alphaland used all its resources in agriculture, it could generate 50 units of F per
Year and no units of M. This is point a in figure 1. If only manufactured goods were
produced, 50 units of M could be had per year and no units of F, point c. By shifting
resources between farms and factories, many output combinations of F and Mare possible
'long the line abc. Points inside abc, within the shaded area, are possible too. But they are
inefficient, reflecting resource unemployment or underemployment. From any shaded
area point inside abc, more M or F (or both) can be obtained without sacrificing any other
23
output. Along abc, more M can be obtained only at the expense of some F and vice versa.
The slope or steepness of abc reflects the rate at which F and M can be substituted for each
other in production by rearranging fully-used resources inside Alphaland. In this partic-
ular case, that rate of substitution is 1.0 F for 1.0 M. No output combination outside of abc
is possible for Alphaland, given its resources.
Panel B of figure 1 shows the same thing for Betaland. But there are some differences.
First, Betaland is a smaller economy than Alphaland. No matter what it does, Betaland
cannot match the potential production of Alphaland in either F or M. Betaland could
possibly produce 40 units of F (and no M) at point d, or 20 units of M (and no F) at point j.
Any of the points along or inside dej are feasible, but only the points along dej are
efficient. The rate at which F and M can be substituted for each other in production is
different in Betaland than in Alphaland. For Betaland it is 2.0 units of F for 1.0 unit of M.
This country-to-country difference in the rate of substitution of one output for another is
the key to the concept of comparative advantage used in international trade analysis.
To grasp this concept, imagine that Alphaland is now producing and consuming the
combination of 20F and 30M denoted by point b in figure 1. Assume similarly that
Betaland is at point e, which is 32F and 4M. Now visualize taking panel A in your hand,
flipping it over, and placing it upsidedown on panel B so that points band e lie exactly on
top of each other. This is point e(b) of figure 2. The size of the rectangle in figure 2 formed
by this maneuver is the total amount of F and M produced in Alphaland and Betaland
together. This "world" output is 34M and 52F. Point e(b) shows how this "world"
production is shared between the two. Betaland produces 4 units of manufactured goods
and Alphaland contributes 30 units, the total being 34. On the other hand, Betaland
produces 32 units of agricultural products while Alphaland grows 20 units, totaling 52.
Up to now, these two nations were isolated from each other. Now suppose that they
look into possible international trades. Why might they wish to do this? For one thing,
they could, via trade, separate the combination of F and M that each produces from the
combination that each consumes. In figure 2, the two nations could possibly trade away
from e(b) to any point inside the large rectangle by exchanging F and M with each other.
Alphaland would not be interested in any trade that would deliver it to a shaded-area
point inside abc. Those points are available to Alphaland without trade and are inefficient
besides. Similarly, Betaland would disdain trades leading to shaded-area points inside
dej. However, there are points in the rectangle that are outside the capacity of each nation
to achieve independently yet are available through trade. These are inside the unshaded
area of figure 2. This unshaded area exists because the rate of substitution of F for M
differs between Alphaland and Betaland. The greater this difference, the larger this
unshaded area of potential exchange.
If these two nations are jointly producing F and M at point e(b), demand analysis will
show that, in general, the people of each nation will be better off if they trade away from
e(b) down into the unshaded area. Determining a precise point of mutally agreeable
exchange in that area is beyond this discussion, but it exists. Suppose for instance that it is
point g in figure 2. At g, Betaland would have 18 units of M and 14 units of F available for
use, while Alphaland would have 16 units of M and 38 units of F. Naturally, this
distribution also uses up the total "world" output of 34M and 52F.
Figure 3 is a close-up view of part of figure 2. In order for the two nations to get from
point e(b) to point g via trade, Betaland would need to import 14 units of M and export 18
units of F. On the other hand, Alphaland would export 14M in exchange for 18F.
Notice that this is a better trade-off of F for M than either Alphaland or Betaland could
make by rearranging its own resources internally. Alphaland could obtain only 14 more
units of F internally by shifting resources and giving up 14 units of M; but on the "world"
market it can get 18 F units. Similarly Betaland could get only 9 more units of M internally
by releasing resources from 18 units of F; through international trade it can gain 14M
units.
In this example, Betaland has a "comparative advantage" in agriculture relative to
Alphaland. This is because, within its own resource structure, it can generate 2.0 units of
F for each 1.0 unit of M it gives up, and Alphaland can get only 1.0 unit of F for each 1.0
unit of M it gives up. The reverse argument shows that Alphaland has a "comparative
advantage" in manufactures relative to Betaland. The existence of comparative advantage
produces an area of potential trade (an unshaded area) within which each nation can
make better deals for itself by international exchange than by adjusting its own resources
internally.
Further analysis shows the validity of the common sense notion that trading nations
can capture even further trading gains by specializing, at least to some extent, in the
products for which they have comparative advantage. As times goes by, however, na-
tions' resources and abilities may change. Such changes can drastically alter the world-
wide patterns of comparative advantage.
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The theory of comparative advantage was first stated clearly by David
Ricardo in 1817. It has since been refined and extended by other econo-
mists. Instead of looking at the absolute level of costs of individual
products, the comparative advantage idea suggests that we consider the
cost of producing additional units of any one product in terms of the
reduction necessary in the output of other goods. For example, to pro-
duce additional units of wheat, a nation would have to rearrange its
resources. In doing so it might have to give up the opportunity to produce
some units of corn.
The theory suggests that we compare these "opportunity" costs (e.g.,
the value of corn given up) with international prices. Then we should
import goods for which the international price is less than the domestic
"opportunity" cost of producing an additional unit at home. And, by the
same logic, we should export products for which the international price
is higher than the domestic "opportunity" cost of producing an addi-
tional unit. Resources released from producing imported goods can, in.
theory, be developed in the production of export goods. Via specializa-
tion and trade, consumers in each trading nation can escape from the
limited combinations of products available from only domestic re-
sources. Through exchange they obtain a lower cost and a more abun-
dant, wider selection of goods and services.
In the context of comparative advantage, international trade rests
Upon differences among countries in the rates at which one product can
be substituted for another in production by internal resource adjust-
ments. These differences in opportunity costs are the basis of compara-
tive advantage.
Mutually advantageous trade can arise among nations as long as these
substitution rates differ. And they will differ where nations' climates,
resources, people, and technologies differ. The principle of comparative
advantage is symmetrical. That is, if a country has a comparative advan-
tage in the production of one or more goods, than it must have a compara-
tive disadvantage in the production of some other goods.
Comparative advantage is a real, not a monetary, concept. Because the
structure of relative costs among countries forms comparative advantage,it is not affected by changes in currency exchange rates or general infla-
tion. Exchange rates among currencies of trading nations (e.g., German
marks obtained per U.S. dollar) translate comparative advantage into
absolute advantage comparisons to which individual buyers and sellers
'flay respond. However, the comparative advantage a country might havein the production of some goods may be obscured by an exchange rate
With other currencies which does not reflect the real purchasing power ofits currency. This can create a balance of payments problem, which willbe discussed later.
The actual size and composition of trade flows and the equilibrium ofi
nternational prices also depend upon demand conditions in trading
,nations. Demand conditions are shaped by national income and its distri-
baution, population, and the tastes and preferences of people. Changes in
tcl
.
.emand can alter international trade just as well as changes in compara-tive advantage patterns.
Why Relative Costs Differ among Countries
The principle of comparative advantage helps shape a country's poten-hal trade pattern. Production costs differ among countries because: (1)
supplies of productive resources vary widely from country to country, so
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the costs of using plentiful resources will be lower than costs of using
scarce resources (this can apply to land, labor, capital goods, and the
various technical skills available in the work force); (2) different com-
modities require basic resources in different proportions; (3) most goods
can be produced by more than one production process—each with a
somewhat different combination of resources; and (4) resources have
differing degrees of mobility among countries.
If resources could be transferred easily from country to country, a
major incentive for international trade—differences in relative produc-
tion costs—would eventually disappear. Yet productive resources such
as land and climate are truly fixed, and the migration of people is limited.
Consequently, comparative advantage quite broadly explains most of the
world's agricultural trade and much of the trade in other products. Still,
technology and capital does move among nations, changing relative
costs and comparative advantage. Hence, patterns of international trade
evolve over time. This evolution causes most trade problems and trade
policy disputes. An example of this is the post-World War II emergence of
Japan as a highly competitive exporter of heavy industrial products and
sophisticated electronic equipment.
Transport Costs
Trade is profitable to individual buyers and sellers only if the costs of
transport and other trade barriers do not exceed the existing between-
country price differences for the same goods. The ability of goods to
withstand delays in transport (their nonperishability) and the value-to-
weight ratio become important determinants in the commodity composi-
tion of international trade. Although the theory of trade often evolves as
an abstraction from these issues, it can be shown that when the costs of
overcoming distance of perishability exceed price differences no trade
occurs.
Terms of Trade
We have considered why countries trade but have not been explicit about
the specific terms on which countries will trade. Although several terms
of trade concepts exist, the one most frequently used is the "commodity
terms of trade," sometimes called the "net barter terms of trade." In a
simple world of two commodities (for example, soybeans and cars) the
commodity terms of trade are the price of one product expressed in terms
of the other. For instance, 800 bushels of $5/bu. soybeans may have to be
exported to import one $4,000 car. This 800 to 1.0 figure is a price ratio.
There exist as many of these ratios as there are commodity pairs in a
nation's trade picture. Individual traders need not consider terms of trade
in making international transactions, but they are important for assessing
the basic economic forces at work.
Since most countries trade in a multitude of products, it is useful to
have one overall measure of the terms of trade rather than dozens of
individual ratios. A composite price index of export products divided by
a similar price index of imports is such a measure. This terms of trade
index indicates how the prices of a nation's exports have changed rela-
tive to its import prices in comparison to some base period.
A decline in the terms of trade occurs when the prices of imports rise
relative to those of exports. For many nations which export raw materials
(like cotton) and import vital food and manufactures (like wheat and
trucks), this can be an important measurement. Unless productivity in
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the export sector has increased, such a decline reduces a trading nation's
ability to import. This threatens its standard of living and its potential for
economic growth. Changes in terms of trade adjusted for productivity,
therefore, are frequently considered as a measure of the economic envi-
ronment faced by trading nations.
When a country's terms of trade improve, its real income advances
faster than its production. This occurs because the purchasing power of
its exports has increased. It can use the proceeds from the same amount of
exports to buy more or better imported goods than before. For instance,
the sharp increase in coffee prices in 1975-76 paid for a substantial
portion of Brazil's growing petroleum imports.
If one country's terms of trade improve, those of other traders will
deteriorate. This-is because the terms of trade are price ratios of goods
flowing in opposite directions across international b6undaries.
Gains from Trade
If international trade occurs, someone benefits on each side of the trans-
action. Otherwise, no trade would occur. In addition to narrow commer-
cial motives of individuals, firms, and government agencies involved in
trade, some broader economic effects occur as trade develops. These are
beneficial to an economy at large, and can be grouped into two categories:
those stemming from specialization in production and those which are a
consequence of the exchange of goods.
Specialization
Trade theory indicates that it is to a country's advantage to specialize, at
least partially, in producing goods for which it has a comparatively lower
per
-unit cost. Assuming that currency exchange rates are approximately
in balance, comparative differences in production costs determine which
goods are exported and which are imported. Thus trade can have a
profound impact on a country's industrial and agricultural structure.
Trade will stimulate investment and expansion of industries producing
goods that are comparatively cheaper, and it will force the contraction of
industries producing comparatively higher-cost products. As industries
expand, they will demand inputs and products from other industries.
This leads to investment not only in the export sector but elsewhere in the
economy; the benefits of specialization are not limited to expanding
export industries.
Resources and investments will move out of less efficient, higher-cost
industries and toward expanding sectors. This process may be easy and
rapid or painful and slow. But as it occurs in a market economy, per-unit
costs will tend to rise in expanding industries as less efficient resources
are drawn into them and fall in declining industries as least efficient
resources are forced out. Ultimately the incentive for further expansion of
domestic production for exports disappears. Over time a country's re-
sources are utilized fully and most efficiently if they are allocated among
industries in order of their comparative advantage. This involves
Specialization.
Exchange
How do individual consumers benefit from international specialization
based on comparative advantage? A trade theorist might say that "inter-
national exchange raises the real income of a trading country." This
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would not convince a steel worker whose job is threatened by foreign
steel imports that trade is beneficial. What are the specific benefits of
international trade?
International trade is beneficial when it allows buyers access to goods
which otherwise would be either unavailable or more expensive. A large
number of tropical products such as coffee, tea, cocoa, bananas, and
spices would disappear from the grocery store shelves if international
trade were interrupted. Domestic production of such items in green-
houses would be extraordinarily costly.
Relatively lower foreign prices also allow consumers to buy more
goods with their disposable income. If people can buy imported televi-
sion sets, textiles, or shoes for significantly lower prices than domestic
items of comparable quality, they have in effect raised their incomes.
Therefore, lower-priced foreign goods offer consumers a genuine eco-
nomic opportunity to increase their purchasing power. This is true no
matter what the reason for the lower foreign prices. Moreover, these price
benefits extend beyond consumer goods. They also are embedded in
imported industrial products and raw materials used to produce final
goods domestically at lower prices than otherwise would exist.
Differences between domestic and international price ratios signal a
profitable opportunity to transform domestic goods into foreign goods
via exchange. Specialization according to comparative advantage per-
mits a nation to produce more export goods than it wants and then trade
them for less costly imported goods from all over the world. This pro-
vides a better deal for consumers than if everything were produced at
home.
Distribution of the Gains from Trade
Generally, trade is better for a nation's economy than no trade; yet trade
may not be beneficial to all individuals in an economy. And as trade
patterns change, the distribution of benefits and problems in an economy
also change. Most industrial and agricultural goods are produced using a
multitude of raw materials, complex machinery, innovative technology,
and skilled labor. Each of these inputs must be "rewarded" for its service
(wages for labor, depreciation for machinery, rent for land, royalties for
inventions, and returns for ownership and management). The sum of
these rewards is the total cost of a product. Unless monopoly or direct
government control are involved, the price of a product over time will
equal its cost of production.
The reward each class of inputs earns depends upon the demand for it
and its supply. The demand for any input (land or labor, for example)
reflects the total demand for all products using it. Supply, however, is
often fixed (at least in the short-run) and varies widely among countries.
Some nations are richly endowed with natural resources such as fertile
soil, good climate, or rich mineral deposits. Others have an abundant
labor supply. Still others have an elaborate and modern industrial plant.
Because resource prices generally reflect relative scarcity, the smaller the
supply of a particular input relative to demand, the higher its price and
the larger its share in total costs. If producers have some choice over how
much of each resource can be used, they will choose a least-cost combina-
tion. This will be achieved by using less expensive resources in place of
scarcer, more costly ones.
As international trade develops, trading nations "export" the services
of abundant factors and "import" the services of relatively scarce factors.
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As export industries expand because of international trade, the demand
for abundant resources increases and so does their value. On the other
hand, imports tend to lower the return to relatively scarce resources.
Therefore, there is a tendency for resource prices to be drawn closer
together as trade expands. Because of increased production efficiency,
the trade-caused loss in income to scarce resources is smaller than the
gains to abundant resources. Thus, a country as a whole gains from
international trade even though some resources and their owners may be
seriously damaged.
Proteclion from Trade: Why It Happens
Despite strong arguments about broad benefits of freer trade, the econom-
ic changes it generates can impose. hardship on some industries and
individuals. Those affected often argue successfully for protection
against freer trade. Trade protection occurs when any group of producers
or consumers is insulated from the full force of international competition
by deliberate economic policy.
Most people think of protectionism as policies which reduce imports
of foreign goods below amounts that otherwise would occur. This re-
duces competitive pressure on domestic producers of the same or similar
items and delays resource adjustments. It is possible to reduce competi-
tive pressures on export producers by policies such as export subsidies.
These too are protectionist. Consumers or users of an export product can
be protected from foreign buyer competition. Export taxes or embargoes
(controls) can keep domestic prices lower than they otherwise would be
by preventing products from moving to overseas markets.
The classic method of import protection is the tariff, sometimes called
an import tax or duty. It can be either a fixed charge per unit imported or a
fixed percentage of the value of each shipment. The former is called a
specific tariff, the latter is an ad valorem tariff. Other nontariff protection
devices include import quotas (direct quantity controls), mixing regula-
tions, complex packing and labeling requirements, health and sanitary
regulations, foreign exchange restrictions, and variable import levies. All
have one thing in common: they make it more difficult or impossible for
foreign sellers to compete with domestic sellers. Virtually all nations
apply some of these protectionist devices. Generally, we can view them
collectively as if they were tariffs because they drive a wedge between
international prices and domestic prices.
Protection or Revenue
Historically, tariffs have been a major source of government revenue for
many trading nations including the United States. The famous tea import
tariffs imposed on the 13 original American colonies had no protective
value. They were simply a tax on colonial tea consumers. The revenues
went to the British government.
Tariffs are attractive as a government revenue source because of the
ease with which they can be collected. This is especially so for numerous
developing countries, since income or profit taxes are difficult to obtain.
However, most developed countries now levy tariffs mainly to protect
domestic industries rather than raise revenue. For example, United
States tariff revenues in 1977 were only 1.4 percent of all government
receipts.
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Reasons for Protection
When businessmen, farmers, or political leaders call for government-
sponsored trade protection on behalf of an industry, they may advance
many reasons. These reasons can be classified into a relatively few
categories for discussion.
Protect a new industry. Tariffs and quotas often are used to protect
new industries. For example, suppose that nation A does not produce
cotton but buys it from nation B. Cost studies show that if A attempted to
produce its own cotton the cost would be higher than B's cotton price.
However, the studies also show that A's cost disadvantage is only a short-
term problem. If A somehow could begin cotton production it might in
time be just as efficient or perhaps more efficient than B. But time and
money are required to construct efficient irrigation facilities, train pro-
ducers, and obtain specialized equipment. To enable A to get into cotton
production, a tariff might be added to the price of cotton imports from B
so that producers in A could begin to compete in the local market.
Through the tariff, the consumers of nation A would pay a subsidy to
their cotton producers, hoping that someday the new industry would be
efficient. Economists call this the "infant industry" argument for
protection.
If a fledgling industry has the political power to obtain a protective
tariff, it may have the political power to continue it. When this occurs the
infant may never grow up, and consumers may find themselves perma-
nently protecting jobs and incomes in the favored industry.
Protect national security. With trade, specialization in production
tends to occur among nations. This tendency toward international spe-
cialization might cause a particular domestic industry to shrink below
the size considered prudent for strategic reasons.
In times of international upheaval or actual war, trade may shrink or
stop entirely. If nation A were dependent upon nation B for the weapons
of war, then A would be especially vulnerable. Consequently, many
nations maintain industries that produce the essentials of war — food
and weapons — even though the principles of free trade dictate other-
wise. Maintaining industries not economically efficient reduces a na-
tion's level of living. However, if a nation might cease to exist by losing a
war, then its citizens might willingly lower their living standards to
protect industries thought to be essential to national defense. These
might include agriculture, oil, steel, aircraft, and electronics.
Many nations are substantial food importers. Some would be even
larger food importers if full international specialization in food produc-
tion occurred. But most cling to some minimum level of self-sufficiency
for national security reasons. Bitter past experience with food shortages
caused by trade disruption and war underpin this policy.
If a particular industry is truly essential to national security, then the
argument for raising protective trade barriers is reasonable. However, it is
difficult to identify such industries and to assess the trade-offs that their
protection involves by lowering national income during peacetime.
Protect national health. The free trade of goods between nations may
be restricted for health reasons. The United States prohibits the importa-
tion of fresh or frozen beef from countries that have a history of foot-and-
mouth disease. Likewise, some nations restrict imports of U.S. frozen
poultry, fearing infection of their flocks with Newcastle disease. In some
countries, including the United States, metropolitan areas do not permit
fluid milk to be sold within their jurisdiction unless the dairy farms,
domestic or foreign, have been approved by their own inspectors.
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Clearly, governments are wise to regulate trade in products potential-
ly injurious to public health. However, the health argument sometimes is
used arbitrarily to protect the economic health of some industry. Trade
restraints established for health reasons should be reexamined period-
ically to see if the hazard really exists.
Protect against "unfair" foreign trade policy. Most trading nations
try to restrict imports of competitive goods when they feel exporters are
selling excess production below production costs on international mar-
kets and disrupting normal trade. Some exporters attempt to dispose of
surplus production or capture new markets by offering goods interna-
tionally at prices lower than internal levels. Export subsidies, multiple
price schemes, and/or tax advantages may be used to do this. Special
credit arrangements or price concessions on other export items also may
be offered to importers. Selling internationally at prices below domestic
production costs is called "dumping." Recently, the Japanese steel in-
dustry has been accused of dumping steel into the U.S. market at below-
cost prices. In the 1950s and 1960s our Public Law 480 program was
viewed by some as mainly a dumping mechanism for surplus U.S. farm
commodities.
Consumers of importing nations typically favor the purchase of world
market goods offered at low prices. However, producer groups and do-
mestic merchants often succeed in obtaining countervailing duties, quo-
tas, and special restrictions. These are called "antidumping" measures.
Protect domestic programs. When a government supports the market
price of any commodity above world levels, some form of import control
is required to prevent its being swamped by goods from abroad. This is a
very difficult problem for many trading nations which provide farm
income support through high, guaranteed prices.
When a national program is established to set market prices above
market-clearing or world levels, the amount supplied to that national
market, whether from domestic or foreign sources, normally will exceed
the amount demanded for consumption. Unless the government operat-
ing the program has a bottomless treasury, some means of controlling
supplies offered for sale at the support price must be found. Action
usually is taken against imports, if there are any, to bring demand and
supply into balance at the support price without resorting to unpopular
controls on domestic producers. But even if some form of internal pro-
duction restraint is used, import controls are needed to keep the program
from being inundated from abroad. Section 22 import quotas under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 provide this protection for a num-
ber of price-supported U.S. farm products such as grains and dairy
products.
- Protect the balance of payments. When a nation's payments to
foreigners persistently exceed its earnings from them, the country has an
international balance of payments problem. If balance of payments diffi-
culties continue, confidence in the nation's currency and economic
strength is undermined. As a result, downward pressures develop on the
value of the nation's currency relative to other currencies.
To stave off currency devaluation, a government may attempt to
duce payments to foreigners by restricting the entry of imported goods.
'the nation's export earnings remain the same, the reduction of imports
yvill tend to bring the nation's international payments account toward
b_alance. However, foreign earnings may not stay the same. They may
decrease because: (1) foreigners, earning less of the restricting nation's
Currency from imports, may buy less from it, turning instead to other
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suppliefs, and (2) foreign governments may retaliate by raising their own
trade barriers against products from the restricting nation.
Improve the international terms of trade. An important importing
nation may be able to force down the world price of a traded product by
imposing a tariff on it. This will improve the nation's terms of trade. The
theoretical rationale for such a maneuver is based upon the ability of the
large importer nation to exert monopoly power on international prices
and thereby secure more favorable terms of trade for itself. This motive
for imposing a tariff is not primarily for protection, but . a domestic
industry producing this.particular item or its substitute will gain protec-
tion indirectly. Economists call this the "optimal" tariff argument.
Protect against painful economic adjustment. As economic changes
occur around the world, it is inevitable that familiar patterns of compara-
tive and absolute advantage will erode, and new ones will evolve. Previ-
ously strong and vigorous domestic industries may find themselves
facing heavy competition from imports of foreign goods. This is a clear
signal for some economic adjustment.
If the increased import flow and the resulting downward pressure on
domestic prices and sales are not caused by dumping by foreign sellers,
some domestic producers may be forced either to leave the affected
industry, accept lower returns, or become more efficient. For the people
involved this often is a difficult and painful choice. For some resources
like highly specialized buildings and equipment there may be no choice.
Thus, it is not at all surprising that industrial leaders and their
representatives first seek government protection when imports threaten
traditional domestic markets. Such threats constitute the main reason for
today's protectionist sentiment in the United States. Although other
reasons, such as those mentioned earlier, may be presented and argued,
the desire to avoid harsh economic adjustment usually lies behind the
drive for new or stricter import controls. This is especially true in agricul-
ture and basic industries of trading nations, including the United States.
Resources in these industries are traditionally less mobile than else-
where. Moreover, powerful economic and technical changes quite apart
from foreign competition already are at work within these industries.
To accuse adversely affected groups of selfishness, greed, or short-
sightedness when they propose higher tariffs and tighter quotas is to be
naive about the real problems of economic adjustment. Industrial jobs
lost to import competition are not always similar to those that open in
other industries, nor are they always located in the same geographic area.
The presence of general unemployment throughout an economy can
aggravate this picture even further. Specialized machinery, buildings,
tools, and other facilities may be rooted permanently in the affected
industries with no alternative uses. They will continue to be employed
even at low returns until they simply wear out. But we must remember
that protecting an industry from onerous resource adjustments means
that we sustain higher long-run costs and inefficiencies throughout the
economy.
Economic Effects of Import Protection
Who pays when a tariff or a quota is enacted? Suppose the United States
imposes a new tariff on natural rubber imports. As prices inside this
country increase, the tire industry likely will reduce its use of natural
rubber, switching further to synthetic rubber. Prices of other items con-
taining natural rubber will rise, inducing buyers to cut down on their use.
Eventually, this will cause a reduction in natural rubber imports, possi-
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bly causing a drop in world market prices for natural rubber. Still, the
final consumer pays more for items that contain natural rubber. The
difference between lower international prices and higher domestic
prices is absorbed by the U.S. government as an import duty. The reduc-
tion in world demand leads to a reduction in export earnings of rubber
exporting countries like Malaysia and Thailand. Thus, foreign producers
share the burden of the new import duty with U.S. consumers.
The distribution of this burden between the U.S. and the rubber-
exporters depends mainly on two factors — the U.S. share in the world
market for natural rubber, and the extent to which other products will be
used instead of natural rubber as its price increases. The larger the market
share of the tariff-imposing country, the greater the effect on world
market prices. Since, in this illustration, the U.S. is the largest single
importer of natural rubber, its imports are critical in the price-formation
process for natural rubber. The effect of a new import tax likely would be
strongly felt in the exporting countries. The burden for U.S. consumers
depends on how price-responsive (elastic) the demand for rubber is.
As the natural rubber price rises because of the tariff, consumers will
switch toward items using synthetic rubber. To the extent that synthetic
rubber is more costly than natural rubber, or lower in quality, consumers
will reduce purchases of all rubber-using products. Here, the burden on.
consumers is reflected in higher prices, lower purchases, and substitu-
tion toward synthetic products. The tariff-laden price of natural rubber
also will provide protection to the makers of synthetic rubber products.
Their prices may increase and sales expand as imports fall.
The overall economic effects are a tax on consumers, an indirect
subsidy to the protected industry, and a narrowing of markets and possi-
bly lower prices for exporters. More people and other resources may be
employed in the protected industry or remain there longer than other-
wise. So it is important to consider: (1) where and how efficiently these
resources might be used elsewhere in the economy, and (2) whether a
tariff is the best means of insuring both income and employment.
International Adjustments
The behavior of a country in its economic relations with the rest of the
world can be likened to that of a family. For a short period a family can
spend more than its current earnings by dipping into savings, by obtain-
ing loans, or by selling assets. If this continues savings and assets eventu-
ally will be depleted, and the family's credit for more loans will dry up.
So, in some way, the family will have to adjust its behavior by reducing
its expenditures, raising its income, or both.
The flows of currency between nations largely reflect flows of exports
and imports. If a nation's exports exceed its imports, then its central bank
accumulates foreign exchange reserves. This is like a family's building
Up financial reserves through savings. Although central banks accumu-
late foreign exchange reserves for several reasons, a major purpose Is to
allow the nation to import more than it exports for some period. When
imports exceed exports, a nation's foreign exchange reserves dwindle,
threatening its ability to continue importing at the current level.
If a nation spends more for imports than it earns from exports (and any
net capital inflow), it is experiencing a "balance of payments deficit."
(The reverse is a "balance of payments surplus.") A deficit nation can
draw on its accumulated reserves of foreign currencies; it can sell gold; it
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can accept credit from other countries, thereby increasing its external
debt. Since a country, like a family, cannot incur external debts or sell
assets indefinitely, some adjustments must eventually occur.
One remedy likely to be considered first is to control imports by new
tariffs, quotas, or voluntary trade restraints negotiated with exporters. As
mentioned, this is not a long-run solution. Exports also may fall as
foreign nations retaliate with new tariffs and as their export earnings,
hence their imports, decline.
A more permanent solution is to enhance the level of the nation's
exports by specific national policies which improve the operation of the
export sector. Tax advantages and other fiscal incentives to exporters also
may be used. However, such indirect solutions to a payments deficit are
likely to work over a lengthy period, not quickly.
Adjustments that can occur more quickly involve changes in curren-
cy exchange rates through international money markets. Japanese im-
porters of U.S. soybeans pay our exporters in U.S. dollars. Exporters,
merchants, and farmers have no direct use for Japanese yen. (Even if an
export contract stipulates payment in yen, U.S. exporters would change
them into dollars.) The number of yen a Japanese importer has to pay for
one dollar is the exchange rate between dollars and yen. This rate is the
number of units of one currency that can be exchanged for one unit of
another at a given time. Today, the currencies of most trading nations are
bought and sold daily on open money markets around the world; their
prices in terms of other currencies (rates of exchange) are determined
continuously.
The prices of physical commodities like corn or soybeans are deter-
mined through the interplay of market demand and supply. The soybean-
corn price ratio over time is an indicator of changing conditions between
soybean and corn markets. For example, an increase in this ratio reflects a
strengthening of soybean relative to corn markets. Exchange rate changes
between the yen and the dollar have a similar interpretation. If this rate
dropped from 250 yen for one dollar to 200, the yen "went up," and the
dollar "went down." In other words, the yen became more expensive and
the dollar became cheaper. The Japanese importer now has to give up
only 200 yen to buy one dollar. Before it was 250.
What caused this exchange rate change? The demand for yen relative
to its supply in international money markets has increased in comparison
with the dollar. Consider how this occurs. When a nation like the United
States has a sizeable trade deficit, more of its currency is paid to foreign-
ers than is being earned. These excess dollars in foreigners' accounts
exert downward pressure on the price of dollars in terms of other curren-
cies to the extent that foreigners sell excess dollars for their own or other
currencies. In an open currency market like this, the yen price of dollars
will "float" down. Similarly, the dollar price of yen will increase. Over
periods of weeks and months, the value of a deficit nation's currency will
fall, and that of a surplus nation will rise.
These exchange rate adjustments will push international accounts
toward a balance as: (1) the international prices of deficit nations' exports
fall in foreign currency terms, and (2) the international prices of imports
increase in domestic currency terms. Governments may try to stave-off
such adjustments by having central banks purchase or sell large amounts
of currencies on money markets or by directly blocking exchange rate
changes via administrative controls. Many other complexities of interna-
tional finance affect the balance of payments, but they are beyond this
chapter's scope.
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Concluding Comments
The theory of international trade as it has evolved over the past 150 years
does not attempt to exhaust the reality of modern commerce. By means of
simplification and abstraction, it tries to lay bare the crucial long-run
forces at work in international exchange. It tries to help us understand
and analyze economic events based on a plausible and internally consist-
ent structure of ideas. It does not do a complete job because the theory is
not a perfect reflection of the world, and vice versa. Moreover, the logic
and application of trade theory need not always imply completely free
trade as a national policy.
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Introduction
Chapter 1 presented a review of world trade institutions and the histori-
cal development of U.S. trade policies. Chapter 2 presented the theoreti-
cal basis for why trade among nations takes place and the devices nations
sometimes use to restrict trade. In this chapter we focus on interrelation-
ships between domestic agricultural price and income policies and inter-
n:atonal trade policies of principal trading countries. It is divided into
five parts: (1) a brief review of the objectives of domestic farm policies
and the tendency for trade policies to accommodate domestic policies;
(2) the economics of interdependence between trading nations; (3) the
effects of United States domestic agricultural and trade policies; (4) the
effects of domestic agricultural and trade policies in other principal
trading countries; and (5) conclusions and implications for the United
States.
Domestic Farm Policy Objectives and their
Implications for Trade
The objectives of general economic policy in most nations include full
ployment, price stability, adequate economic growth, productive effi-
ciency, and equitable distribution of income. Different countries place
different emphasis on each of these objectives depending upon the time
and the stage of economic development. Furthermore, each country has
its own interpretation of "adequate," "efficient," and "equitable."
In the early 1930s, during the Great Depression, many countries
attempted to maintain employment and increase incomes through van -
3
37
ous policy measures. These were extended to agriculture to stabilize farm
prices and incomes because it was believed that instability in the agricul-
tural sector posed an important source of instability for the general
economy.
As economic growth has occurred and per capita incomes have risen
since World War II, the industrial sector of every developed economy has
expanded relative to the agricultural sector. Agriculture's share of the
gross national product and employment of the labor force both declined.
Therefore, since World War II, instability in the agricultural sectors of
developed countries has had a smaller impact on the general economy.
As problems of instability were perceived to be of less importance, equity
considerations became the driving force behind direct government in-
volvement in agriculture. Nevertheless, the recurrence of economic in-
stability in the early 1970s raised again questions of how instability in the
agricultural sector affects the general economy.
Technological Transformation of U.S. Agriculture
Since the early 1950s U.S. agriculture has undergone a technological
transformation which greatly increased resource productivity and out-
put potential. Capital in the form of chemical, biological, and mechanical
innovations was substituted for land and labor. Increased output in the
face of an inelastic and slowly growing demand tended to depress farm
prices and incomes, thus creating the necessity for labor resources to shift
out of agriculture and for other modifications in resource use, such as
growth in farm size, to occur. Although large resource adjustments oc-
curred, per capita incomes in agriculture still lagged behind the nonfarm
economy.
Policy efforts to support farm income made use of such measures as
price supports, storage programs, direct payments to producers, subsi-
dized inputs, acreage allotments, and marketing quotas—to name a few.
The technological transformation of U.S. agriculture has been of
fundamental importance in the development of U.S. agricultural poli-
cies. Similar but possibly less rapid technological change also has char-
acterized agriculture in most other developed countries. Even so, the
policy response of a particular country has been highly individualistic,
depending upon its particular set of circumstances, its policy goals, and
the set of policy instruments it considers acceptable. '
Farm Policy Variations between Countries
In the United States, Western Europe, and Japan price support policies
were developed with the objectives of maintaining farm income while
capital was substituted for labor. In the United States, labor shifted out of
the sector rapidly, while in other developed countries policies tended to
hold labor in the agricultural sector. In Western Europe agricultural
policies placed much less emphasis on increased efficiency available
through land consolidation, although some moves in that direction have
occurred.
Both developed and less developed countries (LDCs) who are net
importers of agricultural products have had a goal of increasing domestic
food production. Western Europe and Japan in particular have empha-
sized the objective of self-sufficiency in food production in the interest of
national security. A deliberate decision has been made to sacrifice eco-
nomic efficiency which could be attained through greater dependence on
trade in agricultural products, for greater national security and protec-
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tion for their own producers. The costs of these policies continue to be
debated.
Developed countries such as the U.S. and Canada, which have large
net exports of agricultural products, have adopted trade policies de-
signed to exploit the comparative advantage they have in the production
of export products. They have sought increased access to foreign markets
for agricultural products which would permit them to increase their
foreign exchange earnings.
The European Community (EC) grains policy represents an example
of a domestic-farm program that requires interference with trade in grain.
Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC, prices of grains
are supported at a level above world export prices. Prices to producers are
maintained through a system of government purchases and limits placed
on imports. A duty is set equal to the difference between the lowest
offering price for grain in the port of Rotterdam and the domestic support
price. It is recalculated daily and, therefore, keeps imported grain from
selling for less than domestically produced grain, regardless of how
world market conditions change. Export subsidies are then used to dis-
pose of stocks when excessive levels are reached.
In LDCs increasing agricultural exports is one of the few means
available for earning essential foreign exchange to acquire capital invest-
ment goods and the technology necessary for modernization and devel-
opment. Likewise, foreign exchange is needed for acquiring consumer
goods not locally available. However, rather than attempting to expand
production of those goods in which they have a comparative advantage,
many LDCs have followed import substitution (produce-at-home) poli-
cies under the assumption that this approach contributes more to eco-
nomic development. With this approach infant industries often are
Protected in hopes that such industries will become competitive and able
to supply domestic and export markets. In addition trade often is re-
stricted in an attempt to correct balance of payments deficits rather than
rely on more general economic and monetary policy.
With the exception of a few countries such as West Germany, the
Netherlands, and Japan, the trade sector is generally much smaller than
the domestic sector of the economy. Since the trade sector is a smaller
sector, benefits from increased exports tend to accrue, at least initially, to
only a part of the total economy. Likewise, large benefits from restricting
imports may accrue to a small number of domestic producers who com-
Pete for the same market. The higher costs to consumers are spread over a
large number of people. But even when the costs to each consumer have
reached significant levels, they generally have not been able to generate
significant political opposition to the import restrictions.
Dominance of Domestic Policy
When trade policy objectives conflict with domestic policy objectives, in
both developed economies and LDCs, domestic policy almost, always
dominates. As a result, trade in certain agricultural products may be
selectively restricted even when the country's general policy is to pro-
mote freer trade. U.S. dairy trade policy is a good example of such an
accommodation. Imports of manufactured dairy products are restricted
to a small percent of domestic consumption, even though the United
States follows a policy of negotiating for freer access for its exports to
other countries' markets. The grains policy in the EC is another example
of a domestic farm program that requires interference with trade,
39
The Economics of Interdependence among Trading Nations
This section presents a graphical technique which serves two purposes:
(1) it illustrates the interdependence among agricultural sectors of coun-
tries which are linked together through international trade, and (2) it
provides an analytical tool which permits one to analyze the effect of
various trade and domestic policy measures. More specifically, it will
show that export quantities are determined by price rather than a "sur-
plus" in an exporting country or a "shortage" in an importing country.
The framework is based on conventional economic logic. When the
price of a product rises, its producers respond by supplying more of the
good to the market; consumers respond by demanding less. When the
price falls, consumers demand more and producers want to supply less.
This behavior can be represented for a given product, say wheat, as in
figure 1. An upward sloping supply curve, labeled S, and a downward
sloping demand curve, labeled D, can represent the collective behavior of
all suppliers and demanders, respectively, in an economy. The two
graphs in figure 1 illustrate hypothetical supply and demand curves for
two countries—e.g., the United States and West Germany. For now,
assume the two countries are isolated or out of contact from world trade
in the commodity represented by the graphs. (In this sense they are
"closed" economies—i.e., closed to foreign trade.) The points where the
supply and demand curves in the two graphs intersect are the only price--
quantity combinations at which both consumers and producers are satis-
fied in each country. In this sense the price A and the quantity OB are
equilibrium dimensions in the United States, as are price C and quantity
OE in West Germany.
In this example the equilibrium price C in West Germany is much
higher than the price in the U.S. This would be the situation in free
market economies if West Germany's resources were not as well-adapted
to production of the commodity as U.S. resources. If the high West
Germany price C prevailed in the U.S., our producers would produce
more than OB and consumers would buy less. There would be a surplus
or excess supply in the U.S. at that price. If the low U.S. equilibrium price
Figure 1. Illustration of Domestic Supply and Demand Curves in the
United States and West Germany when Considered to be Closed
Economies ,
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A prevailed in West Germany, their producers would supply less than
OE, and their consumers would try to buy more. Then there would be a
shortage or excess demand in West Germany.
At various differing prices in each market a different quantity of
excess supply in the U.S. (or excess demand in West Germany) would be
obtained. These quantities may be plotted against price on another graph
as excess supply and excess demand curves, as in the center panel of
figure 2. (The two outer panels reproduce the two graphs from figure 1.)
These curves (or lines) can then be interpreted as export supply and
import demand relationships. This illustrates that a different quantity of
export supply or import demand is associated with every price in each
market. At the closed economy prices of A in the U.S. and C in West
Germany, the quantity supplied for export by the United States and the
import quantity demanded in West Germany both equal zero. The center
panel represents the world market which can be in equilibrium only
when the amount traded equals both the export supply quantity and the
import demand quantity.
Now assume that the barrier to trade that existed between the two
countries is removed; i.e., the economies become open to trade. When
trade is permitted the price rises in the United States and falls in West
Germany until the export quantity in the United States exactly equals the
import quantity in West Germany. In the U.S. at price G (=W), consump-
tion falls from OB to OH, and production increases from OB to OF. In
West Germany consumption increases from OE to OM at price Z (=W),
and production falls from OE to 0J. Exports from the U.S. equal imports
of West Germany (HF=OU=j1\4). Prices are equalized in all markets at
Z.1 The important lesson from this is that when trade is permitted,
internal market prices in each trading country are determined by both the
domestic market and world markets.
'A constant exchange rate between the currencies of the exporting and importing countries is assumed here. The
effects of changing the exchange rate are discussed later in this chapter. Transportation costs are ignored for now in
the analysis, but they too are discussed later in the chapter. The reader is reminded that this framework treats only
one commodity or product at a time. It assumes that all other input and output prices, real per capita income,
Population, production technology, and consumer tastes and preferences in each economy are assumed not to
change.
Figure 2. Illustration of the Effects in the United States and West Ger-
many after Opening-Up International Trade
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The analytical framework presented in figure 2 can be used to illus-
trate the effects of changes in demand or supply in either the United
States or West Germany. Likewise, it can be used to illustrate the effects of
domestic policies or trade policies imposed by either of the two coun-
tries. For example, a change originating in the United States will shift
either the domestic demand or supply curve, depending upon its source.
This will bring about a shift in the U.S. export supply curve which will
affect the quantity and price in the world market. This in turn will
determine the quantity and the price of the product imported by West
Germany. A change originating in West Germany will cause its import
demand curve to shift. Effects of this shift can be traced through to the
United States. Thus, the graphical approach portrays the interdepen-
dence of two countries linked by a connecting "world" market for a
particular product.
The graphical approach also illustrates how all consumers and pro-
ducers are affected by changes originating in either country. For exam-
ple, in figure 2 when trade was opened up between the two countries
German consumers benefited. They were able to acquire a larger quantity
of product at a lower price. German producers, however, would receive
lower prices for their product and would sell a smaller quantity. On the
other hand U.S. producers would benefit from higher prices and would
expand their output. U.S. consumers would pay a higher price for a
smaller quantity of the product as exports expanded..
The analysis indicates why either producer or consumer groups may
favor protectionist policies over free trade, even though total world
output and welfare are increased as explained in chapter 2. The model, as
presented in figure 2, represents a simple two-country world, the U.S.
and West Germany, but it can be expanded to include more than one
importing country. The figure on the right can include aggregations of
domestic demand and supply curves for all other trading countries; i.e.,
all importing and all other exporting countries in the rest of the world
(ROW). The import demand curve in the center figure would represent
world import demand as viewed by the U.S.
With this introduction to the benefits and cost of trade, we turn now to
examine policies used to protect domestic markets from import competi-
tion. The reader can skip the following graphical presentations without
losing continuity of the analysis if he or she prefers, as the framelWork also
is presented in the text. Elaboration of each figure is included in notes
below the figure.
Effects of United States Domestic Agricultural and
Trade Policies
U.S. Price Support
For most of the period since the 1930s the U.S. government supported
wheat, feed grains, and cotton prices at levels above the world price with
the objective of raising U.S. farm income above what it otherwise would
have been. Prices were supported through nonrecourse loans to farmers
and government purchase programs.
When the loan rate is set above the market price the government loan
rate becomes the price to which consumers and producers respond, since
producers can turn the commodity over to the government at that price.
At the higher price consumers reduce their purchases, and producers
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increase their sales (figure 3). The quantity available for export increases.
But at the higher price the rest of the world (ROW) will purchase less of
the commodity.
If U.S. support prices were set sufficiently high, exports would cease
and imports of the commodity would be attracted into the U.S. In order to
avoid this possibility, Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933 provides for the use of quotas and duties for limiting the imports of
those commodities for which price supports are in effect.
When the U.S. supports its grain prices above the international mar-
ket clearing equilibrium price, stocks are accumulated in the U.S. and
less is imported by other countries. Domestic prices in the importing
countries tend to rise. Foreign producers expand their production to
make up for part of the quantity formerly imported. Consumption is less
than before prices were raised in the U.S.
As storage stocks increase and storage costs escalate in the U.S.
various means are sought for disposing of the surplus. This requires
either export subsidies or controls on production to keep stocks from
continuing to grow.
Export subsidies paid to grain exporting firms enable them to buy
grain at the internal market price and sell it at the lower world price. An
alternative to the subsidy is for exporting firms to export grain they have
Figure 3. Illustration of the Effects in the United States and the Rest of the
World of a Price Support Policy for Grain in the United States
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Without price supports in the U.S., prices would be equal in the U.S. and the rest of the
World (ROW); i.e., price G = price W = price Z. When prices in the U.S. are supported at
Price A, consumption in the U.S. is reduced from quantity OB to quantity OC; production
increases from quantity OF to quantity OE. The government would be required to
Purchase the difference between the amount produced, quantity OE, and the amount
Consumed, quantity OC. Government purchases would be CE. If the U.S. prices itself
_completely out of the export market by setting its price at A (import demand at price
Y—which equals A—is zero), production in ROW would increase from quantity Oj to OK.
Consumption in ROW would decline from quantity OM to OK, and price would rise to S.
If the U.S. decides to dispose of its stocks in the export market, an export subsidy
ould be required. Exporting quantity OX would cause the world price to fall to T so that
t1).e subsidy on each bushel would be equal to the difference between the U.S. price A andthe world price T. The price in ROW would decline to V; production would decline to
9uantity OR, and consumption would increase to quantity ON. ROW imports would then
sb e t h e quantity RN, which equals OX. The effect of the U.S. price support and export
_ubsidy program is to raise the price, reduce consumption, and increase exports in the
u S., and reduce prices and increase consumption in the rest of the world.
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acquired from the market and have it replaced with grain from Commodi-
ty Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks at export prices. In this case the CCC
assumes the loss—equivalent to the export subsidy in the former case.
Credit is required to facilitate the transfer of grains between exporters
and importers. The bulk of this credit is supplied by or through grain
exporting companies and private banks. Government subsidized credit
also is available for increasing trade. The CCC is authorized to provide a
limited amount of credit on an intermediate term basis at rates below the
market rate to selected foreign buyers in cases where it is determined that
sales could not be made without extension of this type of credit. This
represents an export subsidy which is of smaller magnitude than the
direct subsidy paid on each unit exported.
Other forms of export subsidies to reduce government stocks are
included in Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, discussed in chapter 1.
The extent of the export subsidy for P.L. 480 commodity shipments
depends on the method used for disposing of grain. Such shipments
reduce U.S. government stocks and increase consumption of the com-
modity in recipient countries. The imported commodities lower prices in
the importing country and tend to discourage local farmers from increas-
ing their production.
Programs that Limit Farm Output
Reducing the amount of grain produced at the government support price
is an alternative means for reducing stocks and for supporting farm
income. Production may be reduced through a system of marketing
quotas or by paying farmers to hold land out of production.
Input restriction programs, such as land diversion or set-aside pro-
grams, tend to reduce production of the particular commodity. A reduc-
Figure 4. Illustration of the Effects in the U.S. and the Rest of the World of
an Input Restriction Policy in the United States
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Input restrictions could take the form of acreage allotments or payments made to
farmers to hold land out of production. Input restrictions cause the S curve in the U.S. to
shift up to the left. Subsequently, the export supply curve of the U.S. shifts left also. The
equilibrium price in all three markets increases; consumption and production in the U.S.
decline. Exports decline from quantity OU to OX. Consumption in the ROW declines, and
production increases to substitute for part of the export reduction.
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tion in U.S. supply also reduces the quantity available for export (figure
4). As a result the equilibrium price increases in both the U.S. and foreign
markets. Both production and consumption fall in the U.S. with produc-
tion tending to decline more than consumption. Production increases
and consumption declines in the ROW due to the higher world price.
Deficiency Payment Programs
A deficiency payment program also may be used to raise farm incomes. In
this case the government guarantees farmers a target price above the
market price, stimulating larger production. However, rather than buy-
ing up the excess, as with price supports, the whole crop is sold for
whatever price the market will bear. Then the government makes up the
difference between that price and the guaranteed price by a "deficiency
Payment" to the farmer.
Various forms of deficiency payments have been used to support U.S.
farm income. The Emergency Feed Grain Program of 1961 included
direct payments per bushel of corn on allotted production. The 1973
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act incorporated the target price
concept in addition to the loan rate for specified commodities. The Food
and Agriculture Act of 1977 contains provisions for target prices and
deficiency payments.
If no limits are placed on production, a target price when above the
market price stimulates larger production (figure 5). With larger
Production the international market clearing price declines and exports
Figure 5. Illustration of the Effects in the U.S. and the Rest of the World of
a Deficiency Payment Policy in the United States
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If the target price in the U.S. is set at A, which is above the equilibrium Price G,
Production would be increased from quantity OF to OE. Even though the market price in
we U.S. might fall below the target price, the quantity produced would be maintained at
quantity OE since producers are assured of the target price as a minimum price. In effect,this means that the U.S. supply relation is vertical from quantity OE up to the point whereit joins the S relation at target price A.
The segment OH now replaces part of the export supply curve in the world market.ine new export supply curve is the bold black line. Exports from the U.S. to ROW increasesr
om quantity OU to OX. The world market clearing price falls from W to T and by equal
amounts in the U.S. and ROW. Consumption in both the U.S. and ROW increases, but
Production in ROW declines.
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increase. U.S. consumption also increases as a result of the lower market
price. A deficiency payment would be required on each unit of
production.
There are important differences in the trade effects of this approach
and the cases of supporting farm incomes by using either loan rates or
input restrictions. In those two cases exports fall as the U.S. raises its
prices, in effect tending to price itself out of the export market. With
deficiency payments the market is permitted to clear by letting the price
to consumers and the export price fall. The Treasury cost of the deficien-
cy payments may be higher or lower than the cost of a price-support
program depending upon how much import buyers increase their pur-
chases at the lower export prices.
Changing Policy Directions
Since the mid-1960s U.S. agricultural policies for supporting farm in-
comes have depended less on high loan rates and export subsidies and
more on land retirement and direct payments to farmers. Beginning in
1961 with the emergency feed grain program, direct payments were
substituted for high price supports. These payments were made to farm-
ers rather than providing income support only through nonrecourse
loans. With the consumer price level in the 1960s increasing 1 to 3
percent per year and lower price supports in the form of lower loan rates,
the real price of grains declined. Larger exports became possible with less
dependence on export subsidy while incomes to farmers were supported.
However, during the late-1960s and into the 1970s the fixed dollar
exchange rates became increasingly overvalued. This had the same effect
as though a tax had been placed on all U.S. exports and a subsidy given on
all imports. The direct payments provided some compensation to grain
farmers for the implicit tax on exports. (This is discussed further under
the section on LDCs.) Restrictive dairy and meat import policies also
provided some protection for the subsidized imports associated with the
overvaluation.
The export subsidy program ended in 1972 as government grain
stocks were depleted following the large sale of wheat to the USSR. The
1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act incorporated the target
price concept in addition to the loan rate for specified commodities.
Separation of income and price support was to facilitate the continued
movement of commodities into export markets. The 1973 act provided
minimum loan rates and target prices for wheat, feed grains, and cotton at
levels which turned out to be below market prices throughout the life of
the act. Export subsidies were not required. For a short time in 1973 and
1974 import quotas authorized under Section 22 were lifted for wheat
and dairy products. Only a very small amount of wheat was imported
while manufactured dairy product imports increased significantly before
the suspension was ended.
The Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 raised the level of target prices
and loan rates for wheat, feed grains, and cotton, while maintaining the
concepts that had been introduced in the 1973 act. Following past prac-
tice, no target price was established for soybeans. Annual adjustments in
target prices are provided after 1978, based on changes in costs of produc-
tion. The target prices provide the basis on which deficiency payments
are made to producers. The 1977 act provides minimum loan rates which
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are below the target prices for 1978 to 1981. The loan rates are not
automatically increased like the target prices and may be adjusted down-
ward if they tend to keep grain from moving into export markets. The act
also gives the Secretary of Agriculture considerable discretion to raise
loan rates if he considers that higher loan rates would not significantly
interfere with maintaining exports.
The exchange rate of the dollar declined further after establishment of
the initial loan rates for 1977 and 1978, although more with respect to the
German mark and the Japanese yen than with most other currencies. This
provides some offset to the higher support prices, so they will interfere
less with exports than otherwise would have been expected.
No direct price support programs similar to those for grains and
cotton exist for fruits, vegetables, or processed foods. However, limited
price support is provided for some of these commodities. Marketing
orders which provide for separation of markets or make other provisions
for orderly marketing tend to provide some price support. Also, domestic
programs such as school lunch programs, food stamps, and discretionary
government purchases under other programs which increase demand
provide a limited amount of support for these products. These products
are influenced also by price supports on grains and cotton to the extent
that they all compete for many of the same production resources. Occa-
sionally export subsidies have been used to move fruits, vegetables, and
processed foods into export markets.
The U.S. imports three principal groups of commodities which com-
pete with domestic production—dairy products, beef, and sugar. The
1977 Act continued price support for dairy products through purchase of
manufactured dairy products. Since U.S. price levels attract manufac-
tured dairy products into U.S. markets, Section 22 continues to be used to
restrict their import.
No direct price support program exists for supporting income to beef
Producers, although the Meat Import Act of 1964 provides a quota system
that limits imports of beef. Limits on imports have the same effect as a
Price support system. The quota procedure includes a growth factor
Which allows imports to grow as the U.S. beef market expands.
Notification of impending imposition of the quota and discussions
With importers have kept beef imports from rising to the trigger point
Which would cause imports to be stopped. The imported beef competes
mainly with cow beef and lower grade beef used in hamburger and
Processed foods markets, rather than with the higher-grade, grain-fed
beef market in the U.S.
The Sugar Act was not extended after 1974, and for a short time
domestic sugar producers were exposed to competition from foreign
Producers. However, the 1977 Food and Agriculture Act reestablished a
price
-support loan and purchase program for 1977 and 1978 crops of
sugar cane and sugar beets.
About one-half of U.S. agricultural imports consist of products which
are considered complementary to U.S. products; i.e., they are not pro-
duced in commercial quantities in the U.S. The list includes bananas,
coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, spices, and other tropical products. No import
duties or quantitative restrictions are imposed against these products.
However, when U.S. currency is overvalued in foreign markets, imports
are in effect subsidized to the extent of the overvaluation.
47
Effects of Domestic Agricultural and Trade Policies in
other Principal Trading Countries
Almost 50 percent of all agricultural trade occurs between developed
countries. Developed countries import over 70 percent of all traded
agricultural products. The first part of this section analyzes policies of
major developed importers. This is followed by analysis of policies used
by major exporters other than the U.S. A final subsection considers the
policies followed by LDCs, a group of highly diverse countries in terms of
production and trade, which includes both net exporters and net
importers.
Major Developed Net Importers
European Community (EC). The European Economic Community (EEC)
was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. Members included West
Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. On
January 1, 1973 the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the
Community. In the interim the name was shortened to the European
Community (EC), as the institutions of the EEC were integrated with
those of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community.
Initial steps were taken in July of 1962 toward formation of a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which would unify the agricultural policies of
the six original members. The CAP became effective in July 1967. It is a
complex system which includes support prices for producers, govern-
ment purchase and storage of commodities, and direct payments to
producers. A system of variable levies and import licenses is used to keep
lower-priced imports from interfering with the domestic support system.
The system is designed to protect the agricultural sectors of the member
countries from outside competition.
In addition to protecting producer incomes, the CAP has objectives of:
(1) improving the efficiency of agricultural production in member coun-
tries through consolidation of fragmented landholdings and increased
mechanization, and (2) increasing the level of self-sufficiency in food
production of the combined membership. The overriding objectives,
however, are price stabilization and increasing producers' incomes.
Grains policy is the key element in the CAP. "Adequate" income for
the farm sector is to be attained through a system of support prices for
grain. Except for a short period in 1973 and 1974 when world grain prices
rose sharply, EC prices have been significantly above world grain prices.
The support system has three main elements: target price, interven-
tion price, and threshold price. The Ministers of Agriculture from each
country jointly decide the level of the target price in consultation with
representatives of producers. The decision considers changes in costs of
production. Prices are announced each August for the following produc-
tion year. The target price is the key element in the system, with other
prices tied to it.
The target price or desired wholesale price is set at a level which is
expected to provide "adequate" income to the sector. A wholesale price
is determined for the greatest grain deficit region in the EC—Duisburg-
Ruhrast, West Germany. The intervention price is set about 8 percent
below the target price. It is the price at which national intervention
agencies must buy cereals offered or pay for private storage. The inter-
vention prices vary throughout the EC depending upon the distance from
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the basing point, with the price being lower than the Duisburg-Ruhrast
price by the cost of transportation to that area. Corn is an exception since
the CAP provides for a single intervention price if domestic marketings
are less than 45 percent of domestic consumption.
When the EC establishes a price above the international equilibrium
price it must be prepared to buy all grain offered to it at the intervention
price. To avoid being flooded by imports at the higher-than-equilibrium
price, import quotas or duties are required to limit imports. A duty which
limits imports sufficiently to maintain the EC internal price causes prices
to decline in the ROW. After the duty is imposed, prices in the ROW are
lower than the international equilibrium price. Production in the ROW
declines and consumption increases.
The EC controls grain imports through a system of variable levies and
threshold prices. A threshold price is calculated in order to protect the
target price. It is the minimum import price in Rotterdam and is equal to
the Duisburg price less cost of transport from Rotterdam to Duisburg.
To ensure that the actual import price is equal to the threshold price a
levy is calculated equal to the difference between the threshold price and
the lowest import price offered at Rotterdam. It is calculated and reset
every day. When the import price exceeds the threshold price, the levy
drops to zero. It is a variable levy in the sense that as market conditions
change from day to day, the tax or levy changes just enough to accommo-
Figure 6. Illustration of the Effects in the Rest of the World and the
European Community of a Price Support Policy in the European
Community
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In this example the EC establishes a support price Z, above the international equilibri-
um price V in the EC and price Win the world market. If the EC were to agree to purchase
all grain offered at the support price Z, it would be supporting world market prices at that
level. In that case, EC production would increase from quantity OJ to OR, and consump-
tion would decline from quantity OM to ON. Import demand would decline from JM to
RN (OU to OX). In an open economy, the world market would offer OX' (=HI) of exports.
Production in the ROW would be increased from quantity OF to OI. The EC would have to
buY up stocks equal to XX' at the price Y.
To avoid having to buy quantity XX', the EC must restrict imports. It can use an import
quota or a duty to do this. As imports are restricted to quantity RN (=OX), price in ROWfalls to A and to price T in the world market. Production declines in the ROW and
consumption rises. As noted, consumption in the EC declines from quantity OM to ON
and domestic production rises. EC citizens pay 'a higher price and get less product as a
result of the EC policy. Prices are depressed in the ROW.
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date the domestic target price. As long as the threshold price exceeds the
import price, the variable levy effectively buffers the internal EC grain
market from fluctuations in world grain prices. When the import price is
above the target price, export taxes and quotas are used to keep internal
prices from exceeding the target price level.
EC grain trade is further controlled by licensing imports and export
transactions. The licenses are issued for a limited period of time and
require a deposit on intended transactions. The deposit is to assure that
the transaction is completed during the licensed period under penalty of
forfeiture of the deposit. Every type of grain is treated separately under
target prices and import levies, even though feed grains are close substi-
tutes. Soybeans and their products are not subject to the variable levy
system.
Because the variable levy differs among grains, the proportions in
which raw materials are used in processed feeds are significantly differ-
ent from those in the U.S. or other more market-oriented systems. Tapio-
ca chips, corn gluten meal, soybean meal, and other products against
which no variable levy applies are used in greater proportion in EC
livestock rations. As a result of the selective application of variable
levies, livestock rations may consist of large amounts of low-protein
carbohydrate sources such as tapioca chips supplemented by large
amounts of soybean meal, which is low in price relative to feed grains.
The pricing system is further complicated by the currency used for
establishing the target prices and the related intervention and threshold
prices. All are set in units of account, an artificial currency originally set
at par with the U.S. dollar. Since floating exchange rates came into use,
fixed exchange rates (the so-called "green rates") have been maintained
between each member country's currency and the unit of account for use
in administering agricultural price policy. ,
Use of the green rates tied to an artificial unit of account means that
prices of farm products can vary substantially among member countries
although a basic objective of the CAP is a system of common prices for all
EC countries. Prices tend to be higher in those countries with weak
currencies and lower in those with strong currencies. In trying to mini-
mize these price discrepancies and their impact on trade among member
states, the EC has used offsetting border taxes and subsidies. These
represent a return to the system of price differences and duties which
were in effect prior to implementation of the CAP in 1967. They represent
a further cumbersome step in pricing products. Problems with these
complex taxes and subsidies have led to repeated efforts to abolish the
green rates or at least bring them closer to market rates. But all the
proposed solutions would bring about changes in national agricultural
prices, the very thing that the member states sought to minimize with
introduction of the green rate; therefore, no quick solution appears in
sight.
Although grain price policy is the cornerstone of the CAP, livestock
prices are supported also. By 1970 about 90 percent of agricultural
production was under EC regulation. Negotiations among member coun-
tries are moving toward bringing virtually all EC farm production under
joint Community control.
In addition to grains intervention prices are set for sugar, rapeseed,
sunflowerseed, olive oil, beef, butter, nonfat dry milk, certain Italian
cheeses, and tobacco. Minimum import prices are established for dairy
products, beef, pork, poultry, eggs, olive oil, sugar, wines, certain fresh
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fruits and vegetables, and tomato concentrates, in addition to grains.
Thus, the system of support for livestock products varies among com-
modities. Intervention prices, minimum import prices, variable levies for
some products, and direct payments to producers are among the instru-
ments used.
As surplus agricultural commodities have been acquired by the inter-
vention agency, export subsidies (restitution payments) have been used
to move products into the export markets. In some cases products have
been exported for as little as one-fourth their acquisition costs. The CAP
contains no provisions for supply control. However, as surplus commod-
ities (particularly butter) have accumulated, modest programs have been
used to encourage the slaughter of dairy cows and the retirement of dairy
farmers above a specified age from farming.
After 10 years experience with the CAP, the EC has become self-
sufficient in some products formerly imported—notably wheat. Al-
though wheat is imported in order to acquire the desired mix of wheat
varieties for domestic consumption, domestic wheat is subsidized into
livestock feeding and exports may be subsidized. Imports of soybeans
and soybean meal which are not subject to the variable levy have contin-
ued to increase. Likewise, imports of feed grain substitutes not subject to
the levy, such as tapioca chips, have increased substantially.
Both farm prices and consumer food prices are more stable than in the
United States. EC consumers were not required to adjust their consump-
tion of grain and livestock products as world grain supplies varied
during the 1972-75 period to the extent that consumers in many other
countries found necessary. A consequence of this is that greater food
price stability in the EC contributes to greater instability in those coun-
tries which rely more on an open market system.
Maintenance of high food prices in the EC has limited the growth in
consumption of livestock products which accompanies rising real in-
come. Thus, export markets for feed grains have grown less than they
likely would have under a less-protected system. However, use of sup-
port prices for livestock products has enabled EC producers to feed price-
supported grain to livestock and expand livestock output.
Japan. japan is the largest single-country market for U.S. agricultural
products, even though imports of some products are severely restricted.
Japan controls its food grain trade to protect its rice industry.
The goals of domestic agricultural programs are to increase produc-
tion, maintain farm incomes, and bring about shifts in production pat-
terns. Although the overriding objective is to increase self-sufficiency in.
food production, the agricultural resource base severely limits attain-
ment of this objective.
Rice is the most important crop in Japan. It is produced on 50 percent
of all cultivated land. All rice is purchased from farmers by agents of the
Japan Food Agency. In 1977 the purchase price was over three and one-
half times the world price of rice. After milling, rice is resold to consum-
ers at a lower price. Japan is self-sufficient in rice production and does
not permit importation of. rice.
In 1977 wheat prices were supported at over five times the world
price. However, Japan produces only about 5 percent of the wheat it
consumes. All imported wheat is purchased by private firms at world
import prices for the japan Food Agency and is resold to millers at about
double the purchase price. Profits to the Food Agency help to finance the
rice program.
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Since rice is the key commodity and is subject to almost complete
government control, all other price supports are set relative to rice.
Annual increases in the support price for rice have required increases in
the support prices for other crops to avoid encouraging additional pro-
duction of rice, which is already in oversupply, and to encourage produc-
tion of other crops.
Livestock prices are supported through selective government pur-
chases and controls over imports. If the market price for beef falls below a
predetermined level, the government buys the commodity in an effort to
increase its price. If market price exceeds a specified level, the govern-
ment permits more beef imports.
Direct support prices are not available for pork, but prices are main-
tained within a range through government purchase and regulation of
pork imports. Thus, prices for beef and pork are administered in the sense
that government purchases are made to support prices, and import quo-
tas are adjusted to keep prices within a range.
Domestic agricultural policy and trade policy are closely coordi-
nated. Domestic policy is designed to protect the domestic industry in
order to encourage a higher level of self-sufficiency in food production,
and trade policy is adjusted in order to fill the gap between domestic
production and total food requirements as determined by the Ministry of
Agriculture.
Japan uses the usual methods of tariffs, quotas, and licenses to limit
trade. Quantitive restrictions apply to the import of beef and pork. When
these methods for limiting imports do not produce desired restrictions
Japan tends to tighten up its health restrictions, pollution standards, and
plant quarantines.
Although the objective of a greater degree of self-sufficiency in food
production has been attained, particularly in rice, it has been reached at
high cost and represents pseudo-self-sufficiency. Rice production con-
tinues to depend on imported fertilizers and imported energy sources.
Through its system of price supports and regulation of imports Japan
maintains a high degree of price stability for food products, similar to that
attained by European Community countries. As a result of controlling
internal prices and maintaining consumption levels regardless of chang-
ing world conditions, their policies tend to cause greater price instability
in countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia where agricultural
commodity prices are less restricted.
Centrally planned economies. Since 1972 certain centrally planned
economies—particularly the USSR, Eastern Europe, and the People's
Republic of China (PRC)—have become intermittently large importers of
U.S. grains. This group of countries is treated together even though
economic development varies significantly within the group.
Agricultural production in centrally planned economies is character-
ized by public ownership of land, target production levels, state purchas-
ing agencies with delivery quotas established for farms generally at fixed
prices, and products sold to consumers at prices also fixed by the govern-
ment. Until about 1972 emphasis in the USSR was on self-sufficiency in
food production with as little reliance on food imports as possible. Food
imports tended to occur only when production fell significantly below
target production levels due to crop failure. Recent Five-Year Plans
under which the USSR operates have called for increased production of
livestock, poultry, and dairy products. These plans have called for im-
porting grain if feed production dropped below levels required to reach
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the livestock production targets. Imported grain is made available for
livestock feeding at subsidized prices so that prices of the resulting
livestock output do not necessarily reflect the cost of imported grain; i.e.,
livestock output is sold to consumers at fixed prices which do not reflect
world supply-demand conditions for grain. Likewise, consumer prod-
ucts made from imported wheat may not be priced to fully reflect the cost
of imported wheat, but may be sold to consumers at subsidized prices.
Foreign trade in the USSR is controlled by the government through
centralized economic planning and regulatory organizations. The actual
foreign trade in agricultural commodities is carried out by Foreign Trade
Organizations (FT0s) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade. Exportkhleb is the FTO which controls and handles exports and
imports of grains, pulses, oilseeds, and oil seed meal. It is an independent
economic organization with its own operating capital which can enter
into trade contracts with foreign firms and governments.
This Soviet centralized system for buying grain in world markets
permits the USSR to exercise its monopolistic power in purchasing grain.
The monopoly is further strengthened by maintaining control over the
information about growing conditions for the domestic crop.
The entry of the USSR into world grain markets since 1972 has been
the major unsettling factor in world grain markets. Estimates are that as
much as 80 percent of the annual variation in world grain trade in recent
years can be attributed to year-to-year changes in USSR grain imports.
This large variation is a result of the situation in which planned produc-
tion often fails to reach target levels because of adverse weather peculiar
to the USSR grain-growing regions, maintenance of internal prices at
fixed levels, and trade conducted in large volume by a state trading
agency. This combination of forces can throw large shocks on the more
market-oriented economies.
Because of the annual variation in U.S. grain exports to the USSR, the
two countries in 1975 negotiated a 5-year agreement on the amount of
grain which the U.S. would make available to the USSR without further
governmental approval. The agreement required that the USSR import at
least 6 million metric tons each year and could import as much as 8
million metric tons without prior approval. Larger amounts could be
approved depending on Soviet import needs and U.S. supplies. The
agreement was intended to stabilize U.S. grain sales to the USSR and to
encourage the USSR to hold larger stocks of grain.
Major Exporters other than the United States
This section examines agricultural and trade policies which affect ex-
ports in major grain exporting countries other than the United States.
Agricultural marketing boards are a major form of government in-
volvement in marketing grain in Australia and Canada. These marketing
boards generally handle all export sales. The Australian Wheat Board
(AWB) guarantees farmers a minimum price each year based on the cost
of production. In high-price years, farmers must contribute to the wheat
stabilization fund. In low-price years, the Treasury is responsible for
deficits not covered by the stabilization fund.
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) exercises control over all wheat
exports. Wheat producers receive a guaranteed initial price with supple-
mental payments later based on export sales. If the CWB fails to break
even or make a profit on exports, the Canadian government makes up the
loss. Both Australia and Canada have a two-price system in which the
domestic price may be different from the export price. One justification of
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using export marketing boards is that the volume of wheat handled
results in economies of scale in the handling and selling of wheat domes-
tically and internationally.
Australia has a number of other policies which influence its supply of
wheat. The government subsidizes fertilizer purchases by farmers. For
example, in December 1976 the subsidy was about 14 percent of cost for
nitrogen and about 20 percent for superphosphate. The Australian trans-
port system, particularly the rail system, also is heavily subsidized. Thus
transportation costs for wheat, a principal commodity shipped by rail,
are lower. In Canada preferential freight rates on Western grain represent
a substantial subsidy to grain exports. The effect of input subsidies or
transportation subsidies is to increase the quantity of grain available for
export at any given price.
The focus of agricultural policies in Argentina has changed consider-
ably since March 1976. Up to that time agricultural policies in Argentina
had favored low food prices through market and price controls. The new
agricultural programs initiated in April 1976 returned domestic market-
ing and foreign trade to the private sector, freed domestic prices from
controls, raised support levels more in accordance with world levels,
reduced export taxes, and promoted exports through periodic devalua-
tion of the peso. An enlarged credit program to cover production costs
and storage expansion also was instituted.
Both South Africa and Thailand are world exporters of corn. South
Africa controls the marketing and influences the production of corn
through its Maize Board (MB). The MB sets producer prices and is
obligated to purchase all production. The Board also sets consumer
prices and maintains a Stabilization Fund.
The government of Thailand negotiates annual bilateral corn export
agreements. The agreements contain the total volume of annual sales, a
general consensus on the monthly quantity of corn to be delivered, and
specific formulae to calculate monthly export prices.
To assure a domestic supply of rice at politically acceptable prices,
the Thailand Ministry of Commerce has a rice reserve ratio program,
under which exporters must sell up to 30 percent (depending upon
grade) of their total sales to the Ministry at controlled prices. For the
future the Thai Board of Trade is attempting to persuade other Asian
countries to enter into long-term (5-year) rice contracts to ensure 'a steady
export market.
Since 1968 Brazil has followed a policy of promoting -nontraditional
exports such as soybeans and soybean products. Exports of soybean meal
and oil have been stimulated by more favorable tax and/or subsidy treat-
ment than soybeans themselves, which have intermittently been subject
to export embargoes or taxes. Overvaluation of the cruzeiro and export
licensing have tended to restrict Brazilian exports. Brazilian wheat poli-
cy, which includes very high support levels, is designed to increase self-
sufficiency in wheat production. Although wheat imports tend to be
reduced by the policy, it appears to have stimulated greater soybean
production and exports since wheat and soybeans are double-cropped
and the high capital costs can be spread over the two crops.
Less Developed Countries as Growing Participants in Trade
Many developing countries have discriminated against their agricultural
sectors by means of restrictive domestic and trade policies. These poli-
cies have lowered domestic prices, transferring income from rural pro-
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ducers to urban consumers by keeping domestic agricultural prices
below world prices. As a result exports have been less than they other-
wise would have been.
Many developing countries take a pessimistic view towards their
export potential for agricultural products. This pessimism derives from
one or more of the following beliefs: (1) there is a secular decline in the
terms of trade for primary products, thus to promote agricultural exports
is to suffer income losses to the advanced countries; (2) technological
superiority of agriculture in the advanced countries (especially the Unit-
ed States) means the LDCs cannot hope to compete in world markets; and
(3) export potentials are limited because advanced countries impose
restrictions on imports of primary products.
U.S. sugar policy is an example of a restriction which limits exports of
a tropical product important for various LDCs. When the U.S. places an
import duty on foreign sugar in order to protect its domestic producers,
U.S. import demand for sugar is reduced (figure 7). This raises the price
of sugar in the U.S. and lowers the price in the ROW. In the U.S. produc-
tion increases while consumption falls.
Although the beliefs held by the LDCs may have some validity as
illustrated by the sugar case, there also are many self-imposed restric-
tions on their exports. Many countries use explicit export taxes instead of
income or land taxes as a means of raising revenue from their agricultural
sector. Similarly, the exchange rate is commonly overvalued with effects
on exports and agriculture similar to an explicit export tax. And direct
export quotas frequently are imposed in an attempt to control inflation.
However, these policies are being reexamined, as there is a growing
Figure 7. Illustration of the Effects in the Rest of the World and the U.S. of
an Import Tariff in the United States on Sugar
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If an an valorem (percentage of value) tariff is imposed on sugar imported by the U.S.,
this has the effect of shifting the import demand curve down and to the left. This raises the
Price of sugar in the U.S. from price V to price Z and lowers price in the ROW from G to A.
In the U.S., sugar production increases from quantity OJ to OR, while consumption fallsfrom quantity OM to ON. Imports fall from quantity )14 to RN (OU to OX). In ROW price
talls from G to A, production falls from OF to OE, exports fall from BF to CE, and
consumption increases from OB to OC.
Transportation costs cause a parallel shift to the left in the import demand curve in a
similar 
manner. As the import demand curve shifts because of transportation costs, adiverge occurs between the price for the commodity in the exporting countries and
Importing countries. The divergence is the per unit transportation cost.
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recognition in some developing countries that exports are important and
that these policies have caused countries to become net importers of
agricultural products when they formerly were net exporters.
Many developing countries since World War II have systematically
pursued an import-substitution, industrialization policy. To implement
the industrialization policy, governments have intervened rather strong-
ly in the trade sector. Restrictions on trade have taken the form of export
and import quotas, special licensing arrangements, tariffs, and multiple
and overvalued exchange rates.
It should be noted, however, that these restrictive policies are not
directed solely to promoting industrialization, nor are the policies exclu-
sively a product of industrialization efforts. Many developing economies
have been plagued throughout the postwar period by high and unstable
rates of inflation. One means employed by their governments to keep the
cost of living down was to permit exports only after domestic "needs"
had been fulfilled. Hence, rather than use the export sector as a source of
income and as a means of financing imports, an "exportable surplus"
approach to exports has been followed. Exports were regulated by issu-
ing licenses, and a license was granted only when there was a clear
indication that the domestic market was "adequately" supplied. The
result was a diversion of exportable production to the domestic market
and a stagnation of the export quantum. This "sealing off" of the export
sector frequently led to internal prices for exportable products that were
substantially below world market levels. Production was lower than it
might have been and domestic consumption was higher. Hence, exports
were reduced not only because of the direct effect of licensing, but also
because the quantity available was smaller.
Sizeable and persistent overvaluation of their currencies is another
policy which has discriminated against the export sector in many LDCs.
This policy was pursued for a number of reasons. In cases where the
country is the dominant supplier of an export product, such as Brazil in
the world coffee market, currency overvaluation was the primary means
used to exploit the country's dominant position in the world market. An
overvalued exchange rate is an implicit export tax, and if the country is
important enough in world markets and confronts an inelastic demand
for its export product, it is possible to shift the tax onto the foreign
consumer. In other words, when the currency of the exporting country is
overvalued, the importer pays a higher price in his currency than he
otherwise would.
One problem with a policy of currency overvaluation is that usually
no attempt is made to discriminate between the export(s) in which the
country has market power and those where no market power exists. In
some cases it has been recognized that market conditions are not the same
for all products, and a policy of multiple exchange rates has been used on
the export side and/or the import side. But despite attempts at a more
flexible stance, discrimination usually continues. The important point is
that overvalued rates tend to be maintained on traditional agricultural
exports as well as on nontraditional exports in which a country appears
to have export potential.
Overvalued exchange rates also are nominally maintained as a means
of controlling inflation. By keeping domestic prices of export products at
less than world market levels, the domestic consumer is benefited. Fur-
ther support for this policy is provided by the desire to maintain low
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prices for the imports needed for industrialization. Quotas and tariffs are
used to keep out or limit the import of luxury goods, in order to channel
the limited amount of foreign exchange to higher-priority needs.
Concluding Comments
Since the trade sector in most economies is significantly smaller than the
domestic sector, most countries place a higher priority on attaining
domestic policy objectives. Domestic policies are designed first and trade
policies are adjusted later to accommodate; therefore, trade policy must
be interpreted in the context of domestic policy. Prices, production, and
consumption of agricultural products in any country are the net effect of
the total package of domestic and trade policies.
Domestic agricultural policies that support farm prices above world
price levels necessitate restrictions on imports and export subsidies.
All countries, including the U.S., impose policies that distort trade.
Arguing over who imposes the greater amount of restriction probably
does not represent a fruitful exercise.
About one-half of the world's grain and livestock is consumed in
countries that have programs which stabilize internal prices and con-
sumption. When a large proportion of world consumption is controlled,
the adjustment to changing supply-demand conditions is shifted to the
more open market economies. When grain production declines in one
country and prices are not allowed to rise to ration out the smaller supply,
but instead imports are acquired to make up for the shortfall, the adjust-
ment to the smaller supply is shifted to the exporting countries. This
leads to exaggerated price adjustments .in the more open economies.
Since many countries place emphasis on price stability and depend-
able supplies, sharply fluctuating prices in world markets encourage
self-sufficiency policies and intensify the search for alternative sources
of supply. Export embargoes, even though temporary, when imposed by
a major exporter like the U.S., intensify movement toward self-sufficien-
cy policies. Distortions in internal markets in which incentives are not
used to stimulate greater production when world supplies are dimin-
ished tend to hold world production below its potential.
Because of the close interrelationship between domestic and trade
Policies, efforts at reducing trade barriers are confronted with the need
for altering domestic policies. But most countries consider internal food
and agricultural policies as non-negotiable domestic issues in interna-
tional fora. Until circumstances or attitudes change, efforts at further
agricultural trade liberalization will make only slow progress and negoti-
ations will be difficult.
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Introduction
The often large and entirely unpredictable movements of prices for many
Primary agricultural commodities during 1972-75 again focused interest
on the potential importance of international commodity policies. That
interest has been evidenced in reports from the Club of Rome, the World
Food Conference in 1974, and a World Food Council (WFC), and recently
in suggestions for a New International Economic Order (NIE0) by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
The new focus on international issues and arrangements is not acci-
dental. Indeed, it has been sharpened by the recent successes of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in collectively
tripling the price of oil. That international cooperation can be a powerful
Policy tool is clear, perhaps more clear than ever before.
Many long-standing concerns exist as to how international trade
should be organized. Up to the 1920s market organization and distribu-
tion systems were almost the exclusive domain of the private sector. After
that an increasing international public interest in commodity schemes
and other trade arrangements arose. Since the World Economic Confer-
ence in Geneva in 1927 a vast array of commodity actions have been
ttenipted for a variety of economic and political purposes. It is impor-
tant to note,_therefore, at the outset of this chapter that the set of world
tensions which led to the initial interest in international market organi-
zations is not the same as the sat which propels UNCTAD and similar
trade arrangements today.
In this chapter we will: (1) analyze the economic rationale behind
commodity arrangements; (2) outline various mechanisms for attaining
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objectives of the agreements and arrangements including a digression on
the stocks question; (3) briefly review the historical performance of the
agreements and arrangements; and (4) analyze the difficulties in negoti-
ating and executing commodity agreements and arrangements. Through-
out the presentation one overriding issue will be evident—that nations
pursue particular international policies for domestic or internal reasons.
Economic Rationale
Traditionally, with the exception of petroleum, the international com-
modity problem has been viewed as consisting of two aspects: first, short-
term instability of markets for primary products resulting in wide year-
to-year fluctuations in prices and export earnings; and second, the deter-
iorating terms of trade and sluggish growth in export earnings brought on
by long-term trends in commodity markets. Recently a third set of issues
has been added—that of insurance reserves for the world's consumers
—which grew from humanitarian concerns over food shortages during
the 1972-74 period. Thus, the major economic objectives of commodity
agreements and arrangements are a combination of increased market
stability, improved terms of trade, and guaranteed food security.
As of 1978, the "commodity boom" of 1972-74 seems to have abated.
The resultant perplexity among nations over the long-term availability of
supplies, market access, and market structure seems to have added to the
confusion that existed because of failure to differentiate between tradi-
tional short-term price instability and the more fundamental resource
transfer and income distribution problem. It is important, however, to
distinguish between these two problems, as the policy ramifications are
much different. Further, it is necessary to clarify the question of reserves
(stocks, food aid, disaster relief) relative to commodity agreements.
Price Instability
Short-term instability of commodity prices, while viewed by many as less
important than long-term trends, is, nevertheless, a very important prob-
lem. One objective of most commodity_arrangements is to reduce period-
to-period price variations. Price -fluctuations of primary commodities
arise basically from inelastic supply and demand schedules coupled
with shifts (primarily worldwide) in supply and demand. For agricultur-
al and related raw materials, short-term shifts in supply arise because of
the biological nature of production—from weather and other natural
factors. Shifts in demand arise from variations in the business cycle, from
traditional factors such as population and income changes, and from
variation in the production of products which are close substitutes. In
situations where changes in supply are most important, the prices and
volume of exports tend to move in opposite directions, thereby moderat-
ing the fluctuations in earnings. In situations where changes in demand
are most important, prices and volume tend to move together; thus,
export earnings are more volatile. Market structure also affects producer
price instability and, in turn, incomes and other matters.
Sharp swings in prices and export earnings have a negative effect on
the ability of developing countries in particular to execute rational in-
vestment programs. Their impact on domestic savings, tax revenues, and
especially on the capacity of these countries to import is well-docu-
mented. Moreover, the ratchetlike effects of sharp price fluctuations of
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agricultural products and raw material prices on wage rates and manu-
factured product prices have inflationary consequences for all countries.
When the boom collapses corresponding corrections do not take place in
wages and the price of manufactures, either at home or abroad.
Because stabilization of these well-recognized, short-term price fluc-
tuations potentially can benefit both exporters and importers, arrange-
ments to moderate them have gained a wider degree of support than have
terms of trade corrective recommendations in which one party is per-
ceived as directly benefiting at the expense of the others. "Potential" is
stressed, because while both losers and gainers can prefer stability if
compensation is paid, actually providing for compensation is a subject of
difficult negotiation.
Terms of Trade
A second objective of commodity arrangements is to enhance or alter
terms of trade through the transfer of resources or through income redis-
tribution. Economic literature traditionally has argued that the terms of
trade or long-term problem consisting of low prices and incomes is more
fundamental than the short-term problem of price instability. The World
Bank in a major study in 1970-71 found a strong correlation between rates
of growth in gross national product (GNP) in developing countries and
the growth of their export earnings, but only a weak relationship between
growth in GNP and export stability. In other words instability in export
earnings can be a very serious problem when superimposed on an unfa-
vorable trend, but is much less serious when the general trend of export
Prices is rising.
Evidence from the latter part of the nineteenth century and the post-
Korean War experience supports the view that the terms of trade are
declining for producers of agricultural and raw materials. This view was
Popularized in the 1950s and eventually led to the first UNCTAD meeting
in 1964. The argument runs as follows: (1) the elasticity of demand for
most agriculturaaw-inaterials is low both with respect to income
and price; (2) st raw materials are produced in worldwide competitive
markets tending to drive prices down as output increases, whereas manu-
factured products imported by developing countries are produced in
oligopolistic markets in which output is controlled and prices main-
tained; and (3) because workers in the advanced countries are organized,
Productivity gains in manufacturing take the form of higher incomes
rather than lower prices. On the other hand, in the developing countries
the gains from technical progress in primary material production are
Passed on to the rich countries in the form of lower prices.
The rich countries have the best of both worlds according to this
thesis. They are the principal beneficiaries of economic progress abroad
through lower import prices and the economic beneficiaries of progress
at home through higher incomes. At the same time the system traps the
developing poor countries. Hence, the poor make a strong case for some
sort of offsetting arrangement, whether through producer cartels or
through broader international price "indexing" arrangements for raising
the prices of primary products over the long-run. Also, they make the
case for a new international economic order which would correct the
structural inequities of the present system.
However appealing, this line of argument fails to take account of the
Wide divergencies among individual commodities. In the first place, not
all primary commodities show sluggish trends in export earnings; hence,
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corrective price measures might not be necessary. For example, copper,
sugar, iron ore, timber, beef, and bananas-accounting for 40 percent of
total export earnings in developing countries-grew at a rate of 7.8
percent in the period 1960-62 to 1970-72. Second, and more basic, few
commodities lend themselves to a manipulation which would result in
schemes which universally benefit the less developed countries (LDCs)
as against the developed countries (DCs).
In this context it is important to remember that the sources of most
raw material exports are the resource-rich DCs. Theoretically there is
much to be gained by suppliers through setting monopoly prices. Restric-
tive agreements might generate significant additional income to produc-
ing countries due primarily to shortterm price inelasticities of demand,
especially in the higher price ranges. It has been shown by MacAvoy i 
Economic Perspective on the Politics of International Commodity Agree-
ments, however, that LDCs would not obtain much of the increased
revenue because developed countries are responsible for substantial
volumes of the commodities. Moreover, the LDCs would be penalized
because they themselves consume large quantities of the commodities in
question. Table 1 indicates roughly the possible net gains to LDCs. They
would be greatly penalized by increases in wheat and rice but would gain
from an increase in the price of sugar, which, according to the calcula-
tion, accounts for just over half of the total gains when net losses on wheat
and rice are excluded. The poorest countries would be net losers even if
wheat and rice were not subject to restrictive agreements.
Insurance for Humanitarian Purposes
In addition to price stability and income transfer-or efficiency and
equity objectives-a third general purpose of commodity arrangements,
albeit more of a byproduct of the other objectives, is that of providing
food insurance to consumers for emergency purposes. The world became
Table 1. Net Revenue Flows to LDCs through Increased Commodity
Prices (in billions of dollars)
Percentage of Total Increase Percentage of
Commodity in Revenue to Commodity Increase in Cost Net Revenue to
Exported LDCs with Price Imported to LDCs with LDCs with Price
Commodity by LDCs Increase of by LDCs Price Increase of Increase of
20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100%
Cocoa
Coffee
Tea
Wool
Cotton
Wheat
Rice
Sugar
Bananas
Jute
Sisal
Beef
Rubber
Copper
Tin
Iron
99 0.386 1.933 3.0 0.012 0.058 . 0.375 1.874
96 .501 2.507 4.1 .021 .106 .480 2.401
83 .119 .597 28.6 .041 .206 .078 .391
12 .273 1.366 0.9 .207 1.033 .067 .333
58 .504 2.518 16.7 .145 .726 .358 1.792
4 .135 .677 45.1 1.697 8.487 -1.562 -7.809
36 1.383 6.915 71.5 2.762 13.811 -1.379 -6.896
70 2.123 10.616 22.3 .679 3.397 1.444 7.220
93 .031 .154 6.4 .002 .011 .029 .143
97 .022 .113 32.8 .008 .039 .015 .074
98 .025 .123 5.2 .001 .006 .023 .116
30 .003 .014 5.9 .000 .003 .002 .011
98 .170 .849 9.6 .017 .083 .153 .765
54 .831 4.156 7.2 .110 .549 .721 3.607
85 .161 .804 5.8 .011 .054 .150 .749
38 .211 1.054 0.8 .004 .022 .206 1.032
Source: MacAvoy, Paul W. Economic Perspective on the Politics of International Commodity Agreements.
Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1977, p. 18, table 4.
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more aware of this need after the sharp shift from economic surplus to
shortage in the early 1970s. After the 1974 World Food Conference (WFC)in Rome and subsequent conferences--including UNCTAD IV at Nairobi
in 1976—many countries came to expect that solutions to the most urgent
food problems would be incorporated into any future agreements regard-
ing commodity policies. The mechanisms by which this can be done
include stocks, food aid, disaster relief, and other such instruments.
The crucial point is that a balance needs to be struck between the
responsibility of exporting nations to maintain reasonable inventories for
commercial purposes on the one hand, and the appropriate sharing of the
financial costs of maintaining emergency food supplies by the various
importing countries—rich and poor—on the other. Indeed, the develop-ing nations bear some responsibility to acquire stocks to meet their most
urgent needs. One method of assuring this responsibility is met is for
these nations to negotiate commodity agreements involving food prod-
ucts that take into consideration such questions as emergency food
stocks, food aid, and disaster relief.
Mechanisms, Techniques, and Instruments
Even though there is a strong economic rationale for international trade
arrangements, mechanisms still must be found to harmonize conflicting
interests and to execute general policies through institutional guide-
lines. In this section we shall briefly outline four categories of such
mechanisms or techniques: multilateral trade negotiations, international
negotiations of domestic agricultural policies, grain reserves, and com-
modity agreements.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Free, unfettered trade is theoretically the preferred mechanism in balanc-
ing economic interests between nations, while at the same time integrat-
ing economic and political interests toward a peaceful and stable world.
Due to trade restrictions or distortions, however, governments are prone
to intervene in order to reduce barriers and harmonize interests.
International trade agreements are based on the premise that to re-
duce barriers and obtain and develop foreign markets for its products a
country must provide corresponding market opportunities within its
borders for products from other countries. The multilateral trade negotia-
tions concept grew out of the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934 and its postwar corollaries: the ill-fated International Trade Organi-
zation, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These
and other institutional instruments for facilitating trade are treated in
greater detail in chapter 1. Suffice to say that the LDCs have found fault
With the traditional trade and monetary institutions such as the GATT
and the IMF and have sought redress in other bodies such as the
UNCTAD. Other countries have pursued the mechanisms of bilateral
trade agreements, multiyear contracts, and preferential trade arrange-
ments in order to achieve national policy objectives.
International Negotiations of Agricultural Policies
Many countries, developed as well as developing, are not willing to bind
themselves and their agricultural policies through monetary and trade
mechanisms such as the IMF and GATT. Indeed, it has been difficult forthe United States and other exporters to bargain for reductions in agricul-
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tural trade restrictions in the Geneva GATT negotiations. For the export-
ers to obtain significant concessions the European Community and Ja-
pan, for example, would have to alter their domestic agricultural policies
to a degree which is apparently politically unacceptable in those coun-
tries. To be complete it should also be noted that many traditional
exporters, including the U.S., have been reluctant to alter their own
domestic agricultural policies.
As one alternative to direct confrontations such as those which take
place in the GATT, developing and developed countries have used other
international fora to modify or make adjustments in their domestic agri-
cultural policies. Three such fora are the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), and the International Wheat Agreement (TWA). There are
others. The common thread running through all these organizations and
arrangements is the attempt at structural adjustments at production lev-
els in the developed countries.
Although chapter 3 was devoted to the interrelationship between
domestic agricultural and international trade policies, three groups of
agricultural adjustment problems should be identified here and reem-
phasized: first, those at the farm level in terms of size and/or organization.,
second, those at the national level in term-s- of supply-demand imbal-
ances; and third, those at the international level, where the trade and
development of other countries are affected. Negotiations to achieve
adjustment in the domestic agricultural policies of developed countries
at the production level would undoubtedly facilitate the solution of other
sets of problems which arise at the national and international levels.
Grain Reserves
Price volatility and economic shortages since 1972 have put the interna-
tional grain reserve question into the headlines. No such multinational
reserve ever has been accomplished. Surplus stocks in the developed
countries always have been the byproduct of farm programs, particularly
in the United States and Canada. These countries have been residual
suppliers of grain to the world, and no conscious attempt has been made
to rationally accumulate and operate a reserve.
The problems of negotiating an international grain reserve, like all
attempts at multicommodity stabilization, appear to be formidable.
There are some strong arguments, however, for reserves; and if the
principal countries were willing to consider the issues seriously, the
obstacles to an agreement are not insurmountable. First, sharp upward
changes in grain prices often have a pervasive influence on most food
prices in the rich industrial countries and, via the wage mechanism, on
the overall pi.fdelevel.lhe complications for national economic policy,
or for demand management, that follow from these inflationary develop-
ments could restrict total output below potential and at large economic
and social cost. Appropriate grain reserves could keep price changes
within a less disruptive range, thus making an impressive contribution to
the welfare of industrial nations and, because of their dominant role in
the world economy, to the welfare of developing nations.
Second, for the poor, nonindustrialized countries, higher grain prices
often work a variety of hardships: (1) on economic stability via
heightened inflationary pressures; (2) on development programs and
prospects, by forcing direct reductions in the volume of nonfood imports;
and (3) on levels of food consumption and nutrition programs through
cutbacks in grain imports.
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Third, grain reserves for emergency use could be mobilized against
disasters, and even famine emergencies could be coped with by such
reserves. Prompt, adequate response from stocks for emergency use is
one of the strongest points to be made for reserves, and such stocks have
drawn widespread support. However, there are strong arguments against
the accumulation of food reserves to combat endemic hunger.
There are alternative methods to assure an adequate grain supply to
stabilize international prices, but most appear to be subject to greater
liabilities or inadequacies than a grain reserve. One alternative is to
return by default to the situation where the U.S. and Canada were resid-
ual suppliers from stocks accumulated under domestic programs. FAO
proposed another alternative scheme through which individual coun-
tries would accumulate stocks that would be loosely coordinated by an
international agency. Yet another plan would foster bilateral supply and
purchase agreements between a few large exporters and importers with-
out official provision for stocks. All these alternatives have one or more
major shortcomings, and a rational, consciously accumulated and oper-
ated grain reserve has various advantages in comparison.
Commodity Agreements
The basic forms for commodity agreements are multilateral contracts,
quota agreements, and buffer stock arrangements. They may be set up to
Operate independently or in tandem to achieve the desired objectives.
Each of the forms has advantages and disadvantages.
The multilateral contract, as exemplified by the International Wheat
Agreement, attempts to balance interest of producers against interest of
consumers, sets no limits on production, and does not seek to limit the
emergence of new producers outside the agreement. Attempts are made
to balance world supply with demand. This type of agreement can be
applied, however, only to commodities such as wheat which are traded
in standardized grades on well-organized markets. A control mechanism
also is required to enable the signatory governments to fulfill their obliga-
tions. Another obstacle to a smooth working of multilateral contracts is
that the market may become controlled by a small number of countries
which operate their own national policies so as to abort some of the
Objectives. Such has been the case with past U.S. and Canadian wheat
Policies.
Quota agreements attempt to regulate quantities which may be pro-
duced or exported by allocating a fixed amount to each country. Exam-
ples include the Coffee Agreement and the Sugar Agreement. This type of
agreement has been used frequently to prevent competitive price cutting.
Its principal purpose is to safeguard the position of established produc-
ers; and in theory, as well as in practice, it resembles private cartels and
monopolies. Quota agreements also can embrace import quotas as an
added inducement to stability.
Though certain short-term advantages may accrue to some nations as
a result of quota agreements, the disadvantages are so great as to questionthe agreements as a policy instrument. Existing patterns of production
and export tend to become frozen, protection of high-cost or marginal
Producers (these are the ones who usually argue most vehemently for
quotas) results in inefficient production and misallocated resources, andthe breakdown or violation of such agreements introduces elements of
market instability. Finally, if quota agreements are successful in raising
Prices they may induce new producers to enter the market. Rigid trade
Patterns and orderly marketing become "unglued" and unstable when
65
the agreement breaks down. The gyrations in the early 1970s in sugar
prices and more recently in coffee prices are illustrative of potentially
destabilizing results of quota policies.
Buffer stock is the third form or technique used in commodity agree-
ments. Buffer stocks are meant to moderate extreme price fluctuations—
by buying at low prices and selling at high prices—without distorting the
basic patterns of production and trade. This method gives consumers
flexibility by letting them buy where they like; also, it leaves low-cost
producers free to compete on market terms and does not necessarily
require government control of exports and imports. The Tin Agreement
was designed to operate on the buffer stock principle.
Buffer stock schemes have many problems, however. Extensive stor-
age facilities are necessary. These costs, coupled with acquisition costs
and interest costs, amount to a considerable capital investment. For some
commodities these costs are prohibitive; hence, the basic questions of
price ranges in which stabilization is to be attempted and of the source
and amount of finance always are troublesome. A further problem is that
once a buffer stock is begun there is always the temptation to try to use it
in resisting the long-term trend of prices and to shift the terms of trade in
favor of certain producer groups.
Other very specialized multinational arrangements also affect com-
modity production and trade. Three are described below:
(1) Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in trade. This technique
has been used by the British Commonwealth as well as the French
in their dealings with excolonial countries. The Lome Conven-
tion which became fully operative in April 1976 epitomizes GSP.
Through this Convention the European Community gives trade
preferences to 49 members, most of which are excolonial coun-
tries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Ocean (ACP). A GSP
is also part of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. Special tariff rates are
permitted on selected products from developing nations.
(2) Common markets. These arrangements are made principally to
harmonize price and selected other policies over a geographical
area where a commonality of interests exists. The EC, COMECON
(CMEA), and LAFTA are examples.
(3) Multinational firms. Some firms or associations of firms are set up
to deal primarily in the production and marketing of a single
commodity—for example, oil.
History, Performance, and Potential
of Commodity Agreements
It was not until the 1920s that multinational interest in governmental
commodity schemes became evident. The Great Depression resulted in
catastrophic price declines and created an increasing interest in govern-
mental intervention in markets, market support, and intergovernmental
market regulation. The Monetary and Economic Conference held in
London in 1933 adopted a resolution favoring international commodity
agreements. In the interwar period, stabilization schemes were formu-
lated for a number of commodities—wheat, sugar, tea, rubber, tin, cop-
per, silver, nitrates, and potash.
Rules governing the conclusion and operation of commodity agree-
ments were worked out in the Havana Charter. Signed in 1948, but never
ratified by the United States, the charter permitted the member govern-
6
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ments, as an exception to free trade, to enter into agreements regulating
trade in primary commodities. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) included many trade provisions of the charter, such as
commodity agreements, which are permitted as an exception to free
trade.
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
has within its structure at the Rome Headquarters a Commodity Division
which is directly concerned with commodity agreements. Third World
nations have worked through FAO; but more recently they have shifted
the forum to UNCTAD, which has emerged as a more politically effective
organization. The LDCs have made commodity policy an issue on which
there is a unified confrontation with the industrialized consuming na-
tions. More will be said later on the efforts of UNCTAD.
Since World War II, several multinational institutions have been
created specifically to deal with internationally traded commodities and
the consequent policy issues. In fact, many commodities have their own
international organizations; for example, the International Wheat
Council.
Five Commodity Agreements
Commodity agreements have been difficult to negotiate and even more
difficult to operate. After many years of trial and error, there existed in
1977 only five commodity agreements (coffee, cocoa, sugar, wheat, and
tin), and these are rather ineffective in regulating world markets. Despite
this record, however, commodity agreements have been denounced as
having restricted supplies, diverted attention from fundamental prob-
lems, and interfered with economic efficiency in international produc-
tion and distribution. Other economic "sins" also have been laid at the
door of commodity agreements.
A brief treatment of selected agreements follows.' Table 2 presents
the principal features of five agreements (wheat, sugar, tin, coffee, and
cocoa). Other agreements have existed on olive oil, skim milk powder,
and butterfat; and there was a "gentleman's agreement" on whole milk
Powder. Informal agreements have been negotiated for a variety of food
and fiber products. International consultative organizations have been
set up for wine, cotton, rubber, wool, and lead. Finally, there are associa-
tions of producing countries built around commodity interests; e.g.,
raisins, copper, coconut, pepper, and others.
Wheat. International discussion to stabilize wheat prices began in the
early 1930s. There have been seven agreements since 1949. Unlike other
agreements, controlled supplies and buffer stocks are not in the objec-
tives. Up to 1968 the International Wheat Agreement (TWA) was a "multi-
lateral contract" under which exporters and importers agreed to buy or
sell wheat from each other at prices within an agreed range. This mecha-
nism provided a useful umbrella under which the world's two major
exporters—the U.S. and Canada—prevented prices from falling below
the floor level. The TWA negotiated in the GATT Kennedy Round in 1967,
attempting to raise wheat prices, but broke down in 1968 under the
pressure of surpluses. It also included a food aid provision, partly to
Spread the financial burden more evenly among donors, and partly to
remove some of the surplus grain off commercial markets. This worked
11Are are indebted to Dr. Anthony G. Leeks, Chief, Basic Foodstuffs Service, Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, Rome, for his assistance with this information.
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relatively well. In 1971, the negotiators were unable to agree on a new
price range. Since then the TWA has contained no commercial trade
provision. Efforts are now under way to work out a new type of TWA
based on an internationally coordinated system of national stocks.
Table 2. Principal Features of Formal International Conunodity Agree-
ments
Title
Formal
export or
Entry into Participating Price targets production Buffer stocks Other policy Institutional
force countries quotas measures support
International 1971. Major exporting Not at present. No No From 1959 Administered
Wheat Preceding and importing Earlier agree- until 1971 by the
Agreement. agreements countries, with ments included importers International
1949, 1953, exceptions a range be- undertook to Wheat Council.
1956, 1959, during certain tween max. buy a min.
1962, 1965, periods.* and min. prices, share of their
1966, 1967. imports from
member
countries
and exporters
to sell the
equivalent of
their average
exports over
the preceding 4
years to member
countries at
prices within
the agreed
range.**
International 1969. All major Not at present. Not at present. Not at present. Not at present: Administered
Sugar Preceding exporting and A range of Export quotas Min. and max. Trigger mech- by the
Agreement. agreements importing coun-trigger prices applied to free stocks to be anism International
1954 tries trading applied from market from held in produ- linking quota Sugar
and 1959. on free world 1969 to 1973, 1961 to 1973. cing countries adjustments Organization.
market. when the econo- were stipulated and stock
mic provisions from 1969 to releases to
of the agree- 1973. movements in
ment lapsed. market prices
operated from
1969 to 1973.
International 1976. All major Yes. Yes. Yes. Administered
Tin Agreement. Preceding producing and Range between Export quotas. Producing and by the
agreements importing max. and min. consuming International
1956, 1961, countries. prices. countries Tin Council.
1966, 1971, contribute to
and 1976. the buffer stock:
International 1976.*** All major ex- Yes. Yes. No. No. Administered
Coffee Preceding porting and Range between Export quotas _ by the
Agreement agreements importing min. and max. consisting of a International
1962 and countries, prices to be fixed part and Coffee
1968. established by a variable part, Organization
the ICO. linked to the
price range
established
by the
ICO, or in its
absence to
average
indicator prices
for "other
muds" and
Robusta coffees
in 1975.
International 1976.**** All major Yes. Yes. Yes. No. Administered
Cocoa Preceding exporting and Range between Export quotas. by the
Agreement agreement importing min. and max. The agreement International
1973. countries, prices, provides for Cocoa
except U.S.A. different Organization
combinations of
export quotas
and buffer
stock opera-
tions at different
price levels.
For example, U.K. in 1953 and 1956, Argentina in 1949 and 1953, and USSR in 1949, 1953, 1956, 1959, and
1967.
** The 1967 and 1971 agreements include a Food Aid Convention involving a commitment on the part of each
member to supply a fixed quantity of cereals in the form of aid to the developing countries.
*** Not yet operative.
****Not yet operative.
Source: Compiled from information from FAO, Rome.
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Sugar. Various attempts have been made to stabilize the world free
sugar market beginning as early as 1937. The 1969-73 arrangement relied
mainly on export quotas to share markets and keep the prices within a
preset range. Provisions existed for stocks as well as supply guarantees to
traditional importers. After operating satisfactorily in its first 3 years, the
agreement became ineffective after shortages developed. Prices could not
be controlled. As with cocoa, the price range was narrow and the upper
limit not high enough to encourage sufficient investment at the right
time. The market regulation scheme lapsed between 1973 and 1977. The
United Nations negotiation conference on sugar convened in April 1977
and once again ended inconclusively, mainly because of disagreements
over whether the agreement should be basically a minimum price
scheme (quotas) or defend a minimum and a maximum range (combined
quotas and stocks). After convening again in the summer of 1977 in
Geneva, an agreement was reached, details of which are not yet available.
Tin. The international marketing of tin has been controlled for the last
50 years, with agreements begun in 1921 and made up solely by produc-
ing nations. The first International Tin Agreement, including both con-
sumers and producers, came into effect in July 1956, for a period of 5
Years. There have been several agreements since that time. Most major
producing and consuming countries have been parties to the agreements,
except the People's Republic of China (the fourth largest exporter) and
the United States (the largest consumer.)
Coffee. Two long-term coffee agreements have been negotiated, one
in 1962 and another in 1968. However, combinations of exporters, pri-
marily in Latin America, have been involved off and on in intercountry
coffee arrangements since 1902. Several 1-year agreements were in effect
from 1957 to 1962. Supplies entering world trade were regulated by
export quotas in order to maintain prices within an agreed range. An
innovative plan was adopted later—a Diversification Fund set up to
assist producers to shift to other crops, which took pressure off coffee
supplies. The agreements worked reasonably in stabilizing prices at
relatively low levels and, coupled with disastrous frosts in Brazil, ulti-
mately eliminated the burdensome surpluses. The 1972-75 agreement
eliminated economic provisions and the Diversification Fund. The cur-
rent agreement begun in 1976 contains provisions for export quotas
which can be invoked if prices fall below a given level. There are no
contingencies for shortages; hence, the quota system was not needed as of
the beginning of 1978.
Cocoa. An agreement on cocoa was a long time in gestation—the mid-
1950s until 1972. It attempted both a price floor and ceiling along with a
System of adjustable export quotas and a buffer stock. In retrospect, a
buffer stock and a price ceiling have not been possible because of the poor
harvests and high prices of 1972-73 and 1973-74. The present agreement
was negotiated in 1976 and contains some more flexible features. But it
still relies essentially on the same mechanisms, and the producing and
consuming nations have had difficulty in agreeing on a price range.
Commodity Agreements and Stability
Experience with commodity agreements has tended to confirm economic
and political theory. First, an effective price-raising agreement creates a
strong incentive by suppliers to "cheat." Second, entry into the industry
becomes more profitable for additional suppliers. And third, product
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substitution by consumers is inevitable as prices go higher relative to
other products. Actually, negotiating commodity agreements to stabilize
—or raise—prices has presented other difficulties. Exporters and import-
ers have, in practice, had trouble agreeing on an appropriate price range.
For example, there was a great controversy between the U.S. and produc-
ing countries on the price range in the first Coffee Agreement. Exporters
have had differences regarding the proper basis for establishing export
quotas. And financing any stock acquisitions has been a formidable
obstacle when any serious talks get under way.
In sum, the search for solutions to commodity problems through some
type of commodity policy, agreements, or broader economic arrange-
ments by governments seems to have intensified since first appearing on
the scene in the 1920s. In this search, a new focal point seems to have
evolved, one relating the difficulties in commodity markets to the prob-
lems of economic development in the developing countries. Stabiliza-
tion, in short, is viewed as not just for the benefit of the rich, but as a
supporting mechanism for accelerating the development of those mar-
ginal nations in the world economy.
New Modes of International Trade Arrangements
and Future Prospects
If the record of commodity agreements and other trade arrangements is
poor, why is there so much current interest in this kind of joint action in.
world trade? One answer might be that a returning to beggar-thy-neigh-
bor trade policies of the 1930s and the poor development performance
among the LDCs are considered bad economic alternatives. Existing
agricultural agreements in their various forms cover a volume of trade
valued at more than $15 billion a year, but a wider and more effective
coverage is desired by many. The LDCs of the world have found fault with
the present monetary and trade institutions, the IMF and the GATT. They
claim that prices of their exports, mainly raw materials, have not risen as
fast and have been more variable than prices of their imports, mainly
manufactures. Thus they turned to the international organ where their
voices predominate, the United Nations, and succeeded in creating the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. In the
periodic sessions of this forum they have united their efforts to make an
impact on the developed nations of the world. Their principal intent is to
make international trade an effective instrument for their development.
Demands for a New International Economic Order (NIE0) were made
to the international community by UNCTAD in the mid-1970s.2 Some
ideas, such as proposals for international commodity agreements and for
financial considerations, were introduced in sections of the earlier Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO) charter but not in the GATT. These are
serious proposals that warrant attention. Leaders of the less radical LDCs
have moved away from ideological posturing and the presentation of
impossible demands for implausible changes in the world economic
order. Their concern now is to secure a more equitable share of a growing
world product while avoiding damaging an admittedly imperfect, but
also dangerously fragile, world economy.
2Thjs section was adapted largely from writings of T. K. Warley, professor of Agricultural Economics, University of
Guelph, Guelph, Ontario.
A
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There are qualitative as well as quantitative differences in this ap-
proach. The NIE0 encompasses every facet of the relationship between
the advanced societies and the developing countries—aid, trade, mone-
tary arrangements, private foreign investment, control of resources, ac-
cess to capital and technology, the location of production activities,
shared responsibility in decision making, and the structure and func-
tions of the multilateral institutions. Fundamental structural changes are
demanded. The cumulative result would make development of the LDCs
a prime purpose of all international economic relationships. In sum, the
LDCs are proposing the creation of a global system of pooling material
and nonmaterial resources, systematic planning of the world economy,
and its management in ways which will result in the redistribution of
world income and wealth in their favor.
An integrated program for commodity trade has been drafted, con-
taining seven interlocking elements. They are: (1) an expanding set of
intergovernmental commodity agreements for an open-ended list of
products; (2) a common fund to finance those agreements, including
provisions for buffer stocks; (3) index-linking of the prices of LDC com-
modity exports to the prices of their imports; (4) compensatory financial
arrangements to guarantee the total value of their commodity exports; (5)
a network of intergovernmental purchase and supply commitments; (6)
improved conditions of access to advanced country markets; and (7) the
transfer of primary processing activities from rich to poor countries.
These measures are designed to serve two ends. The first is to improve
the economic performance of commodity markets by enhancing market
stability. Less uncertainty would allow greater scope for comparative
advantage to determine the location of production and processing activi-
ties. The second goal is to improve the political performance of world
commodity systems by redistributing income in favor of the poorer
countries.
The UNCTAD proposals challenge three assumptions of the existing
economic order. Those assumptions are: that the LDCs would progres-
sively adopt the predominately market-oriented system of international
exchanges employed by the advanced countries; that trade in commodi-
ties would fit for the most part into the same kind of international
economic regime as trade in manufactured products (occasional inter-
ventions by governments in commodity markets might be necessary, but
these were to be regarded as aberrant and transient); and that the interna-
tional trading system is neutral with regard to income distribution. The
system's central concern was efficiency in resource use—thereby the
growth of world product, not its distribution. Any politically unaccepta-ble distribution of income resulting from competitive trade should be
corrected by direct transfers.
In contrast the LDCs believe: that economic waste in unregulated and
imperfect commodity markets is exceptionally large and that continuous
intervention is thereby justified; that because of the supply, demand, and
structural characteristics of commodity markets, market forces will
Widen international income disparities; and that international economicfrelations
 should be concerned with equity as well as efficiency. There-
ore, international commodity policy should be directed toward redis-
tributing world wealth.
The UNCTAD Secretariat was charged with the task of translating the
1-,..DCs' demands into a set of practical proposals for action by the interna-
Ponal community. The resulting proposals were examined and endorsedby UNCTAD IV in 1976 at Nairobi, with some reservations. It was agreed
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that preparatory meetings for international negotiations on individual
products should be convened under UNCTAD auspices and that negoti-
ating conferences should be completed by the end of 1978. Some parts of
the program will be carried forward in the GATT multilateral trade
negotiations.
Many of the proposals for changes in trading arrangements will affect
U.S. agricultural trade. Measures that will accelerate economic growth in
the developing countries and expand their capacity to purchase food-
stuffs will benefit U.S. grain producers. Competition will be enhanced for
commodities produced in both the LDCs and North America. Establish-
ing internationally regulated trading arrangements for commodities will
change the economic environment in which U.S. agriculture functions,
and market forces will lessen in importance.
The initial position of the United States with respect to UNCTAD IV
was to maintain that the old economic order had served advanced and
developing countries well; to deny that a new economic order was in the
making; to stress that the primary concern must be with ensuring the
growth of world output, rather than with its distribution; and to empha-
size that adjustments in economic relations must confer mutual benefits
on both rich and poor countries to be acceptable. In consequence, the U.S.
opposed the use of commodity policy to transfer resources to the LDCs
and the concomitant indexation of commodity prices and/or export re-.
ceipts. Intergovernmental commodity arrangements should not be a per-
manent feature of the world's commodity systems. And, finally, the U.S.
would not commit itself to the proposed common funding of buffer
stocks.
The U.S. position became more supportive in 1977, however, when
the U.S. participated in discussions on commodity agreements, a com-
mon fund, and compensatory financing. Additionally, the U.S. has ad-
vanced numerous specific proposals for changes in world economic
systems that would favor the developing countries and particularly the
poorest among them. All of its proposals are consistent with a more
liberal and a more just economic order, and many of them coincide with
the LDCs' aspirations. These include expanded aid, easier access to
Western capital and technology, accelerated trade liberalization, more
liberal compensatory finance arrangements, and a willingness to consid-
er on a case-by-case basis the merits of commodity arrangements with
short-run stabilization objectives.
Concluding Comments
In short, even the developed countries such as the U.S., which in the past
have protected their farmers from world market fluctuations, seem to
want some type of cooperative action to prevent cut-throat competition
and to sustain prices in the world market for commodities such as sugar
and wheat. On the other side of the coin, importing countries are looking
for security of supplies, especially after the market uncertainties during
1972-74. Access to supplies of imported foodstuffs such as grains and
soybeans, as well as to basic raw materials like rubber, is uppermost in
the minds of some importers. More recent experiences with coffee and tea
prices have revived consumer fears of further inflation in food prices.
Producers also have an interest in price stability because wild fluctua-
tions in prices dislocate investment programs and encourage the search
for substitutes.
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Ultimately the problem of commodity arrangements has a political
dimension. The main objective of UNCTAD's Integrated Commodity
Program as well as that of many other schemes is to lead to a massive
income transfer from the rich to the poor countries. At the same time, the
various components of the NIE0 would hope to assist all countries by
radically improving the structure of world markets and by shifting the
balance of trading relationships onto a more equitable footing. How the
conflict of perception and purpose between the developed and the devel-
oping countries will evolve, and which elements of their respective
proposals will find an enduring place in future international commodity
policies cannot be foretold at this time.
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Introduction
Before examining the quantitative dimensions of agricultural trade, a
look at the following background material will be helpful.
World trade in agricultural products expanded nearly seven times
Over between 1950 and 1976, from about $21 billion to $138 billion.
However, during the same period total world trade expanded by more
than 16 times over. Therefore, the share of agricultural products in total
world trade declined from about 34 percent to 14 percent (table 1).
Table 1. The United States in World Trade, 1950-1976
Year
1950
1951-55 Ave
1956-60 Ave
1961-65 Ave
1966-70 Ave
1971-75 Ave
1976
Total exports Agricultural exports 
U.S.
World U.S. share
Billion dollars Percent
Share agr.
of total tirade
U.S.
World U.S. share World U.S.
Billion dollars Percent Percent
61.20
84.82
113.32
157.52
248.00
610.09
991.07
10.14
15.20
19.06
23.76
35.05
73.22
113.39
16.5 20.60 2.87 13.9 33.7 28.3
17.9 26.80 3.30 12.3 31.6 21.7
16.8 31.62 4.26 13.4 27.9 22.3
15.1 38.67 5.64 14.6 24.5 23.7
14.1 47.60 6.54 13.7 19.2 18.7
12.0 96.11 15.73 16.4 15.9 21.5
11.4 138.00 22.99 16.7 13.9 20.3
Source: Mackie, A. B. "World Economic Growth and Demand for U.S. Farm Products." World Economic
Conditions in Relation to Agricultural Trade. U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS, WEC-12, Washington,
D.C., August 1977, p. 25.
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Most of the gain in world trade in agricultural products since the
1950s arose from increased demand for food and feed products in the
developed countries.
The developed countries carry on a major share of the trade in agricul-
tural and forestry products. In 1971-75, the developed countries supplied
62 percent, the less developed countries (LDCs) 29 percent, and the
centrally planned countries 9 percent of world exports of agricultural
and forest products. Since 1955 the developed countries have increased
their share of world agricultural exports, the centrally planned have
remained about the same, and the developing countries have declined
(appendix table 1). Looking at changes in trade patterns in terms of
imports, a reverse situation emerges. Both developing and centrally
planned countries became more dependent on imported agricultural and
forestry products, whereas developed countries reduced their dependen-
cy.
Marked changes have occurred in the broad pattern of agricultural
trade between 1956-60 and 1971-75: (1) growing concentration of trade
among developed countries; (2) growing dependency of LDCs and cen-
trally planned countries upon the developed countries for more of their
food imports; and (3) diminishing concentration of trade among centrally
planned countries.
The most important trading partners of developed countries are other
developed countries. While in 1956-60 about 57 percent of total devel-
oped country imports came from the developed countries, this share rose
to about 67 percent in 1971-75. Over the same period the share of LDCs'
agricultural imports supplied by the developed countries grew from
about 55 percent to 59 percent; and the share of agricultural imports
supplied by developed countries to the centrally planned countries rose
from 21 to 34 percent. Conversely, the share of export trade within the
centrally planned countries dropped to about one-third in 1971-75, from
about two-thirds in 1956-60.
Commodities in World Trade
Compositional Trends
In 1976 world trade in agricultural commodities was approximately 55
percent food products, 14 percent feed products, 11 percent agricultural
raw materials, and 20 percent other or residual commodities.
Gradual changes in the commodity composition of world trade have
occurred in the post-World War II period. From 1955 through 1976 the
trend has been toward a higher proportion of food and feed products and
a smaller proportion of raw materials and other products (appendix table
2 and figure 1).
The share of food products in world agricultural trade grew from 41
percent to nearly 55 percent of the total. This growth was due mainly to
sharp increases in the three main export categories—animal products,
food grains, and beverages and spices.
Trade in feed products showed the sharpest advance with a total over
14 times greater than in the mid-1950s. Rising world demand for meats
and livestock products generally has been the main contributing factor to
this expansion. Trade in agricultural raw materials such as cotton, tobac-
co, tallow, and hides and skins—the most cyclically volatile group of
commodities—grew less rapidly than total agricultural trade over the
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1955-76 period. The general tendency to substitute synthetics for natural
raw materials plays a major role in any explanation of the slow growth of
agricultural raw material trade.
Grain Trade Patterns
The importance of grains in world agricultural trade has risen from about
10 percent in 1955 to 19 percent in 1976 (based on data in appendix table
2). The overall increase conceals contrasting trends among regions and
countries. Marked shifts have occurred in the patterns of world grain
trade, with developed countries now accounting for a relatively larger
share of the export trade, while the shares of LDCs and the centrally
planned countries have fallen. By 1971-75 the developed countries sup-
plied 81 percent of the world grain exports, the LDCs 13 percent, and the
centrally planned countries 6 percent.
The number of food-deficit countries is increasing. The striking fea-
tures of this trend appear to be: (1) the diminishing reliance of developed
countries on grain imports; (2) the growing dependence of LDCs on
imports from abroad; (3) the appearance of centrally planned countries as
a major grain-deficit area; and (4) the unique position which North
America has achieved as the world's leading grain exporter.
Among less developed areas Asia, north Africa, and the Middle East
are now net importers of substantial magnitude. Other significant shifts
also have occurred. The most conspicuous changes are the reversal of the
centrally planned countries from high dependency upon purchases from
each other to almost complete dependence upon developed countries.
The second major realignment in regional trade patterns is the dwindling
grain trade among LDCs themselves (appendix table 3).
The reasons for growing dependence on grain imports include: (1)
Population-induced demand; (2) growth in foreign exchange earnings, as
in the OPEC countries; (3) rising affluence; (4) decline in self-sufficiency;
and (5) poor policy management of agriculture.
Figure 1. Commodity Composition of World Agricultural Trade, Se-
lected Years, 1950-1976
Percent
100 
Other
Raw
Materials
Feed
Food
75 —
50 —
25 —
1950 1960 1970 1976
Source: Appendix table 2.
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Population and income growth are the principal demand-generating
forces in the developing countries. Increasing world population at nearly
2 percent per year requires a corresponding increase in food production
merely to maintain current per capita consumption levels. Rising income
is the dominant food demand-expanding factor in the developed
countries.
The major factors involved in changing world wheat trade patterns
were: (1) growth of population and income in developing countries; (2)
expanding use of wheat in livestock feeding in developed countries; and
(3) the expansion of concessional sales and aid programs. Also national
protective measures have contributed to increased production and sup-
ply availabilities. Between 20 to 30 percent of total wheat is used for feed
in developed countries.
About half the world's population eats rice in someform, and for a
large proportion of these people rice forms 70 to 80 percent of their daily
food. Rice is the main staple in the Far East and central Africa where the
per capita utilization has been increasing in the postwar years.
In some Asian countries such as India and the People's Republic of
China wheat and rice usage both have been growing, with wheat growing
more sharply than rice. In Japan, however, the trend has been toward
wheat but away from rice.
Most of the grain in the developing countries is consumed directly as
human food supplemented by small quantities of livestock products and
fish. As per capita income increases, there likely will be a change in
preference from starchy roots to grains and then from direct grain con-
sumption to high quality protein, especially livestock products.
World trade in feed grains expanded about twice as fast as world
wheat trade (5.3 compared to 2.6 times). The much faster increase in feed
grain trade following World War II indicates a more rapidly growing
demand for meat, dairy, and poultry products that require feed grains for
production. With growing affluence, consumers in developed countries
were able to shift to higher-protein diets partly made possible from
increased feed grain imports.
The United States in World Trade
The United States has played a diminishing role in total world trade but a
growing and leading role in agricultural trade. The U.S. share of world
exports of all commodities declined from about 18 percent in 1951-55 to
about 12 percent in 1971-75 (table 1). By contrast, the U.S. share of world
agricultural exports rose from about 12 percent to over 16 percent in the
same period. The importance of the U.S. in world agricultural export
trade varies by commodities, with its major dominance in cereals, soy-
beans, and soybean products (appendix table 4).
The U.S. portion of world grain exports has increased from 31 percent
in 1950-54 to 49 percent in 1973-76 (table 2). Its share of wheat exports
has risen from 33 to 43 percent; its share of coarse grain exports has risen
from 28 to 53 percent. Of the total worldwide increase in grain exports
during the 1970s, the United States contributed 82 percent-90 percent
of the increased wheat exports and about 80 percent of the increased
coarse grain exports.
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Table 2. The United States in World Grain Export Trade, 1950-1976
Year
Total grain exports" Wheat exports Coarse grains
World U.S.
Million tons
U.S.
share
Percent
World U.S.
Million tons
U.S.
share
Percent
World U.S.
Million tons
U.S.
share
Percent
1950-54 42.50 13.20 31 27.20 8.90 33 15.30 4.30 28
1955-59 55.30 20.90 38 34.20 12.20 36 21.10 8.70 41
1960-64 83.28 35.07 42 49.97 19.48 39 33.31 15.59 47
1965-69 99.82 39.28 39 55.44 18.93 34 44.38 20.35 46
1970-74 130.29 56.96 44 64.38 25.37 39 65.61 31.59 48
1973-76 150.98 73.44 49 70.31 30.41 43 80.67 43.03 53
1976 152.13 76.23 50 67.10 29.67 44 84.95 46.56 55
*Excludes rice
Source: Mackie, A.B. "World Economic Growth and Demand for U.S. Farm Products." World Economic Condi-
tions in Relation to Agricultural Trade, U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS, WEC-12, Washington, D.C.,
August 1977, p. 25.
U.S. agricultural imports lagged behind the other major trading coun-
tries and, as a result, its share of world agricultural imports dropped from
about 17 percent in 1951-55 to about 9 percent in 1971-75. Currently the
U.S. is the world's fourth largest importer of agricultural commodities.
U.S. Agricultural Exports
Exports Under Government-Financed Programs
Special government export programs have played an important part in
U.S. agricultural export trade since 1954. Authority to export agricultural
commodities on concessional terms was given under Public Law 480 (the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) and Mutual
Security Aid legislation. During 1955 to 1964 government-aided exports
varied from 24 to 41 percent of total agricultural exports. Exports under
government programs gradually have declined, and by 1976 these ex-
ports totaled less than $1.4 billion and represented only about 6 percent
of the total. Wheat, rice, soybean oil, cotton, tobacco, and nonfat dry milk
are the major commodities moved under government programs (figure
2). These programs have become an integral part of American foreign
relations policy and are sometimes credited with helping develop cash
markets for agricultural commodities and finance development plans in
recipient countries.
•
Country and Area Distribution of U.S. Agricultural Exports
The geographical pattern of U.S. agricultural exports shifted gradually
over the 1951-55 and 1971-76 period. Asia became the principal outlet for
U.S. agricultural exports, reflecting increased shipments to western Asia
and Japan. U.S. exports to this area in 1971-75 averaged $5.41 billion and
represented 34.3 percent of U.S. agricultural exports compared with only
25.4 percent in 1951-55 (appendix table 5). Japan is the leading single-
country market for U.S. farm products, purchasing about $3.56 billion
Worth, or 16 percent of the U.S. total in 1976. Japan is now the chief
market for U.S. animal products, feed grains, and tobacco.
Agricultural shipments to Western Europe did not keep pace with
those to other regional markets from 1951-75. The share of exports to
Western Europe fell to 33 percent in 1971-75 compared with about 46
Percent in 1951-55 and the high of 52 percent in 1950. In 1976 Western
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Figure 2. U.S. Agricultural Exports: Commercial and Government Pro-
grams
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1977 Handbook of Agricultural Charts, Agricultural Handbook No. 524.
Washington, D. C.: November 1977, P. 64. •
Figure 3. U.S. Share of World Gram Trade
Percent
100
Importing Region
50 —
25
Developed Less Developed Centrally
Countries Countries Planned
Countries
World
1956-60 71-75 56-60 71-75 56-60 71-75 56-60 71-75
Source: Appendix table 3.
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Europe regained the top position in U.S. agricultural exports. Within the
region the nine-country European Community (EC) as a whole consti-
tutes the third largest regional market for U.S. farm products. Shipments
to the EC in 1976 accounted for about 28 percent of all U.S. farm exports.
Although the value increased 3.5 times, Latin America's share of U.S.
agricultural exports declined since the early 1950s. The area accounted
for about 10 percent of U.S. agricultural exports in 1971-75 compared
with nearly 15 percent in 1951-55. Growth in U.S. exports to Latin
America was hampered by a combination of: (1) relatively slow economic
growth; (2) low level of foreign exchange; (3) increased domestic agricul-
tural production; and (4) loss of the Cuban market since 1961. Approxi-
mately one-sixth to one-third of exports to Latin America moved under
government-financed programs in the 1950s and 1960s.
The centrally planned economy countries provided an expanding
market for U.S. farm commodities, receiving 8.3 percent of the total in
1971-75 compared with 2.5 percent in 1951-55. Their share of the total
rose to 10.4 percent in 1976. The larger shipments were fundamentally
the outcome of the bloc's inability to meet its growing needs for wheat
and feed grains and feedstuffs. Russia, the People's Republic of China,
and Poland have been the largest country buyers.
U.S. exports to Canada expanded nearly fourfold from 1951-75 and
accounted for around 7 percent of U.S. exports in the latter period. Yet
this is nearly 2 percent below its 1951-55 share of U.S. exports. Canada is
the leading market for U.S. fruits and vegetables, seeds, and sugar and the
second largest for animal products.
A substantial part of the increase in U.S. agricultural exports to Africa
was in shipments under government-financed programs. Grains, vegeta-
ble oils, and tobacco were the major commodity exports to Africa.
Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) has remained a small but stable
regional market for U.S. agricultural exports. This area accounted for less
than 1 percent of U.S. exports over most of the period under review. This
is because Oceania is an agricultural area that produces temperate agri-
cultural products competitive with most products grown in the United
States.
Looking at trade patterns in a broader perspective it appears that
during the 20 years from 1956 through 1975, the United States supplied
an increasing share of agricultural and grain products to the developed,
less developed, and centrally planned economies. (See appendix table 3
and figure 3 for details.)
Significance of Agricultural Trade
to the U.S. Economy
Agricultural commodities generally have maintained their position in
U.S. export trade. Averaging 21.7 percent of total exports in 1951755, the
share of agricultural commodities slipped slightly to 21.5 percent in
1971-75. By contrast, agricultural imports dropped sharply from 40.4
Percent in 1951-55 to 11.3 percent in 1971-75. They accounted for only 9
Percent of total U.S. imports in 1976 (appendix table 6).
Since 1960, the total agricultural exports have exceeded total agricul-
tural imports. Since 1972 the net agricultural trade balance has made a
sizeable contribution to improving the U.S. balance of trade. Because of a
favorable agricultural trade balance, the total U.S. trade balance was
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Figure 4. Agriculture's Contribution to the Balance of Payments
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*Value of commercial sales plus credit sales under PL 480. Years ending June 30
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1977 Handbook of Agricultural Charts, Agricultural Handbook No. 524.
Washington, D.C.: November 1977, P. 64.
Figure 5. U.S. Agricultural Exports as Percent of Cash Farm Market-
ings
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Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS. Farm Income Statistics, selected issues, and U.S. Foreign Agricul-
tural Trade Statistical Report, fiscal year 1976 and various issues.
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positive in fiscal years ending June 30, 1974 through 1976 (figure 4). The
export surplus of $12 billion each year was highly significant in easing
the U.S. balance of payments problem.
An important share of many farm commodities ends up in export
markets. In 1976 out of 338 million harvested acres, 96 million acres
provided products for export (appendix table 7).
The value of agricultural exports has risen faster than total cash
receipts from farming. In 1950 the value of farm product exports was
equal to about 10 percent of cash receipts from farming, while in 1975
and 1976 they were equal to about 24 percent (figure 5). Consequently
significant changes in total U.S. agricultural exports will affect farmers'
incomes and their ability to purchase farm equipment, building supplies,
household appliances, and other consumer goods.
U.S. Agricultural Imports
From 1951-55 to 1971-76 U.S. imports of agricultural products nearly
doubled in value (appendix table 8). Particularly large increases were
shown by supplementary commodities, or those partially competitive
with U.S.-produced farm commodities (figure 6).
Supplementary Imports
Supplementary commodities include meat and meat products, sugar,
vegetable oils and oilbearing materials, wine, fruits and vegetables, dairy
products, and hides and skins. Not all supplementary imports are neces-
sarily directly competitive. A large part of the beef imported is of lower
grade than domestically-produced beef, for example; hence, it competes
in the utility or canner-cutter beef market rather than with feed-lot beef.
Figure 6. U.S. Agricultural Imports, Complementary and Supplemen-
tary, 1951-55, 1971-75, 1976
Source: Appendix table 6.
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In 1971-75 meat and meat products combined accounted for about 24
percent and sugar for nearly 25 percent of total supplementary imports
(appendix table 8).
Oilseeds and products constitute the third largest group of supple-
mentary agricultural imports accounting for 7.2 percent of the total in
1971-75.
Vegetables and preparations ranked fourth among U.S. supplemen-
tary imports and comprised 7 percent in 1971-75. A major share of
vegetables are imported in winter and spring months, fresh tomatoes
being the main component. Wines and malt liquors showed the fastest
growth, increasing more than 10 times over between 1951-55 and 1971-
75.
Imports of fruits and preparations increased about fivefold from 1951-
55 to 1971-75. Dairy product imports expanded about six times in the
period under review. Tobacco imports rose a little more than two times
over.
Complementary Imports
Imports of complementary commodities advanced less than 7 percent in
the period 1951-55 to 1971-75.
Major complementary commodities were coffee, crude natural rub-
ber, cocoa beans, bananas, and spices. Coffee is the largest import item
and accounted for about 60 percent of the value of total complementary
imports and over one-fourth of total agricultural imports in 1976.
Crude rubber constitutes the second largest complementary import
item, representing about 11 percent of total imports. Synthetics have
slowed the imports of crude natural rubber as well as carpet wool and raw
silk.
Origin of U.S. Agricultural Imports
U.S. imports of agricultural commodities come from a large number of
countries, with 51 percent supplied by 10 countries. Latin America is by
far the most important source of agricultural imports for the U.S., though
its share of the total has diminished over the years.
Latin America is the chief supplier of coffee, bananas, cocoa beans,
fruits and preparations, sugar, molasses, vegetables and preparations,
and some fibers.
Coffee comes mainly from Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, whereas the
Dominican Republic leads all other countries supplying sugar. Mexico is
the major supplier of both fruits and vegetables and the second largest
supplier of raw cotton, oilseeds, and dutiable cattle. Costa Rica, Hondu-
ras, and Ecuador are the leading suppliers of bananas. On a regional
basis, U.S. imports from Western Europe, Oceania, and the centrally
planned economy countries have shown the greatest growth since the
mid-1950s.
Asia held third place- among geographical regions as a supplier of
U.S. agricultural imports. The main Asian suppliers of imports were the
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka.
Asia is the chief source for U.S. imports of crude rubber, tea, hides and
skins, vegetable oils, nuts and preparations, spices, and black pepper.
Agricultural imports from Africa have shown no major underlying
trend, supplying about 10 percent of U.S. import requirements in 1976.
Complementary products, mainly cocoa beans and cocoa butter, crude
rubber, tea, and spices, accounted for the bulk of U.S. agricultural
imports.
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Oceania has become a growing source of U.S. agricultural imports,
contributing 10 percent to the total in 1971-75. Imports of beef and veal
alone accounted for about 66 percent of total imports from this area in
1971-75.
Agricultural imports from Canada have grown in line with total U.S.
agricultural imports, maintaining the country's share at 5.5 percent over
the period under review. The bulk of the imports from Canada are supple-
mentary products including grains and preparations, cattle and meats,
hides and skins, and oilseeds and products.
Recent years have seen an increase in importance of U.S.-COMECON
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) trade, and in 1976 this area
accounted for around 3 percent of total U.S. agricultural imports. Anifnal
products represent about 90 percent of imported commodities, and to-
bacco accounts for a major portion of the remainder.
Imports and Consumption
Of all food consumed in the U.S. from 1950-76, imports supplied a
relatively stable share of from 9 to 12 percent. In 1976, imports accounted
for 9 percent of total food used. Among temperate crops, imports pro-
vided 43 percent of the sugar, 23 percent of fresh fruit, 10 percent of fats
and oils, and 6 percent of fresh vegetables in 1976. Except for sugar, the
importance of foreign sources for each of these commodities has in-
creased since 1955.
Imports supplied about 57 percent of total U.S. consumption of edible
fishery products in 1976 compared to 37 percent 2 decades earlier. Only
3.7 percent of all livestock products were imported in 1976, but this was
double the 1.4 percent imported in 1955.
Imports accounted for 6 percent of red meat imports, compared to 1.5
Percent in 1955. Beef accounted for 80 percent of these imports. Dairy
Product imports have increased from .3 percent in 1955 to 2 percent of
total supplies in 1976.
Factors Affecting U.S. Agricultural Imports
The growth in U.S. agricultural imports reflects the interaction of a
number of forces including: (1) increases in incomes and demand; (2)
changes in prices of U.S. farm commodities relative to foreign farm
commodities; (3) increased competition from synthetic products; (4)
Special supply situations at home and abroad; and (5) U.S. import
Policies.
Buoyant economic conditions in the United States during the 25-year
Period under review undoubtedly contributed to the marked increase in
imports. Record levels of disposable incomes tended to raise imports of
complementary products and of certain specialty items such as meats,
cheese, and wines. Relatively high domestic prices of cattle, beef, and
dairy products served as a price incentive to foreign countries to divert
larger shipments to the U.S. market.
Cost-price factors also were responsible for attracting foreign fruits
and vegetables into the country. Other factors affecting the volume of
imports are weather-induced supply changes and livestock cycles result-
ing in overproduction or shortages. Relaxation of U.S. import restraints,
duty reductions, and larger import quotas have resulted in substantially
higher inflows of certain commodities. Conversely, tightening of import
restraints has impeded the inflow of meats and dairy products at times.
The United States regulates imports to prevent the inflow of commod-
ities that: (1) might interfere with the operation of domestic farm price
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and income support programs; (2) do not meet domestic health and
sanitation standards; and (3) might carry plant diseases. The importatio 
of commodities that are subject to price support or other programs ad-
ministered by the USDA are regulated under Section 22 of the Agricultur-
al Adjustment Act, as amended.
Under Public Law 88-482, quotas are imposed to regulate imports of
fresh and frozen beef and veal. Should these meat imports exceed 110
percent of the base import quantity, the President may proclaim import
quotas. Many agricultural imports must meet U.S. requirements of
health, sanitation, and quarantine. Import duties are relatively low for
U.S. agricultural imports. By value, 52 percent of U.S. agricultural im-
ports entered duty free in 1976. These commodities are, mostly, comple-
mentary products. Duties on all U.S. agricultural imports averaged 3.3
percent in 1976 compared with about 6 percent in 1960.
Export Expansion and Foreign Economic Growth
Expansion in export markets has become a key element of U.S. farm
policy in the 1970s and will no doubt remain a central feature in the
decade ahead. Unfortunately, from the U.S. farmer's standpoint, the
demand of the world's more prosperous nations for farm products is
becoming quite well-satisfied. The majority of people among their popu-
lations have incomes high enough to adequately meet their food needs.
As their incomes rise still further, they can be expected to spend a smaller
proportion of their additional income on food.
The future expansion of exports of U.S. farm products to high-income
countries may be relatively modest. It will be limited primarily to that
expansion in demand resulting from population growth plus that result-
ing from shifts in consumer demands to' higher-quality foods such as
meats and meat products. Such shifts in consumer habits are predictable
and usually result in growth in imports of feeds and feed grains. On the
other hand, most of the growth in demand for food grains will be in the
low-income countries. In these countries, the income elasticity of de-
mand is still high (.4 or more) and greatly accelerates the growth in total
demand for food when per capita income rises. In general the short-run
effect of income growth in the developing countries is to shift the total
demand upward faster than domestic food production, thereby increas-
ing the demand for food imports. Also, about 90 percent of the world's
population growth is taking place in the developing countries.
A recent USDA study of the changes in agricultural imports associ-
ated with changes in per capita incomes since 1959-61 in about 70
countries shows that for the countries as a group, the growth in imports of
agricultural products has kept pace with their growth in income. Howev-
er, growth in import demand has varied greatly depending on whether
they were high- or low-income countries. It has been slowest in the high-
income countries. Specifically, the study showed that as income per
capita rose 10 percent, agricultural imports:
(a) from all countries rose by about 12 percent in the early 1960s, and
increased by 15.4 percent in 1971-73 in countries with less than $400 per
year per capita income. However, they rose only 5 percent since the early
1960s in those high-income countries with per capita income of more
than $700 per year.
(b) from the United States rose very rapidly in the early 1960s (32.9
percent) and less rapidly (19.3 percent) in 1971-73 in those low-income
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Table 3. Agricultural Imports Per Capita Related to Level of Income
Country
group 1938 1959-61 1964 1971-73
Dollars per capita
High
-income countries
Income 246 700 2,280 2,710
Imports from:
All sources 15.73 48.13 79.49 92.82
United States 1.25 . 5.27 7.88 14.23
_ Low-income countries
Income 50 110 240 352
Imports from:
All sources 1.48 5.08 7.90 13.91
United States 0.12 0.51 1.15 3.14
Import elasticity
High
-income countries
Imports from all sources 0.52 0.55 0.57
Imports from United States 0.98 0.77 0.21
Low-income countries
Imports from all sources 1.15 1.20 1.54
Imports from United States 3.29 2.48 1.93
Source: Mackie, A.B. "World Economic Growth and Demand for U.S. Farm Products." World Economic Condi-
tions in Relation to Agricultural Trade. U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS, WEC-12, Washington, D.C.,
August 1977, p. 31.
countries with less than $400 per year per capita income. Imports by the
high
-income countries during the early 1950s increased by 10 percent,
but they increased by only 2 percent in 1971-73 in countries with per
capita income of more than $700 per year (table 3).
Judging from these figures, per capita agricultural import growth was
more than proportional to per capita income gains in the poorer nations
and less than proportional in the richer nations (table 3). These results are
significant for the American farmer. When income rises in foreign coun-
tries, the people in low-income countries who are not totally satisfied
with their diets are likely to spend a large part of their increased income
on food-more food and better food. This need for more food and fiber
will be translated into market demand and, as we have seen, into in-
creased demand for food imports from all countries in general and the
United States in particular.
Concluding Conunents
The major changes in agricultural trade that have occurred since World
War II may be summarized as follows: the share of agricultural products
in total world trade has declined; the developed countries have increased
their share of the agricultural trade; developing and centrally planned
countries have increased their dependence upon the developed coun-
tries for their agricultural imports. Trade in food and feed products has
increased as the proportion of raw materials has declined. Grains have
become a more important part of world trade, with the developed coun-
tries exporting more and the developing and centrally planned countries
importing more of the total. Trade in feed grains has expanded about
twice as fast as wheat as a result of the rapidly growing demand for meat,
dairy, and poultry products.
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Although the United States now plays a diminishing role in total
trade, it has increased its share of world agricultural trade. It has supplied
a major share of the increased grain trade in the 1970s. Government-
financed exports make up about 6 percent of the U.S. total. japan and
Western Europe are the major buyers of U.S. agricultural exports.
Almost three of every 10 acres in the United States are harvested for
exports. Agricultural exports are equal to about 24 percent of all cash
receipts from farming.
Although U.S. agricultural imports have nearly doubled in value
since World War II, the proportion of agricultural imports among U.S.
imports has declined significantly. The proportion of supplementary or
partially competitive commodities has increased. Latin America is the
largest source of U.S. agricultural imports. In recent years imports have
supplied about 9 percent of total food consumed in this country.
Future growth of U.S. farm exports will depend upon population
growth, shifts to higher-quality foods in the developed countries, and
higher incomes in the developing countries.
Appendix table 1. Regional Share of World Trade in Agricultural and
Forestry Products and Cereals, 5-Year Average, 1956-60 to 1971-75
Importing region
Developed Less developed Centrally planned World
Exporting region Agr. Cereals Agr. Cereals Agr. Cereals Agr. Cereals
Percent
Developed
1956-60 41.7 40.7 9.5 18.3 1.9 2.4 53.1 61.4
1961-65 43.1 38.4 9.3 20:2 2.5 11.6 55.6 70.2
1966-70 45.7 41.4 9.3 22.7 2.5 8.0 57.5 72.1
1971-74 47.9 41.6 11.1 28.4 1.7 11.4 62.4 81.4
United States
1956-60 9.1 18.3 4.3 13.3 0.2 1.3 13.6 32.9
1961-65 9.6 20.4 4.7 16.8 0.3 1.4 14.6 38.6
1966-70 9.3 19.6 4.4 15.8 0.3 1.1 14.0 36.5
1971-75 9.9 19.9 5.0 18.6 1.1 5.5 16.0 44.0
Less developed
1956-60 29.7 10.1 7.2 12.0 1.5 0.8 38.4 22.9
1961-65 24.9 7.8 5.9 9.6 3.6 2.5 34.4 19.9
1966-70 22.6 8.0 5.6 8.2 3.5 1.7 31.7 17.9
1971-75 19.1 4.7 6.0 6.5 3.4 1.4 28.5 12.6
Centrally planned
1956-60 2.4 3.2 0.6 1.9 5.5 10.6 8.5 15.7
1961-65 3.4 2.3 1.3 2.0 5.3 5.6 10.0 9.9
1966-70 4.4 1.8 1.7 3.1 4.7 5.1 10.8 10.0
1971-75 3.9 0.6 1.8 2.0 3.4 3.4 9.1 6.0
World•
1956-60 73.8 54.0 17.3 32.2 8.9 13.8 100.0 100.0
1961-65 71.4 48.5 16.5 31.8 12.1 19.7 100.0 100.0
1966-70 72.7 51.2 16.6 34.9 10.7 14.8 100.0 100.0
1971-75 70.9 46.9 18.9 36.9 10.2 16.2 100.0 100.0
Source: Mackie, A. B. "Patterns of World Agricultural Trade and U.S. Agricultural Exports." Foreign Agricultural
Trade of the United States. U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS. Washington, D. C.: December 1976, pp.
14-17.
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Appendix table 2. Commodity Composition of World Agricultural
Trade, 1950-1976
Commodity 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Billion U.S. Dollars
Food products 8.43 11.83 15.69 21.39 28.08 30.09 35.88 51.23 64.55 69.98 70.34
Animal 1.78 2.60 4.47 6.68 9.18 10.51 13.06 17.63 18.68 20.20 21.87
Foodgrains 2.80* 2.82* 3.30 4.62 4.92 5.20 5.98 11.02 14.94 16.11 13.56
Fruits and nuts 0.80 1.32 1.24 1.73 2.03 2.27 2.64 3.16 3.46 4.16 4.16
Vegetables 0.25 0.43 0.41 0.87 1.10 1.03 1.31 1.74 1.88 2.19 2.75
Sugar and honey 0.49 0.68 1.65 1.99 2.57 2.77 3.49 4.65 9.17 11.27 7.43
Beverages and spices 1.43 2.84 3.19 3.53 5.08 4.64 5.15 6.65 7.74 7.90 12.28
Vegetable oils' 0.45 0.60 0.89 1.37 2.01 2.35 2.47 3.86 6.20 5.36 5.28
Wine and beer 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.60 1.19 1.32 1.79 2.52 2.48 2.79 3.01
Feed products 0.84 1.28 2.31 4.43 5.41 6.03 7.01 12.79 16.32 16.12 18.31
Feeding stuff 0.17 0.39 0.07 0.79 1.11 1.22 1.43 3.06 2.86 2.50 3.52
Feedgrains 1.20 2.34 2.79 3.16 3.71 6.67 9.52 10.20 11.10
Oilseeds2 0.67 0.89 1.04 1.30 1.51 1.65 1.87 3.06 3.94 3.42 3.69
Agricultural raw material 5.98 6.96 7.83 7.32 7.29 7.23 8.24 12.44 15.41 12.96 14.76
Tobacco 0.45 0.72 0.47 1.16 1.28 1.31 1.66 1.82 2.35 2.53 2.77
Rubber 0.04 1.46 1.82 1.28 1.13 0.97 0.90 1.91 2.31 1.66 2.30
Fibers 4.52 3.48 4.69 4.44 4.31 4.29 5.03 7.70 8.60 7.03 8.07
Vegetable oil' 0.15 0.20 0.35 0.44 0.57 0.66 0.65 1.01 2.15 1.74 1.62
Others4 0.51 0.65 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Hides and skins4 0.31 0.45 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Residual 5.34 8.69 8.12 9.66 10.77 11.90 14.44 18.60 21.29 22.94 25.48
Totarabove commodities 15.25 20.07 25.83 33.14 40.78 43.35 51.13 76.46 96.28 99.06 103.41
Percent of total world 74.0 69.8 76.1 77.4 79.1 78.5 78.0 80.4 81.9 81.2 80.2
World agricultural exports 20.60 28.76 33.95 42.80 51.55 55.25 65.57 95.06 117.57 122.00128.89
Percent Composition
Food 40.9 41.1 46.2 50.0 54.5 54.5 54.7 53.9 54.9 57.4 54.6
Feed 4.1 4.5 6.8 10.3 10.5 10.9 10.7 13.4 13.9 13.2 14.2
Raw material 29.0 24.2 23.1 17.1 14.1 13.1 12.6 13.1 13.1 10.6 11.4
Residual 26.0 30.2 23.9 22.6 20.9 21.5 22.0 19.6 18.1 18.8 19.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*Feedgrains included in foodgrains.
'Includes SITC 421, 411.3, and 091.4 and 1/2 of 221.4.
2Includes all of SITC 221 except only 1/2 of SITC 221.4
'Includes SITC 422 only.
Not separately listed since 1960.
Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks, selected annual issues.
Appendix table 3. Origin of Agriculture and Grain Imports by Major
Regions, 5-Year Averages, 1956 to 1971-75
Importing region -
Developed Less developed Centrally planned World
ExPorting region Agr. Grains Agr. Grains Agr. Grains Agr. Grains
Developed
1956-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
United States
1956-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
56.5
60.3
62.9
67.5
12.4
13.4
12.8
13.9
75.4
79.2
80.8
88.7
34.0
42.0
38.3
42.4
47.8
56.5
56.6
58.9
24.6
28.5
26.3
26.3
Percent
57.0
63.6
66.7
76.8
41.3
52.8
46.4
50.3
18.5
26.4
23.4
33.6
2.2
2.8
2.4
10.7
17.3
58.7
54.2
70.6
9.6
7.3
7.3
34.3
48.9
55.6
57.6
62.4
13.6
14.6
13.9
15.9
61.4
70.2
72.1
81.4
33.0
38.6
36.5
44.0
.
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Appendix table 3, continued
Importing region
Developed Less developed Centrally planned World
Exporting region Agr. Grains Agr. Grains Agr. Grains Agr. Grains
Percent
Less developed
1956-60 40.3 18.7 48.0 37.2 16.9 5.8 41.8 22.9
1961-65 34.9 16.0 35.6 30.1 29.6 12.8 34.4 19.9
1966-70 31.1 15.6 33.0 24.3 32.9 11.4 31.6 17.9
1971-75 27.0 10.0 31.7 17.7 32.9 8.5 28.5 12.6
Centrally planned
1956-60 3.2 5.9 4.2 5.8 64.6 76.9 9.3 15.7
1961-65 4.8 4.8 7.9 6.3 44.0 28.5 10.0 9.9
1966-70 6.0 3.6 10.4 9.0 43.7 34.4 10.8 10.0
1971-75 5.5 1.3 9.4 5.5 33.5 20.9 9.1 6.0
World
1956-60 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1961-65 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1966-70 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1971-75 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Mackie, A. B. "Patterns of World Agricultural Trade and U.S. Agricultural Exports." Foreign Agricultural
Trade of the United States. U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS. Washington, D.C.: December 1976, P. 17.
Appendix table 4. Conunodity Composition of U.S. Agricultural Ex-
ports, 1950-1975
Commodity 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975 1976
Million dollars
Food 1,549 2,010 2,819 3,114 6,187 11,107 10,319
Wheat and flour 689 736 1,266 1,172 2,479 5,293 4,041
Rice 120 114 160 297 470 858 629
Other food grains and preps.
N.E.C. 37 51 67 80 153 211 211
Meat and animals 54 95 157 182 340 584 879
Dairy and eggs 111 229 172 143 133 153 150
Lard 84 68 54 31 31 24 36
Fruits, nuts, veg. and prep. 224 358 420 476 723 1,469 1,685
Other food and beverages 92 72 92 162 379 423 378
Food oils and oilseeds' 138 287 431 571 1,479 2,093 2,310
Feed and farm input 366 623 1,100 1,868 4,367 7,852 9,221
Feed grains 275 412 693 1,059 2,353 5,246 5,992
Feeds and fodder 24 63 138 343 838 987 1,361
Soybeans' 46 106 213 382 1,036 1,433 1,658
Seeds and breed animals 21 42 56 84 140 186 210
Raw materials 1,337 1,304 1,448 1,352 2,251 2,925 3,456
Cotton 871 675 737 431 753 1,001 1,057
Tobacco 294 350 392 485 657 877 940
Tallow 58 101 113 145 267 299 377
Hides and skins 27 61 83 132 261 292 518
Ess. oils, starch 15 18 22 41 77 101 - 131
Veg. products 72 99 101 118 236 355 433
'Half of soybeans is recorded as beans and half as oil for food consumption.
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Appendix table 4, continued
Commodity 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975 1976
Million dollars
Total exports 3,252 3,937 5,367 6,334 12,805 21,884 22,996
Percent Composition
Food 48 51 53 49 48 51 45
Feed 11 16 20 30 34 36 40
Raw material 41 33 27 21 18 13 15
Appendix table 5. U. S. Agricultural Exports by Country and Major
Areas and Share of Total,* 1951-1976
Year
World
Latin
America
Per-
Value cent
Western
Europe
Per-
Value cent
1951-55 Ave. 3,314 484 14.6 1,512 45.6
1956-60 Ave. 4,264 526 12.3 1,911 44.8
1961-65 Ave. 5,644 509 9.0 2,208 39.1
1966-70 Ave. 6,537 601 9.1 2,398 36.7
1971-75 Ave. 15,731 1,636 10.3 5,201 33.0
1976 22,996 1,943 8.4 7,882 34.2
*Millions of dollars and percent
Centrally
Asia Africa Oceania Canada planned
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
Value
841
1,121
1,730
2,394
5,411
7,582
cent Value cent Value cent Value cent Value cent
25.4 80 2.4 35 1.1 277 8.4 82 2.5
26.2 126 2.9 42 1.0 371 8.7 162 3.8
30.6 341 6.0 45 0.8 567 10.0 244 4.3
36.6 277 4.2 50 0.8 663 10.1 170 2.6
34.3 694 4.4 90 0.5 1,045 6.6 1,309 8.3
32.9 1,179 5.1 119 0.5 1,493 6.4 2,413 10.4
Source: Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, calendar year 1976 and various issues.
Appendix table 6. Commodity Composition of U.S. Agricultural Im-
ports, 1950-1976
Year
Percent Percent
of supplementary Percent agr. of supplementary
Supple- Comple- Total agr. Per capita imports of total imports of imports of
mentary mentary imports agr. imports agr. imports total imports total agr. exports
Million dollars Dollars
1951-55 Ave. 1,825 2,534 4,360 27 41.9 40.4 55.1
1956-60 Ave. 1,823 2,118 3,941 22 46.3 29.1 42.8
1961-65 Ave. 2,140 1,808 3,948 21 54.2 22.7 37.9
1966-70 Ave. 3,012 1,927 4,939 25 60.9 15.5 46.1
1971-75 Ave. 5,349 2,704 8,053 38 66.4 11.3 34.0
1976 6,287 4,705 10,992 51 57.2 9.1 27.3
Source: Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, calendar year 1976 and various issues
Appendix table 7. U.S. Crop Acreage Harvested, Total and for Export
For export
Food Feed Oil Other Total Acreage
Year grains grainsl crops Cotton crops Total harvested2 diverted3
1950 
Million acres
23 11 4 8 4 50 345
1951 
1952 
31 11 3 10 4 59 344
1953 
18 7 2 5 4 36 349
1954 
14 6 3 6 2 31 348
1955 
16 8 4 5 4 37 346
1956 
18 14 7 3 5 47 340
1957 
29 10 8 9 4 60 324 13.6
1958 
18 11 9 7 3 48 324 27.8
17 12 8 3 4 44 324 27.1
1959 
•25 16 11 7 2 61 324 22.5
1960 26 16 11 8 3 64 324 28.7
1961 31 18 10 5 3 67 302 53.7
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Appendix table 7, continued
For export
Food Feed Oil Other Total Acreage
Year grains grainsl crops Cotton crops Total harvested2 diverted3
Million acres
1962 27 20 13 4 2 66 294 64.7
1963 35 22 12 5 3 77 298 56.1
1964 29 22 16 4 3 74 298 55.5
1965 34 22 15 3 2 76 299 57.4
1966 29 17 15 5 3 69 294 63.3
1967 31 12 16 5 5 69 306 40.7
1968 20 13 15 3 3 54 300 49.3
1969 21 13 20 3 4 61 290 58.0
1970 25 16 23 4 4 72 293 57.0
1971 20 15 21 4 2 62 305 37.1
1972 38 18 27 5 3 91 293 62.6
1973 38 21 27 6 4 96 321 19.1
1974 39 21 28 4 7 99 330 0
1975 40 24 26 4 6 100 336 0
1976 32 23 30 5 6 96 338 o
'Includes feed required to produce livestock products exported.
'Area in 59 principal crops harvested as reported by USDA's Statistical Reporting Service plus acreages in fruits,
tree nuts, and farm gardens.
'Total diverted or set aside under various programs, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, includ-
ing limited acreage devoted to substitute crops.
Source: Mackie, A. B. "World Economic Growth and Demand for U.S. Farm Products." World Economic Condi-
tions in Relation to Agricultural Trade. U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS, WEC-12. Washington, D.C.:
August 1977, p. 27.
Appendix table 8. Selected U.S. Supplementary Agricultural Commod-
ities Imports, 1955-1976
Year
Vege- Oil-
Meat tables Fruits Sugar Wine seeds
and Beef Dairy and and cane and and Total
meat and prod- prepa- prepa- and malt Tobacco prod- supple-
prod. veal Pork ucts rations rations beet liquors unmfd. ucts mentary
Million dollars
1951-55 Ave. 159.8 61.8 84.1 39.5 76.6 42.8 410.9 27.5 83.1 179.0 1,825.4
1956-60 Ave. 265.8 128.2 109.4 45.6 91.1 53.8 483.9 47.2 103.6 152.7 1,823.4
1961-65 Ave. 441.1 277.2 132.3 59.9 122.3 83.1 494.2 76.0 110.7 151.8 2,140.2
1966-70 Ave. 771.5 498.4 226.3 111.9 231.1 127.8 618.5 131.6 132.9 194.1 3,011.8
1971-75 Ave. 1,280.6 865.6 365.0 238.3 374.8 210.9 1,325.9 291.4 183.3 389.6 5,349.4
1976 1,422.8 912.1 460.4 268.7 455.2 278.9 1,148.4 454.2 294.3 521.4 6,287
Source: Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, calendar year 1976 and various issues
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Introduction
International trade problems are, in the nomenclature of agriculture, a
perennial species. So, too, are efforts to deal with them. Those efforts
involve political debate within a nation and diplomatic negotiation
among nations. In this concluding chapter we: (1) sort out the events of
the later 1970s that are giving rise to problems in agricultural trade, and
(2) examine national and international attempts to resolve those prob-
lems.
It is worth reemphasizing that in trade matters the political unit is the
nation, though a number of multinational institutions provide a forum
for discussion, collaboration, and even joint action among nations.
Many issues affecting agricultural trade are not exclusively agricul-
tural. For example, one feature of the "international climate" is the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement that set fixed exchange rates
among currencies. Exchange rates are now on "managed floats," with
nations giving varying degrees of support. A second feature of the inter-
national climate is the worldwide demand for the dollar as a medium of
current exchange for goods and services and for investment, a demand
that creates special problems for the United States. A third influence is
the global redistribution of trade balances and financial reserves owing to
the increase in petroleum prices established by the OPEC cartel, an
increase that led the United States to a sizable trade deficit of almost $30
billion in 1977. By no means are the long-run implications of this devel-
opment fully understood.
Thus, U.S. agricultural trade is caught up in a complex "international
Climate" for trade. The worldwide complexities seem so insoluble that
many nations are individually and increasingly turning toward a policy
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of trade protectionism. In this climate, the United States is left with three
policy choices: to resist the protectionist trend and use all possible
persuasion to induce other nations to continue a policy of trade liberali-
zation; to accept the trend as inevitable and turn to bilateral or multilater-
al trading agreements for basic products including farm commodities; or
to become outright protectionist. Which policy to follow is a major
decision facing the nation.
World Interest in International Trade
International trade takes place for the same reason that commerce occurs
within nations: there is an advantage in trade and someone is able to
exploit it. In addition, national goals spur and shape international agri-
cultural trade. Exports of U.S. agricultural products have been encour-
aged officially because they help pay for petroleum imports and are a way
to improve the prices farmers receive as well.
Other more subtle, even abstract circumstances can have a powerful
impact on why nations do or do not trade. One example is the level of
security a nation feels. When countries feel relatively secure they are
more willing to trade. When they are less secure they are more inclined
toward protectionism or self-sufficiency. This pattern extends to world-
wide attitudes toward food security and affects the willingness of nations
to build international buffer stocks. Another influence is the new politi-
cal assertiveness of poorer nations and their demands that the rich and
powerful nations modify the terms of trade in a manner favorable to them.
It is worth noting that larger farm exports are not a universally-
proclaimed goal even in a nation such as the United States. As in most
economic issues, conflict exists. Export demand often competes with
domestic demand for foodstuffs, thereby raising the price domestic con-
sumers must pay for food. Producers of feed grains want maximum
market outlets, but producers of livestock and poultry seek an ample and
stable supply of feedstuffs at reasonable and stable prices. Farm produc-
ers want high prices, but in order to get a large volume of exports and
thereby minimize need for production control, sales prices must be kept
"competitive." How these conflicts are dealt with helps explain why
trade in agricultural products increases, stabilizes, or declines.
U.S. Interest in International Trade
Through much of its history the United States has had a relatively self-
sufficient economy. A tradition of comparative trade isolationism devel-
oped, and the tendency to be unconcerned about international trade has
carried over into current trade negotiations. Robert Strauss, chief negoti-
ator for the United States at the 1977 GATT sessions in Geneva, noted
soon after he was appointed, "We haven't discussed trade in this country
as they have in France, U.K., Switzerland, Germany, and the other na-
tions of the world. You go over there, you go to Japan, they talk trade, they
talk balance of payments, they talk currency, in the same way we talk
football and baseball."
One reason for this lack of concern is that international trade has
accounted for only a modest part of U.S. production of goods and ser-
vices. The proportion was 7 percent in 1946 and now approaches 10
percent. This contrasts sharply with other nations where a far more
significant proportion of output finds a market in other countries.
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Exports have long been more important for the agricultural sector
than for the rest of the economy. Even after World War II when agricultur-
al exports slumped, the proportion of farm production exported was
above other sectors of the nation. Now, agricultural exports account for
one-fifth of all farm production. For some commodities, the proportion is
over half—wheat and soybeans, for example. For producers of these
commodities, export markets are essential to economic success.
Current and Emerging Trade Issues
Overall, the U.S. trade situation in early 1978 included a rising trade
deficit, a falling exchange rate relative to many nations, and a rising value
of agricultural exports.
General Trade Issues
Changes in international trade conditions can be divided into three
categories: those due to the fluctuating value of the dollar, those due to
"nationalization" of trade in raw materials, and those due to the increas-
ing involvement of national governments. Each has potential influence
on agricultural trade.
Trade and the dollar. Changes in the value of the dollar are important,
directly to holders of other currencies and indirectly to U.S. sellers of
farm products. This is true because only buyers of dollars are directly
affected by changes in its value. For them a drop in the value of the dollar
is like a drop in the price of all U.S. products. The dollars cost less
(measured in marks or yen, for example) and their cost for buying U.S.
goods is also less.
The impact on agricultural exports is indirect: insofar as the dollar
weakens relative to the currency of other countries, it becomes easier to
sell farm products to them. Insofar as the dollar strengthens relative to
other currencies, it becomes more difficult to sell to them.
The U.S. trade deficit has potential consequences extending beyond
the financing problems posed for the United States. Those consequences
arise from the role of the dollar in international exchange. A recent report
of the joint Economic Committee of the Congress noted, "The emergence
of a large, persistent U.S. trade deficit could make foreigners far less
willing than they have been to hold (over $300 billion dollars) and dollar-
denominated assets . . . (and the) . . . Capital flight from one currency to
another could overwhelm the ability of monetary authorities to combat
disorder." The report suggested, "If the United States is to have a large
and persistent trade deficit, it must also have a policy for financing and
gradually reducing the deficit that is credible to U.S. residents and
foreigners alike."
Responses to the changing value of the dollar can be observed in
international agencies, and in the actions of individual nations. The
United States, for example, has at times spent large sums to prevent
further weakening of the dollar. An institutional innovation of this peri-
od has been the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a sort of ersatz interna-
tional currency. It is a composite asset made up of 16 currencies. Closely
associated are the actions of the International Monetary Fund, the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank,
and some other international institutions that act to protect the financial
Position of troubled nations. At times Western nations such as Italy and
the U.K. have incurred difficulties, but more often it has been the poor
countries of the Third World.
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Trade and "international cartelization." A second international
trade issue is the changing relationship between the raw-material-sup-
plying and the industrial, raw-material-consuming nations of the world.
Most obvious is the change in policies imposed by OPEC, the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries. These countries have been able to
cartelize the supply and price of petroleum. In the wake of their success,
other mineral suppliers have tried to impose higher prices for their
products. Their efforts, although unimpressive to date, gain more poten-
tial with the gradual exhaustion of some mineral resources. To date,
though, only OPEC and petroleum pricing have had a big impact.
The impact is in fact dual: higher prices of imported petroleum have
damaged the economies of industrial nations; and the funneling of more
than $100 billion a year to the OPEC nations has redistributed trade
balances and financial reserves worldwide. This is the more so because
OPEC nations spend only a fraction of their income currently. The re-
mainder is invested or left on deposit—often in banking institutions of
Western Europe and the United States.
Most vulnerable to the changed international financial relationships
are the poor countries of the Third World that do not enjoy high earnings
from exports of oil or other minerals. In 1977 the external debt of LDCs
(less developed countries) was estimated at between $140 and $170
billion of which at least $75 billion was owed to private banks, with $40
to $50 billion owed to U.S. banks. The large debt balances for oil imports
pose serious problems of financing for import of other goods, including
food products. Many of these countries face serious food shortages in
coming years if projections of world food conditions are accurate.
Increasing involvement of governments. The economic shocks felt
internationally during the 1970s apparently have encouraged the trend
for individual nations to assume responsibility for the performance of
their economies. As governments fill a larger economic role, the terms of
international trade are affected. In the process trade policy often becomes
subordinate to goals for domestic policy. Making international trade
policy secondary to internal economic policy has few repercussions
when all goes well. But when an economic squeeze comes, central gov-
ernments are tempted to manage their foreign trade so as to minimize
internal problems such as inflation and unemployment. This leads to the
"export of instability" via trade protectionism and other measures.
The fundamental cause of protectionism is not a change in attitudes
toward international trade; more nearly, it is a rising concern for internal
economic situations. In almost any country when economic growth lags,
unemployment increases, and imported products threaten domestic mar-
kets, pressure for protectionism surges. Responses of individual nations
divide in the same three ways noted earlier in this chapter as choices
open to the U.S.: (1) to join in international efforts to keep trade channels
open; (2) to negotiate bilateral or multilateral trade arrangements; or (3) to
engage in internal protectionism.
The best example of the first response as of 1977-78 was the Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations conducted under auspices of GATT at Geneva.
The United States was an active participant. An example of the second
response was the efforts of Third World nations, meeting under the aegis
of UNCTAD, to form a common political front regarding trade. These
nations want concessions from the industrial nations in favor of their
products, and they seek to join in commodity trading agreements. The
third option, that of individual nations turning toward more internal
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protection, is felt everywhere. Even the United States, in spite of its
liberal trade posture, has quietly worked out understandings protective
of some of its industries such as textiles, shoes, and TV sets. It continues
its protection on agricultural products, such as beef, sugar, and dairy
products.
Agricultural Trade Issues
Within the sphere of general trade issues as just described, a more
specific application to agricultural trade can be treated under four topics.
They are: (1) protectionist trends in the United States and abroad; (2)
practices in export market development (including how exports are
synchronized with production); (3) the public willingness to trade with
communist countries on terms comparable to those with other countries;
and (4) the extent of public support for concessionary sales of farm
products. Other issues abound, but for conciseness they are included
under these major ones.
Protectionistic trends at home and abroad. In the United States as
elsewhere, lagging economic activity in the later 1970s has brought new
pressures toward protectionism. A slowdown in the expansion of capital
investment in the United States coupled with losses in the competitive
position of many labor-intensive industries gave other nations the oppor-
tunity to supply a larger share of the U.S. market for numerous prod-
ucts—shoes, textiles, color television sets, steel, and even automobiles.
Larger imports of these items at a time of high unemployment raised
serious objections among the industries affected. These objections pres-
sured the U.S. government into protectionist actions, such as negotiating
voluntary import restrictions on shoes from Korea and Taiwan and on
color television sets from japan.
Protectionistic trends by definition act adversely on exports of U.S.
agricultural products. A number of the nations with which the United
States arranged informal import restrictions are significant purchasers of
U.S. farm products. Taiwan purchased $612 million of U.S. farm prod-
ucts in 1977, and Korea and Japan were even larger buyers, with pur-
chases of $919 million and $3,857 million respectively. Together, the
three countries accounted for 23 percent of U.S. farm exports in 1977.
Trade problems with Asian nations illustrate well the connections
between imports of nonfarm products and exports of farm products.
These connections have become more sensitive to policy decisions in
recent years partly because the composition of farm exports has changed.
In earlier years U.S. food exports to Asia and to a number of other
countries consisted in substantial measure of products that satisfied
basic food requirements such as rice, dry beans, and wheat. The demand
for these products tended to be reasonably firm; countries could not
easily reduce their purchases. Actions by the United States to restrict
imports were less important with this mix of exports because other
countries had little choice but to import or risk domestic turmoil.
The situation has changed. Food grains and the nonfoods, cotton and
tobacco, now account for a smaller part of U.S. agricultural exports. A
growing part-20 percent in 1948, but 60 percent in 1977—consists of
oilseeds (and products), feed grains, and livestock and poultry products.
These types of exports allow buying countries more flexibility. Thus,
U.S. actions to restrict imports of manufactured goods carry more danger
now of reducing export markets for U.S. farm products.
Other kinds of protectionist trends among countries that buy our
Products also are troublesome. One example is the invention and spread-
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ing use of devices other than the traditional tariff. Most obvious and best
known are policies such as the variable import levy the European Com-
munity uses to protect its millions of small farmers. Unfortunately, the
EC is not alone in using such a system. japan also maintains a high
internal price support for wheat and levies a tax on imports to protect that
price.
Almost in the nature of a nontariff barrier, but usually less intention-
ally imposed, are impediments to information bearing on foreign trade.
Nations often refuse to share production information that is needed for
buyers and sellers to be well-informed.
Export market development. Tactics and techniques in export market
development often take on a virtual glamor for exporting organizations.
Their importance will not be minimized here, except in a relative sense.
The financial capacity of nations to buy U.S. products, their internal
supply-demand conditions, and free versus restricted terms of interna-
tional trade remain the foremost influences on the volume of U.S. farm
exports.
Market development begins with the offering of high-quality prod-
ucts. Instances such as the grain inspection question that arose concern-
ing wheat exports at the port of New Orleans in 1975 are detrimental to
market development efforts. The irregularities uncovered at that time
included misgrading, false weighing, and adulteration of grain. Those
revelations led to the enactment of a new Federal Grain Inspection Act.
That act was designed to ensure the quality of U.S. grain being shipped to
other nations and was a major step in the development of future export
markets.
Another helpful step in building up repeat export sales is some degree
of stabilization in U.S. supply. Crop storage programs such as those
provided for in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 improve buying
nations confidence that adequate grain and other products will be availa-
ble in future years. Grain producers generally have taken a skeptical
attitude about storage programs, believing instead that periodic world
scarcities will provide higher prices if no sizeable reserve is on hand. U.S.
livestock and poultry producers, export firms, and foreign buyers com-
monly support the idea of a stabilization reserve.
A third phase of market development is financing. By and large, farm
exports from the United States are privately financed. Two governmental
lending programs of note are the Export-Import Bank and the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC). The CCC program provides short-term credit
to finance export sales of U.S. farm products overseas for periods ranging
from 6 months to a maximum of 3 years. Interest rates vary. In 1978 rates
for 6 and 12 months' repayment were 7 percent with a U.S. bank and 81/4
percent with a foreign bank. For terms longer than 12 months, the rates
were 8 percent and 9 percent.
In the winter of 1977-78, when prices of grains sagged and larger
export outlets were sought, strong pressure was exerted for expansion of
CCC lending. The Corporation, which had previously held its export
loans outstanding to $750 million, announced that it would increase its
lending to $1.7 billion.
A separate issue is export financing by international organizations.
Although the United States contributes substantially to the funding of
those organizations and has a voice in setting the terms of their charters,
they are not directly under the control of U.S. authorities.
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Finally, overseas development of farm markets is a useful example of
private-public cooperation. The U.S. government joins with private asso-
ciations in developing overseas markets for soybeans, peanuts, rice,
wheat, feed grains, and livestock. Partly, the joint effort results because
foreign affairs policy is implicitly involved. But other needs including
those for technical information and financing also explain the joint
action.
Perhaps the greatest success story has been the joint work of the
American Soybean Association and the Foreign Agricultural Service of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which began in 1956. Development
work expanded rapidly after soybean prices skyrocketed in 1972, and by
1977 it was ongoing in 45 countries.
Market development work for wheat, rice, and peanuts has been less
effective in bringing about a steady uptrend in exports. Exports of these
products have been subject to a series of unstabilizing events, and annual
volume continues to fluctuate.
The newest export promotion work began in 1976 with a cooperative
agreement between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and four organi-
zations—the American Meat Institute, the National Cattlemen's Associa-
tion, the National Pork Producers Association, and the Independent Meat
Packers Association—jointly called the U.S. Meat Export Federation.
After the initial organization was established membership expanded
rapidly. Ultimately, as many as 30 meat and livestock organizations may
join. A major thrust initially was to expand meat exports to Japan and
West Germany where high import taxes have prevented consumers from
receiving the benefits of lower-cost meat from the United States.
Increasing trade with Coimnunist countries. In 1977, the United
States exported $1.9 billion of agricultural products to Communist coun-
tries, a massive increase from the $142 million exported in 1970. Pros-
pects for the future depend on several factors, most important of which is
their domestic production.
In the new Five-Year Plan covering 1976-1981, the Soviet govern-
ment lowered projected increases in livestock production to levels more
consistent with its own production of grain. However, prospects for
meeting the projected levels of grain and sunflower seed production are
not bright in view of the weather patterns that prevail over the country.
One estimate by USDA is that imports of between 10 and 15 million tons
of grain a year will be required. This is substantially above the 6 or 8
million tons specified in the long-term Grain Supply Agreement con-
cluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1975.
Future prospects for trade with the rest of the Communist world
depend on a number of factors. If diplomatic conditions continue to
improve between the United States and the People's Republic of China
(PRC), there is a high probability of larger farm exports to that nation.
China has almost one-fourth of the world's consumers; only a small per
capita improvement in diets would require massive amounts of food. But
a number of steps are required including a greater awareness of their food
preferences, eating habits, and marketing facilities. Further, expanded
exports can be realized only if an improvement takes place in overall
trade relations. This includes making it possible for the PRC to sell goods
in this country.
Concessionary exports of farm products. Most U.S. farm trade is
commercial. From the standpoint of certain goals such as improving the
U.S. balance of payments, only commercial trade counts. But concession-
ary farm exports (usually under P. L. 480 programs) can make other
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contributions. They can, for example, help relieve a surplus situation for
a commodity—though justifying concessionary exports solely in these
terms in the past has brought on justifiable criticism.
Concessionary exports serve multiple rather than single purposes.
Wisely chosen and properly administered programs of concessionary
exports can contribute to the nation's foreign policy objectives and aid
the economic development of recipient countries. The language of the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 requires that local developmental
programs, where appropriate, be made a condition for qualifying for U.S.
concessionary exports. Concessionary exports also, in some instances,
can prove developmental with regard to commercial exports. Although
the opportunities for this favorable outcome are fewer now than in the
early years of P. L. 480, the possibility merits mention.
Concessionary exports have been smaller, relatively and absolutely,
in recent years. Grants and donations in the 1970s have been only 1 to 2
percent of total agricultural exports, and total shipments under conces-
sionary terms (including long-term dollar credit) have not been above 5
percent of total exports. For reasons too numerous to spell out here,
concessionary export policy will remain a subject of debate and decision
in export policy—and foreign policy—of the United States.
Concluding Comments
In examining the important issues affecting future agricultural trade, one
quickly comes face-to-face with many related nonagricultural trade is-
sues. These issues are complex—dollar devaluation, international cartel-
ization of commodities, and trade protectionism. When combined with
changes in international financial institutions and world trade rules,
these issues pose prospects of an unseftled world climate for trade.
The lurking danger is that protectionist actions of governments may
have a negative impact on agricultural trade. This is a danger always
inherent in a faltering world economy. Based on historical patterns,
insofar as the United States leans toward protectionism the next step will
be retaliation by other countries against U.S. exports. This sequence of
events would likely reduce world agricultural trade and the U.S. portion
of it; it illustrates the increasing complexity of world trade problems and
the problems facing U.S. agriculture as it becomes more and more im-
mersed in a world market for agricultural products.
While agricultural interests do not have direct control over some
important policies that will affect future export levels, there are areas in
which additional influences can be exerted. The discussions over com-
modity agreements take on added importance as vehicles to raise related
trade issues. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations are key discussions for
agricultural interests. These negotiations previously have concentrated
on opening up foreign markets for nonagricultural products from the
United States. If this round proves to have successfully addressed agri-
cultural trade, it may turn out to be more important to U.S. agriculture
than any of the discussions since World War II.
Agricultural exports now absorb about one-fourth of all U.S. farm
output, giving trade issues high priority in domestic policy discussions.
All programs including price supports, target prices, set-asides, market
development, grain reserves, and even research and educational pro-
grams must take increasing account of international trade considera-
tions. Agricultural interests need to be more aware of trade issues and
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contribute toward arriving at a desirable level and composition of agri-
cultural trade, as well as a harmony between foreign trade and domestic
agricultural policies.
It is always possible, of course, that world food shortages may occur
again. Even without such shortages, world agricultural trade will con-
tinue to grow. Prudent policy calls for the capacity to respond to such
growth, including the appearance of new market potentials. To meet
such potentials the nation's economic, educational, technological, and
political systems must emphasize export markets. U.S. growth and devel-
opment in the twenty-first century may depend on it.
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GLOSSARY
Absolute advantage When one coun-
try is more efficient in the produc-
lion of a certain good than is another
country. Accordingly, a country ex-
ports what it can produce more
cheaply and imports what others
can produce more cheaply.
Ad valorem tariff Duties calculated
on the value of goods; e.g., 15 per-
cent of the value (15 percent ad
valorem).
Antidumping measures (Also see
dumping.) According to the U.S.
Antidumping Act of 1921, if a for-
eign exporter sells to the U.S. at
prices "less than the fair value,"
thereby injuring American industry,
import quotas and special restric-
tions (antidumping measures) can
be levied on the goods concerned.
These duties make up the difference
between the exporter's price and the
foreign market value. An interna-
tional antidumping code was nego-
tiated during the "Kennedy Round"
of GATT.
Balance of payments Relationship be-
tween receipts from foreign coun-
tries on one side and payments to
them on the other including all
transactions, private and govern-
mental. The difference between the
two totals represents the balance of
payments. On the plus side are ex-
port sales; money spent by foreign
tourists; payments to the U.S. for in-
surance, transportation, and similar
services; payments of dividends and
interest on investments abroad; re-
turns of capital invested abroad;
new foreign investments in the U.S.;
and foreign government payments
to the U.S. On the minus side are
cost of goods imported, spending by
tourists overseas, new overseas in-
vestments, and the cost of foreign
military and economic aid.
Balance of payments deficit When in-
ternational payments are greater
than receipts.
Balance of trade The relationship
between imports and exports.
A country's balance of trade is only
one aspect of its balance of pay-
ments.
"Beggar-thy-neighbor" policy A pol-
icy of competitive depreciation.
During the 1930's many countries
depreciated their currencies beyond
the equilibrium rate of exchange in
an attempt to stimulate exports,
thereby creating a surplus in their
balance of payments. Since this poli-
cy required a deficit disequilibrium
in the balance of payments of other
countries also faced with depres-
sion, it amounted to exporting un-
employment.
Bilateral Two-party or two-country,
such as a bilateral trade agreement
between the U.S. and one other
country.
Buffer stocks Supplies of a product
which could be set aside and used to
moderate extreme price fluctuations
by assuring a more stable supply.
Cartel A formal arrangement em-
bodying written or explicit verbal
agreements among producers to reg-
ulate price or output or to divide
markets geographically. The most
recent and most successful example
is OPEC.
Commodity An article of trade or
commerce that can be transported,
especially an agricultural or mining
product.
Commodity terms of trade A ratio
consisting of the price of one prod-
uct expressed in terms of another.
Comparative advantage Refers to the
theory that it is best for a country to
devote its energies not to all lines of
production in which it may have su-
periority but to those in which its
superiority is greatest. The theory
requires the opportunity for goods to
be traded between countries.
Complementary goods Goods that
"go togethei." Whenever the price
of one good and the demand for
another are inversely related, they
are complementary. For example, if
the price of gasoline falls you drive
your car more, which increases your
demand for motor oil; thus, gasoline
and motor oil are complementary
goods.
Complementary imports Commodi-
ties imported that are not competi-
tive with U.S.-produced commodi-
ties. Examples are coffee, tea,
bananas, and natural rubber.
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Concessional sales When the buyer is
allowed payment terms more favor-
able than those obtainable on the
open market. Under Public Law 480
the concession may be the type of
currency accepted as payment, the
length of credit and grace period, or
the interest rate charged.
Currency exchange rate Number of
units of one currency that can be ex-
changed for one unit of another cur-
rency at a given time.
Deficiency payments A method of
government support of farm in-
comes. Usually reflect the difference
between actual domestic market
price levels for a commodity and a
higher fixed or guaranteed price.
Agricultural price support for the
principal commodities in the U.K.,
for example, is based primarily on
deficiency payments.
Deflation A reduction in the general
price level, brought on by a decrease
in the amount of money in circula-
tion or by a decrease in the total vol-
ume of spending.
Demand conditions Factors that in-
fluence the demand for a product
including taste and preferences of
consumers, income of consumers,
prices of related goods, and consum-
er expectations in respect to future
prices and income.
Dumping Selling in a foreign market
at a price below that received for the
same product in the home market.
Duty Special tax applied to imported
goods, based on tariff rates and
schedules.
EC (European Community) Esta-
blished by the Treaty of Rome in
1957 and originally called the EEC
(European Economic Community),
it was an attempt by six countries—
France, West Germany, Italy, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg—to unify and integrate their
economies by establishing a cus-
toms union, common economic
policies, and common agricultural
policies. The U.K., Ireland, and Den-
mark became members in 1973. Pop-
ularly called the European Common
Market.
Elastic and inelastic demand How re-
sponsive consumers are to price
changes in a product. The demand
for some products more than others
is affected by price changes. If price
changes result in a great change in
demand, the demand is elastic; if
price changes result in modest
changes in demand, the demand is
inelastic.
Elastic and inelastic supply If pro-
ducers are responsive to price
changes, supply is elastic; if produc-
ers are relatively insensitive to price
changes, the supply is inelastic.
Exchange controls Direct govern-
ment control of the demand and sup-
ply of foreign exchange to regulate
balance of payments movements
and maintain existing exchange
rates. By reducing the demand for or
increasing the supply of foreign cur-
rency, a country can maintain a
given exchange rate.
Exports Products shipped to foreign
countries.
Export subsidies Special incentives
extended by governments in the
form of outright cash disburse-
ments, tax exemptions, preferential
exchange rates, special contracts,
etc. to encourage increased foreign
sales.
Foreign exchange Involves convert-
ing money of one country into that of
another and the transfer of money
values from one country to another.
Free trade Exchange of goods with no
trade barriers or restrictions such as
tariffs or import quotas.
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade) Multilateral -agreement
originally negotiated at Geneva in
1947 among 23 countries (including
the U.S.) for the substantial reduc-
tion of tariffs and other trade
barriers. Provides a forum for inter-
governmental tariff negotiations.
Gold standard Values of national cur-
rencies defined in terms of gold. A
modified form of this system was in
effect until 1971, when the U.S. sus-
pended the dollar's convertibility
into gold.
Green rates Calculations of European
Community agricultural prices and
values made in units of accounts are
converted into a special set of ad-
ministratively determined exchange
rates referred to as green rates.
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Gross national product Total market
value of all final goods and services
produced by a nation's economy be-
fore deducting depreciation charges
and other allowances for consump-
tion of durable capital goods.
IBRD (International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, or
World Bank) Makes or guarantees
loans for development of economic
facilities in developing countries
with funds borrowed in private capi-
tal markets. Loans are made, for ex-
ample, for development of electric
power, transportation, agriculture,
and irrigation. Headquartered in
Washington, D.C., IBRD's activities
are meshed closely with those of the
International Development Associa-
tion.
IMF (International Monetary Fund, or
the Fund) An international regula-
tory institution formed to: (1) pro-
mote international monetary coop-
eration by providing machinery for
consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems;
(2) facilitate growth of international
trade; (3) promote exchange stabili-
ty; (4) assist in the establishment of a
multilateral system of payments for
current transactions between mem-
bers; and (5) give confidence to
members by making the Fund's re-
sources available to them under ade-
quate safeguards.
Import quota Government measure
which limits total volume or total
value of particular goods imported
into a country during a specified pe-
riod. Frequently, import quotas are
implemented by "import licenses"
issued by a government to individu-
al importers to permit them to im-
port a specified quantity or value of a
restricted product.
Imports Products brought into a
country from abroad.
Infant industry argument The doc-
trine that tariff duties are needed for
the protection of new industries. It is
argued that a country in the agricul-
tural stage of development, about to
advance into the manufacturing
stage, will meet difficulties during
the transition period because of the
Competition of established industri-
alized nations.
Inflation An abnormal increase in
available currency and credit be-
yond the proportion of available
goods, resulting in a sharp and con-
tinuing rise in price levels.
Less developed countries (LDCs)
Also referred to as "developing
countries." These, generally, are
countries in which the gross na-
tional product is below $500 to
$600 per capita.
Liberal trade Refers broadly to trade
that is relatively free of controls or
restrictions, in contrast to "re-
stricted trade." "Liberalism" in
trade also can be contrasted with
"protectionism."
Manufactures Goods processed from
a raw state through the use of manu-
al labor or machinery.
Mercantilism The theory and system
of political economy prevailing in
Europe after the decline of feudal-
ism (approximately 1500 to 1750),
based on national policies of accu-
mulating bullion, establishing colo-
nies and a merchant marine, and
developing industry and mining to
attain a favorable balance of trade.
Most-favored-nation Refers to agree-
ments between countries to extend
the same trading privileges to each
other (including tariff concessions)
that they extend to any other
country.
Multilateral Refers to many coun-
tries, as opposed to two countries
(bilateral). GATT is an example of a
multilateral agreement.
Multiple exchange rates May be used
by a government to control foreign
exchange by limiting the import of
certain types of goods. With such a
system, the country sets varying
rates of exchange between its own
currency and foreign currencies de-
pending on classes of imports.
Nonrecourse loan A price-support
mechanism of the U.S. Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) whereby
farmers put up their crops as collat-
eral for a loan. If the market price is
below the government loan rate at
maturity of the loan, farmers may
choose to pay back the loan with
their crops, thereby transferring
ownership to the government.
North-south dialogue Informal nego-
tiations between the industrialized
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countries of the world, generally lo-
cated in the northern hemisphere,
and the developing countries gener-
ally located in the southern hemi-
sphere.
Oligopolistic market When a rela-
tively small number of sellers domi-
nate the market for a good or
service.
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) International
organization formed to control the
export price of petroleum. Member-
ship in 1977: Algeria, Ecuador,
Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela.
Overvalued currency When a coun-
try holds its exchange rate at too
high a level, so that its costs are not
competitive and it chronically runs
a balance of payments deficit.
Perfect competition Assumes the
presence of a large number of inde-
pendent buyers and sellers in the
market with no individual firm ex-
erting significant control over price.
Preferential trade Often used inter--
changeably with "tariff prefer-
ences." Refers to favorable tariff
treatment accorded by one country
or group of countries to all exports of
certain other countries.
Price index Estimates overall changes
in the price level; a percentage com-
parison that tells how much prices
have increased or decreased relative
to what they were in the base year.
Price ratio One price divided by an-
other.
Primary commodities Usually com-
modities in the raw or unprocessed
state. For example, iron ore is a pri-
mary commodity, pig iron is a semi-
processed product, and a steel girder
is a manufacture or manufactured
item.
Protectionism Usually a reaction by
an industry or country to increasing
foreign competition. The most com-
mon type of protectionism is the
protective tariff designed to shield
domestic producers.
Reciprocal trade agreements In
American practice these are agree-
ments concluded with one or more
foreign countries under which U.S.
tariffs or other trade barriers are re-
duced in return for reductions of for-
eign barriers against American
goods.
Retaliation Action taken by one coun-
try against another because of the
imposition of tariffs or other trade
barriers. Retaliation can take a num-
ber of forms: imposition of higher
tariffs, import restrictions, or with
of trade concessions previ-
ously agreed-upon. According to
GATT, restrictive action by one
country legally entitles the ag-
grieved party to compensatory
action.
Specific tariff A duty levied on im-
ports on the basis of some physical
unit; e.g., 20 cents per pound or per
gallon.
Stability and instability Refer to price
fluctuations arising basically from
shifts in supply due to weather vari-
ability and shifts in demand due to
variations in the business cycle,
population, and income.
Supplementary imports Similar to
commodities produced in the im-
porting nation. Also referred to as
"competitive" imports. Examples in
the U.S. are beef, wheat, and cotton.
Tariff Schedule, system, or scheme of
duties imposed by a government on
goods imported (usually) or ex-
ported. Tariffs may be protective
(designed to protect domestic pro-
duction against the economic effects
of imported goods) as contrasted
with revenue-raising (established to
bring revenue to the government).
Terms of trade The relationship over
time between level of export and im-
port prices of a country or region. If
export prices received are higher
than import prices, the terms of
trade are said to be "favorable."
When the reverse is true, the terms of
trade are "unfavorable."
Third World countries Term applied
to the non-Communist developing
countries as a whole. The other two
"worlds" presumably include the
industrialized countries of the West
or "free world," and the Communist
countries or "centrally planned eco-
nomies."
Undervalued currency When a coun-
try holds its exchange rate too low
and runs a chronic balance of pay-
ments surplus.
Rural
Title'
a
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